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                                               Abstract  
Ronak Olfati 
The Impact of Oil Revenue on the Iranian Economy  
Keywords: economic growth, natural resources, oil income, autoregressive 
distributed lag, vector error correction modelsThis study aims to identify the effects 
of oil income on economic growth in Iran over the period 1955-2014. The empirical 
literature indicates that countries with natural resources are growing more slowly 
than their counterparts. However, the results from this literature are far from 
conclusive, particularly in regard to the role played by oil-rich countries. Needless to 
say, this role depends on other factors as well, including the political situation in the 
country, the quality of institutions, and the efficacy of the financial system. Some 
empirical research has found that natural resources, particularly oil, can have a 
positive impact on the output of a country. although natural resources are not a factor 
of production in growth theories, studies have used different growth frameworks in 
order to discover whether having natural resources is a blessing or a curse.  
In line with recent studies, this work uses an augmented neoclassical growth model 
to develop a theoretical framework where oil enters the long-term output of the 
country through saving and investment. Overall, the results suggests that oil income 
has a positive impact on the level of output per capita in Iran. The findings of the 
econometric results are in line with the historical analysis of the study. Since different 
methods and proxies were used, a total of eight models were estimated. 
Interestingly, when PRIVY is used as an index of financial development, the result 
of the study changes and oil no longer has a significant impact on the economy. 
However, this can be translated to an inefficient allocation of credit to the private 
sector.  
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                 Chapter One  
                                             INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background of the Study  
                                                                 
Measures of gross domestic product are still the key means of comparing living 
standards across countries. Although each country has its own unique way of 
achieving a balanced growth path, understanding the general process through 
which a country can grow over time is of enormous practical importance. For 
decades, the debate on economic growth has been important, as governments all 
around the world, in both developed and developing countries, have had to deal with 
the socio-economic costs of low economic growth. Throughout the history of 
economic studies, economic growth has always been at the centre of attention since 
it is a good indicator of how a country is performing in relation to previous years and 
compared to other countries. A number of factors affect economic growth, including 
physical capital, human capital, institutional quality, financial development, climate, 
the political situation and natural resources. However, these are not all the factors 
that can impact on the economic growth and performance of a country. 
Among the aforementioned factors, natural resources are particularly interesting: 
until the 1930s, natural resources were seen as the engine of economic growth for 
industrial countries. The study of the association between natural resources and 
economic growth goes back to the early economists such as Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. Their belief was that natural resources were a blessing for countries, so 
that their development could be based on natural resources endowments. Therefore, 
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in the 19th century, many neo-liberal economic scholars believed that possessing 
natural resources was a privilege for a country. It could be said that some of today’s 
industrial and developed countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia 
and the United Kingdom, used their natural resources to transform themselves from 
developing to developed countries. However, in the twentieth century this role has 
changed and natural resources are considered a curse.  
It is important to mention that resource curse studies concentrate mainly on the 
short-term and negative impact of natural resources on economic growth. The 
resource curse hypothesis was the outcome of resource-poor countries being 
outperformed by their counterparts. It is worth mentioning that some studies in the 
twenty-first century have come to the different conclusion that natural resources can 
have a positive impact on the economic growth of resource-rich countries. These 
more recent studies focus on the long-term role of resource endowments.   
Because of the ambiguity of outcomes, diversified results and contradiction of the 
conventional wisdom, the resource curse came sharply into the research focus, 
attracting a vast amount of scientific attention. Although the relationship between 
natural resource abundance and economic growth has been widely studied in the 
literature, there are different views on this issue. In terms of growth theories, it was 
concluded that the standard growth theory is not automatically applicable in 
explaining growth in resource-abundant countries. Solow (1994) states that all the 
theoretical frameworks of growth are based on assumptions that are valid for mature 
industrial economies. Although natural resource endowments do not play any role in 
the existing growth theories, the role of natural resources in the economy has been 
studied through some growth theories. 
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A significant literature developed on the negative relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth in the twentieth century. Auty (1993) coined the 
phrase “resource curse” and this so-called “resource curse” continues to receive a 
lot of attention from researchers. An econometric study testing this hypothesis was 
initiated by Sachs and Warner (1995a). They confirmed the existence of the resource 
curse by studying a large cross section of countries. The literature has grown 
considerably over time. Economists and political scientists have recognized various 
causal channels through which the resource curse might happen. Broadly speaking, 
these channels can be divided into political and economic ones. Among the 
economic channels, the Dutch Disease and volatility are the most common ones, 
while political economic channels comprise corruption, a lack of democracy, civil 
war, rent-seeking activities and poor-quality institutions. 
In 1977, The Economist coined the phrase “Dutch disease” to explain that the 
discovery of large gas reserves in the Netherlands in the 1960s led to a significant 
decline in the competiveness of its other, non-booming tradable sectors. With the 
Dutch Disease in the Netherlands, the belief in the negative association between 
resource abundance and economic growth grew stronger and new literature 
emerged (Gregory 1976; Snape 1977; Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984; Neary 
and Van Wijnbergen 1986). Sachs and Warner were motivated by the above-
mentioned studies and launched a series of cross-sectional studies that confirmed 
an inverse association between natural resources and economic growth (Sachs and 
Warner 1995a; Sachs and Warner 1997; Sachs and Warner 2001). 
Van Der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) reject the resource curse hypothesis based on 
cross-country evidence. They demonstrate that it is the volatility of the prices of 
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natural resources that causes the so-called “resource curse”. Here in this research 
we are looking at oil as a particular natural resource and one important feature of 
the oil market is volatility, which turns out to play a significant role in the resource 
curse hypothesis. Oil prices by nature are very volatile; therefore, the income from 
them fluctuates. Thus, for a country where resource rents are the main source of 
income, dealing with fluctuations in this income is a challenge. Nonetheless, 
appropriate policies from government can act as shock absorbers, negating the 
adverse impact of volatility (see (Hausmann and Rigobon 2003; Van Der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke 2009).  
Moving further along the spectrum from economic science to political science, there 
are political explanations for the resource curse, such as rent-seeking activities, 
corruption, civil war and voracity. Many scholars, such as Gylfason (2001), Hodler 
(2006), (see(Lane and Tornell 1996; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Torvik 2002; Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004; Robinson et al. 2006), indicate that in some states the money 
from resources gives more power to elites, who can widen the inequality in the 
country. In addition, in political economy there is a growing literature about the role 
that institutions can play in utilizing the income from resources (Mehlum et al. 
2006a).  
  Both the approach and the results of resource curse research have been criticized 
on a number of grounds. Brunnschweiler (2008) points out that the measure that 
Sachs and Warner used in their research indicates resource dependence rather 
than resource abundance. Brunnschweiler (2008) says that if resource abundance 
is used instead of resource dependence, natural resources have a positive impact 
on growth. In line with Brunnschweiler results some studies, such as Esfahani et 
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al. (2013), Cavalcanti et al. (2011a) and Alexeev and Conrad (2009), demonstrated 
that their findings are in contrast to the literature on the resource curse and the 
Dutch Disease.   
In general, the literature on the resource curse hypothesis can be divided into three 
categories. The first group, following Sachs and Warner, confirms the negative 
association between natural resource endowments and economic performance. 
The second group explains the resource curse through political economy. The third 
group, in contrast to the resource curse hypothesis, indicates that there is a positive 
link between natural resources and economic growth. It should be mentioned that 
in this thesis, by natural resources we mean oil endowments, and by economic 
growth we mean the level of output per capita. These terms are used 
interchangeably in this research. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
This study aims to identify the effect of oil export revenue on economic growth in Iran 
during the period 1955-2014. Oil export income in Iran comprised over 80 per cent 
of the government budget in the last four decades so it became necessary to 
investigate its effects on the economy. However, in order to use oil income 
appropriately, other factors such as financial development and political economy are 
important. Therefore, this study uses different proxies to take into account the role 
that the financial system plays in the economic growth of Iran. In terms of political 
factors, the author believes that these are apparent in the level of equilibrium of 
capital stock and affect the steady-state growth of the country.  
6 
 
As indicated earlier, most of the empirical studies on natural resources and growth 
have looked at the revenue from resources as a temporary income. There is a 
scarcity of research on the long-term impact of natural resources on economic 
growth. The literature indicates that the effects of natural resources on growth have 
changed over time: something that was a privilege in the 1960s turned out to be a 
curse in the 1970s. However, it is worth mentioning that the so-called “resource 
curse” has been criticized and has given rise to a number of studies that found a 
positive association between natural resources and economic growth. In terms of 
econometric approach, the majority of studies looking at natural resources and 
growth apply a cross-sectional method, which does not take into account social, 
political or even economic differences in countries. Therefore, it seems more 
appropriate to analyse the impact of natural resources, particularly oil, on an “energy 
superpower” country in the long-term. Based on the discussion above, this study 
aims to achieve the following objectives.  
1.3             Objectives of the Study 
 
1.3.1           Main Objective  
To identify the effects of oil revenue on the output per capita in Iran over the course 
of the period 1955-2014, and to determine whether oil revenue has affected growth 
in Iran positively or not. 
 
 
 
7 
 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives   
 
i) To ascertain whether oil income has been a blessing in contrast to the 
resource curse hypothesis.  
ii) To determine whether oil revenue enters the long-term output of the 
country with a positive coefficient.  
iii) To investigate whether the financial system contributes to the economic 
growth of Iran. 
iv) To specify how the interaction between financial development and oil 
revenue affects the economy.  
1.4            Research Questions  
 
The theoretical and empirical studies on this topic have remained very much a work 
in progress. Consequently, a number of central questions remain to be answered in 
the natural resource abundance and growth linkage literature, including: What 
impact does natural resource income have on long-run and short-run economic 
growth? Under what conditions can revenue from natural resources enter the long-
term output of a country? Is there any potential role for natural resources in growth 
theories? How can financial development impact on economic growth in a 
developing resource-rich country? How can the government negate the adverse 
impacts of volatile oil income? Accordingly, this research aims to re-examine the 
various aspects of the association between natural resource abundance and 
economic growth and to answer the aforementioned questions.  
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1.5            Methodological Framework 
In order to investigate more accurately the effects of petrodollars on economic 
growth, it is necessary to have a theory to decide on the variables of the study. 
However, the traditional models of growth mainly focus on two key factors as drivers 
of growth: technology and capital accumulation. Therefore, the potential role of 
natural resource endowments, particularly oil, is ignored in the growth literature. In 
addition, the literature deals with the economic growth of countries rich in resources 
from a different perspective, looking only at temporary discovery of resources. Most 
of the empirical work in the literature tends to follow Sachs and Warner (1995a) 
cross-sectional specification, which shows a negative relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth.  
This study takes a different approach by using an augmented neoclassical model 
where the income from oil enters the long-term output equation. In essence, in a 
country like Iran, where oil has been produced for over a century, petrodollars enter 
the saving equation of the economy. A fraction of saving is used as financial 
intermediation and the rest is invested. Therefore, oil revenues enter the capital 
accumulation process. In other words, the capital accumulation function consists of 
two parts: one part is investment from non-oil output and the other is investment from 
oil output. Following this theoretical framework, the data will be tested using 
econometric approaches. The data sources for all variables in the study are as 
follows: 
The output per capita is from version 9 of the Penn World tables. The study also 
checks the data on output on the World Bank website. Data related to oil (prices, 
production and revenue) are all from the OPEC website. Data on volatility have been 
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calculated by the author based on the oil prices from OPEC. All other data are from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (electronic format). It is worth 
mentioning that two important events –revolution and war – happened in the course 
of the study and these are considered a dummy variable. 
In regard to data analysis, an econometric technique will be employed, which 
corresponds to regression analysis, particularly co-integration models. Two different 
models will be estimated for testing the hypothesis of the study: first, we estimate 
ARDL models using output per capita as the dependent variable, and our 
independent variables are oil income, financial development (four different proxies) 
and a dummy variable that takes into account the political crises of Iran, war and 
revolution. The results indicate that oil income had a positive impact on the output 
per capita of Iran during the period 1955-2014.  
It is worth mentioning that the rise in the real exchange rate was accompanied by a 
rise in real output, which does not support the Dutch Disease hypothesis and 
resource curse. While the growth literature expects positive impact on economic 
growth the proxies of financial development in Iran, interestingly, does not comply. 
However, this is not surprising given the isolation of the financial system in Iran and 
its inefficiency. The political crises in the country also had a negative and significant 
impact in all models.  
Following that, we estimated another co-integration model using the VECM 
approach. This time we added the interaction between financial development and oil 
revenue and also volatility as a weakly exogenous variable. The results of ARDL and 
VECM estimations were in line and indicated that oil income impacts on the output 
10 
 
per capita of Iran positively in the long run. Financial proxies similar to the ARDL 
results did not show any positive impact on the level of output per capita; moreover, 
the interaction between the financial system and oil revenue has a negative impact 
on the economy. The political crises that were taken into account through a dummy 
variable have a significant negative impact on the economic growth of the economy.  
1.6              Problems and Limitations  
The main challenge that this thesis faces is dealing with data due to the lack of 
availability of reliable data in the course of the study. In fact, one problem is the 
unreliability of data, since the Iranian government sometimes resists releasing 
economic data. For instance, the Central Bank of Iran reveals a lower rate of inflation 
than the real rate just to pretend the economy is doing well. The official exchange 
rate is different from the exchange rate that is used in the free market, and the rate 
in the free market is largely used in the Iranian economy. In other words, the free 
market has been the dominant source of currency exchange. However, it is almost 
impossible to obtain reliable data on the exchange rate in the free market. Another 
problem is that during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, data on the main economic 
indicators became confidential. Therefore, for the years from 2000 to 2008 a lot of 
data are missing.  
Furthermore, the quality of data is not optimal for most developing countries like Iran, 
which could lead to an unreliable outcome from an econometric modelling point of 
view.  As a result, the study’s outcomes should be treated with caution. Lastly, we 
hope the aforementioned challenges are not sufficiently serious to invalidate the 
researcher’s work.  
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1.7              Main Results  
The co-integration results demonstrated that there is a long-term relationship 
amongst the variables of the research. The study finds a positive effect of 
petrodollars on the level of output per capita in Iran. In other words, the econometric 
results are in line with the theory and historical data, which indicate that oil income 
enters the long-term output equation of Iran. These results are in contrast to the so-
called “resource curse” and “Dutch Disease”, where the incomes from resources are 
considered temporary. The impact of the financial system on output was not positive, 
which is in contrast to the growth literature. This illustrates the underdevelopment of 
the Iranian financial system. In addition, the outcome indicates that the interaction 
between oil income and financial development influences the output per capita 
negatively. The results of the study are in line with the work of Esfahani et al. (2013) 
and Mohaddes and Pesaran (2013). 
1.8 Structure and Overview of the Thesis  
This research is structured in three parts. The first part, which includes Chapters 
Two and Three, concentrates on analysing and reviewing the existing literature both 
on growth theories and the resource curse hypothesis. The background part (second 
part) of the thesis is presented in Chapter Four, which deals with the economic 
performance of Iran historically, focusing on oil. It studies the economic performance 
of the country in different sub-periods: I) oil discovery and oil production in 
commercial quantities; II) the Islamic revolution and subsequent eight-year war with 
Iraq; and III) changes in the economic system after the revolution. Chapters Five and 
Six, which comprise part three, introduce the theoretical framework and the 
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methodology that is employed to estimate econometric models and test the theory 
empirically. Additionally, this part offers new insights into the theoretical model by 
suggesting that some of the income from oil will be invested in the economy. 
Furthermore, the econometric models take into account the roles that volatility and 
the financial system can play in the economy. There are some concluding remarks 
and policy recommendations in the last chapter.  
More specifically, Chapter Two reviews the literature on economic growth, taking a 
historical perspective. This chapter is concerned with theoretical models of growth. 
At the beginning, the Harrod-Domar growth framework is presented. This is followed 
by neoclassical frameworks, in particular the Solow growth model (Stochastic Solow 
and Augmented Solow), and then endogenous frameworks. This chapter 
summarizes different growth theories. Although the potential role of natural 
resources in the process of growth is ignored, the objective of the chapter is to review 
all the aforementioned growth theories critically in order to choose a theory that 
meets the aim of this study. The purpose is to assess which theory fits our goal to 
investigate the impact of oil revenue on the Iranian economy.  
Following that, Chapter Three explores the link between economic growth and the 
resource curse hypothesis. Based on the existing literature, it provides an overview 
of the role that natural resources have played in the economic growth of resource-
rich countries. The role that natural resources play in the economy is studied through 
two different channels: economic channels and political channels. This chapter also 
surveys a large body of literature that has employed different econometric 
approaches, such as that of Sachs and Warner and their followers, and researchers 
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who have also used the Augmented Solow models applying VAR, VECM or panel 
methods.  
Chapter Four provides a descriptive analysis of the Iranian economic history 
focusing on oil during the period 1955-2014. This chapter also investigates the 
process of oil industry development in Iran. It starts from the time when oil was 
discovered and produced in commercial quantities until 2014. The chapter discusses 
different phases that the country has faced both before and after the Islamic 
revolution, the eight-year war with Iraq and severe economic sanctions due to the 
nuclear plan of the country. In addition, Iran’s development plans will be discussed 
since the economic targets of the country are usually met through these 
development plans. This assessment gives a historical overview on how the 
economy has developed over time. Moreover, it shows the role that oil has played 
historically in the Iranian economy from its discovery until 2014.  
Chapter Five is devoted to addressing the selection of the theoretical framework. 
This chapter introduces a theoretical framework based on the neoclassical growth 
model, where the impact of oil revenue on economic growth and development occurs 
in the context of the production function of Cobb-Douglas and time series analysis. 
The theoretical framework indicates that since oil has been produced for a long time 
in Iran, it can enter the production function. According to this theory, some 
petrodollars are saved, and apart from a specific proportion of this saving, the rest 
is invested. Thus, oil income enters the capital accumulation function through 
investment. In addition, Chapter Five has an introductory section explaining the 
nature of the data and time series. The data used for this study are output per capita, 
oil revenue, four different proxies for financial development (depth, credit, PRIVY 
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and a new index using principal component analysis), volatility, the interaction 
between oil revenue and financial development and a dummy variable. The data set, 
data definition and preliminary test for econometric analysis are presented in this 
chapter as well.  
The econometric work in this study is set out in Chapter Six. This chapter justifies 
the econometric approach of the study and estimates econometric models. The 
chapter proceeds with an empirical investigation of the role of oil income in the 
Iranian economy. It examines the long-term and short-term impacts of oil revenue 
on the Iranian economic growth over the period 1955-2014 applying co-integration 
models. The results are in contrast to the resource curse theory, which only takes 
into account the short-term impact of natural resources. Two different econometric 
approaches are applied in this chapter. 
The first approach is the ARDL method to show the effect of oil income on output 
per capita. Four different models have been estimated and three of them confirm the 
positive effect of oil on the level of output per capita in Iran. The only model that does 
not confirm the positive impact of oil is the model where PRIVY is a proxy for financial 
development. This can be translated into the inefficient credit provided for the private 
sector in Iran. 
Then VECM approach is used in order to estimate the association between the 
variables of the study. In the VECM models, volatility is added as a weakly 
exogenous variable. Moreover, through an interaction term, the impact of oil revenue 
and financial development is studied. Similar to the ARDL models, four proxies are 
used for financial development. The results are in line with the outcomes of ARDL 
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models, confirming the positive impact of oil on output per capita apart from in the 
model where PRIVY is an index of financial development. In general, both 
approaches demonstrate that oil revenue has a positive impact on the level of output 
per capita. Contrary to the growth literature, the financial system in Iran does not 
contribute positively to economic growth. In addition, in all models the dummy 
variable has a significant negative impact on the performance of the economy. Both 
volatility and the interaction between financial development and oil revenue have a 
negative impact on the level of output per capita.  
Chapter Seven concludes and highlights the main findings and results of the study. 
In general, the notion that natural resource endowments lead to poor economic 
performance cannot be true for all countries rich in natural resources. In addition, in 
the case of Iran, it is concluded that, looking at the long-term, oil has been a blessing 
for the country and has affected economic growth positively. It is worth mentioning, 
contrary to existing literature on financial development and growth, that the financial 
development in Iran has a negative impact on the economy. This is not surprising 
due to the isolation and limitation of the financial system in Iran. Finally, some policy 
recommendations and areas for further research are introduced in Chapter Seven.  
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                                             Chapter Two 
              A LITERATURE REVIEW ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
“If God had meant there to be more than two factors of production, he would have 
made it easier for us to draw three-dimensional diagrams.”       
                                                                                                        (Solow 1956)                                                                                                   
2.1            Introduction  
 
Ever since economics has been a profession, economic growth has been one of the 
main concerns of economists. Economic growth tells us a lot about the economic 
climate of a country, and also countries are categorized in the world according to 
their rate of growth. According to Kuznets (1973), economic growth is a long-run 
increase in the ability of a country to provide goods and facilities to its population. 
He also states that this increase in ability should be in line with institutional 
alterations or advances in technology. Therefore, it can be concluded that economic 
growth is the efficient use of resources in a country to produce goods and services. 
In other words, economic growth implies rises in per capita output.  
The large income differences among countries created a need for concrete 
economic growth models to guide policies pursuing economic growth. This explains 
the large body of literature on economic growth (Solow 1956; Romer 1986; Lucas 
1988; Weil 2005). As pointed out in the previous chapter, the main objective of this 
study is to analyse the impact of oil income on the Iranian economic performance. 
The method is to implement a growth-accounting model, where growth is the 
measure of economic performance. To this end, it is necessary to choose a growth 
framework that can fulfil this task, and to do so, this chapter reviews various growth 
frameworks.  
17 
 
Beliefs and theories on economic growth go back to the classical economists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It can be said that thoughts on economic 
growth began with Adam Smith’s “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations”. While Smith did not develop a long-run growth model, he 
emphasized the significance and effects of increasing labour productivity alongside 
saving and technical progress. Both Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the early 
scholars in economics, provided the basics for the current growth frameworks. Smith 
indicates that productivity is the engine of economic growth, and in his view, 
productivity was the outcome of the division of labour.  
During the industrialization process in 1817, Ricardo published “On the Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation”. Due to the rapid progress of technological change, 
he had to rewrite the technology part in 1821 for the third edition. Ricardo considers 
a two-sector economy with constant returns to scale in manufacturing and 
diminishing returns in the agricultural sector. He assumes capital owners are the 
“productive class” since they use their profit in the capital accumulation process. 
However, this process cannot go on forever because of the population growth. The 
profit will decrease until it reaches almost zero. At this point, the economy will reach 
its steady state. Ricardo came up with the notion of diminishing returns to scale and 
claimed that higher investment will lead to a less than proportionate increment in 
output; therefore, at some point growth will come to an end.  
A few decades later, economic growth was a central theme in Karl Marx’s studies. 
According to Marx, production is closely linked to reproduction. Furthermore, he 
differentiates saving from consumption and considers depreciation and 
technological development in order to develop a framework for physical capital 
18 
 
accumulation. Marx developed a theory of medium-run development, which can be 
seen as a first step toward modern growth models.  
Up to the twentieth century and well beyond, there was not much progress in growth 
theories apart from by Schumpeter, who stressed the role of innovation and technical 
progress. Roy F. Harrod was one of the first economists to focus on the rate of 
growth and developed a theory built on the work of John Maynard Keynes, which 
sets the foundation for long-run equilibrium growth. Subsequently Evsey D. Domar 
focused on the importance of dynamic equilibrium in long-term growth. Since the 
Harrod and Domar models have similarities, they are usually referred to as the 
Harrod-Domar model, which is considered an intermediate step between a classical 
and a neoclassical model.  
While economic growth has been a central part of economics at least since Adam 
Smith, advanced investigation of economic growth using formal frameworks 
emerged in the twentieth century through Solow’s two articles, “A 
Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” (1956) and “Technical 
Change and the Aggregate Production Function” (1957). With these articles the 
literature became an important area of study in macroeconomics. The foundation of 
a neoclassical growth framework started with the work of Robert Solow, who 
believed that economic growth was a result of capital accumulation. Later on, Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988) developed an endogenous growth model, which indicates 
that government policies can change some variables permanently and those 
changes would have a permanent impact on growth rate. The endogenous growth 
model was unlike what Solow demonstrated in his research; according to 
endogenous models, long-run growth depends on exogenous technological 
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progress. Advocates of endogenous theories believe that economic growth is an 
endogenous outcome of an economic system.  
In general, it can be concluded that there were three waves of concentration in 
growth frameworks during the last century. The first one was related to the work of 
Harrod (1948) and Domar (1947), and was an intermediate step between classical 
and neoclassical theory. The second wave introduced the neoclassical growth 
models (Ramsey 1928; Solow 1956; Swan 1956; Cass 1965; Koopmans 1965). The 
first two approaches (Solow and Swan) offer the first neoclassical framework of long-
term growth and mark the start point for neoclassical theories that were built on it, 
such as the Mankiw, Romer and Weil model (1992). The third wave started as a 
response to deficiencies in the neoclassical framework and comprised what are 
known as “endogenous growth models” (Lucas 1988; Romer 1990).   
A number of growth theories have been developed by economists over time to 
explain growth. These theories are mainly established in a production function 
approach in line with microeconomic theories where growth on an aggregate level is 
a factor of inputs and technology. Specifically, alterations in output are created by 
changes in physical capital, human capital and technology. Although some of these 
theories have been augmented by other factors, natural resources were never a part 
of the growth process.     
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows: Section 2.2 starts reviewing the growth 
models by outlining the Harrod-Domar theory. This is followed by Section 2.3, which 
reviews the neoclassical model since it has been used as a guideline model in most 
studies on economic growth. In addition, this section investigates the most dominant 
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neoclassical models besides the Solow model, such as the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model and the Overlapping Generations model, followed by the 
Stochastic Solow framework. Section 2.4 looks at some studies centred on 
augmentations of the Solow model. Then in Section 2.5, the focus moves on to 
analyses of endogenous growth frameworks, while the last section summarizes the 
key points from this chapter.   
2.2 The Harrod-Domar Model  
This review begins with the Harrod-Domar model which is an extension of Keynes 
analysis from a long period perspective. Economic growth and development are both 
dynamic routes; therefore, the first attempt to create a concrete growth model started 
with dynamic evaluation of economics. Modern growth models were born out of  
Keynes (1936) General Theory by expanding his analysis into the long term. Harrod 
(1939) and Domar (1946); (1947), using different routes, aimed to develop Keynes’ 
analysis into a long-run and dynamic theory. Interestingly enough, they came to the 
same conclusion, which answered the following question: When can an economy 
experience a constant growth rate? The response from both was when the fraction 
of income saved is equal to the product of the capital outcome ratio and the rate of 
population growth. Domar considered how investment augments the capital stock 
directly by differentiating between the dependence of actual output on effective 
demand and the dependence of potential output on the capital stock (Hacche 1979). 
However, Harrod took this association into account through the acceleration 
principle, whereby manufacturers’ demand for capital merchandises is related to 
output.  
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2.2.1           Harrod’s model 
Harrod’s framework starts with an accounting identity based on Keynesian identity 
analysing the requirements for maintaining full employment in a long period. It is 
supposed that saving is a function of output and investment is determined by the 
acceleration principle where investment is a function of output.  
 𝐺(𝑡) ≡
?̇?(𝑡)
𝑌(𝑡)
=
𝑠
𝑣
                                                                                                 (2.1) 
where 𝑣 is the acceleration and 𝑠 the propensity to save. Equation (2.1) is the 
essential equation of Harrod’s model. According to him, this equation demonstrates 
the “dynamic theory constituting the marriage of the acceleration principle and the 
multiplier theory” (Harrod 1939: 16). Assuming the economy is in equilibrium, 𝑠 and 
𝑣 are constant and positive, which indicates that there is a unique growth path for 
output, investment and saving. This satisfies Keynesian equilibrium conditions and 
demonstrates that along the growth path all three variables of output, investment 
and saving grow at the same rate of 
𝑠
𝑣
 . Harrod called this rate the “warranted growth 
rate”. However, this is not automatically a full-employment equilibrium growth path 
since the labour market has not been considered.  
It is assumed in the labour market that labour force (𝐿) grows at an exogenous rate 
𝜆, and at the same time labour productivity grows at rate of 𝜏. Therefore, two 
conditions for the permanent maintenance of full employment will be full employment 
at the beginning and growth of output at the rate of 𝜆 + 𝜏. Output should grow at an 
adequate rate to be able to absorb new workers. If the natural rate of growth, the 
rate that keeps the economy in full employment, is 𝑛, then according to Harrod, 𝑛 
should be 𝜆 + 𝜏, which is constant and exogenous. If the equilibrium growth path is 
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stated as a growth path that is both natural and warranted, then in Harrod’s 
framework there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium path has the conditions for 
steady-state growth, which is an essential notion in modern growth theories. 
However, it is unlikely that the economy will be on the equilibrium growth path. 
2.2.2           Domar’s Model  
Domar adopted the same saving function as Harrod but instead of only investment 
he inserted an association between the rate of increase in full-employment output 
and investment. He expresses any units of investment or new capital raising output 
in 𝜎 units. In his model, saving is a function of output again. Equilibrium conditions 
are  𝐼 = 𝑆  and 𝑌 = ?̅?.  The model indicates for full-employment equilibrium that both 
income and investment should grow at a constant rate, which is 𝜎𝑠1.   
The growth rate in Harrod’s model 
𝑠
𝑣
  is similar to the growth rate in that of Domar, 
𝜎𝑠. Domar exhibited potential growth through investment to highlight the importance 
of capital accumulation. He adopted the Keynesian multiplier and developed a 
framework in which investment plays a dual role. To keep the economy in full 
employment, investment needs to grow at a specific exogenous rate. Although he 
did not explain how investment is determined, his framework demonstrates what the 
path of investment should be.   
Harrod and Domar theorized a concrete and linear connection between economic 
growth and investment. The two writers got almost the same results that in an 
unmanaged economy there is no tendency for a full-employment growth path. Most 
                                                          
1 The solution will  be 
?̇?
𝑌
=
𝐼̇
𝐼
= 𝜎𝑠. 
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likely the significant dissimilarity between Harrod’s and Domar’s methods is the use 
of an accelerator and multiplier.  
2.3 The Neoclassical Growth Model  
Neoclassical growth theories can be traced back to Marshall (1898), Ramsey (1928), 
Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). It could be said 
that the neoclassical growth model started with the Solow framework and some more 
advanced expansions based upon it. Despite the fact that the neoclassical growth 
model is dated in the growth literature and research on economic growth has evolved 
over time, it is still one of the most important growth frameworks in economics. Solow 
and Tobin criticized deficiencies in the Harrod-Domar model in the same way. They 
believed it is an unlikely assumption to have fixed coefficients in the economy. The 
existence of variable coefficients in the real world is inevitable and it is naive to ignore 
this variety in the long-term. This was the first step towards a neoclassical analysis 
of economic growth. “An economy evolving according to the Harrod-Domar rules 
would be expected to alternate between long periods of intensifying labour shortage 
and long periods of unemployment” (Solow 1999: 641). In other words, according to 
Harrod and Domar, the economic growth rate of a country is equal to saving divided 
by the capital-output ratio. The problem in this model is that continual growth only 
happens accidentally and the chance of this happening is not very high. The real 
world is not that unstable; therefore, the key features of the Harrod-Domar theorizing 
did not match the empirical results of the process of economic growth. In addition, 
Solow indicated that the Harrod-Domar framework always analyses long-term 
problems with short-term gadgets (Solow 1956).  
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2.3.1         The Solow Model  
The Solow growth framework is a fundamental reference for the majority of growth 
analysis. Given the history of the Solow model, it can be said that Solow’s work is a 
major part of any economist’s toolkit. It has been used in both discrete and 
continuous time (see (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996; Romer and Chow 1996). Robert 
Solow (1956) developed a model to overcome some of the drawbacks in the Harrod-
Domar model. In Solow’s model, output is the only homogeneous commodity that is 
produced by two factors of production: capital (𝐾) and labour (𝐿). Factors of 
production can be operated in different propositions with constant returns to scale 
(henceforth CRS) and are paid according to their marginal products. This model 
assumes that the marginal product of both labour and capital is positive and returns 
to them are diminishing. Solow considered a production function for a final good in 
a standard neoclassical theory as follows:  
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡), 𝐴 (𝑡))                                         (2.2) 
where 𝑌(𝑡) denotes the total output at time 𝑡, 𝐾(𝑡) is the capital stock, 𝐿(𝑡) is the 
labour force and 𝐴 (𝑡) is the level of technology. Solow assumed that both labour 
and technology grow exogenously at the rate of 𝑛 and 𝑔, respectively. Therefore, the 
effective units of labour grow at the rate of 𝑔 + 𝑛.  
𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐿(0)𝑒𝑛𝑡        (2.3)  
𝐴(𝑡) = 𝐴(0)𝑒𝑔𝑡         (2.4) 
The other factor of production, capital, is accumulated as a result of saving 
behaviour. Solow assumed that in a closed economy with a large number of identical 
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households a constant fraction of disposal income 𝑠 is saved and invested. 
Furthermore, the capital that is generated through investment depreciates at the 
constant rate of 𝛿 ∈ (0,1), which means that out of one unit of capital at time 𝑡, just 
1 − 𝛿 is left for the 𝑡 + 1 period. Hence the essential law of motion of the capital stock 
is given by: 
𝐾(𝑡 + 1) = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾(𝑡) + 𝐼(𝑡)                                                                       (2.5) 
where 𝐼 is investment at time 𝑡. According to Solow’s saving assumption, investment 
will be defined as follows: 
 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑌(𝑡)                           0 < 𝑠 < 1                                                         (2.6) 
 𝐼(𝑡) = 𝑆(𝑡)                         
From national income accounting we have: 
 𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐶(𝑡) + 𝐼(𝑡)                                                                                          (2.7) 
 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝐼(𝑡) = 𝑌(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡)                                                                               (2.8) 
From the above we will have: 
𝐶(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑠)𝑌(𝑡)                                                                                                     (2.9) 
Rewriting the fundamental law of motion in the Solow growth model will give us: 
𝐾(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑠𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡) 𝐴(𝑡)) + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾(𝑡)        (2.10) 
 ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)) − 𝛿𝐾(𝑡)                                             (2.11)   
Equation (2.11) is a non-linear difference equation that describes the equilibrium of 
the Solow model along with equations of motion for labour and technology. 
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The effective units of labour are expressed by 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡); therefore, output per 
effective unit of labour, and capital per effective unit of labour, can be defined as: 
𝑦(𝑡) =
𝑌
𝐴(𝑡)𝑙(𝑡)
                                                                                              
 𝑘(𝑡) ≡
𝐾(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)
                                                                                                  
By considering a Cobb-Douglas production function we will have: 
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡), 𝐴(𝑡)) = 𝐴𝐾(𝑡)𝛼𝐿(𝑡)1−𝛼                 0 <  𝛼 < 1                     (2.12)   
Dividing the production function by 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡),  the production function per effective 
unit of labour becomes: 
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑘(𝑡)𝛼                                                                                                      (2.13)   
Dividing both sides of (2.10) by 𝐴𝐿 the evolution of the capital labour ratio will be: 
𝑘(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑠𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)                                                                  (2.14)   
Steady-state equilibrium can be defined as an equilibrium path in which 𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑘∗ 
for all periods of 𝑡. There is a unique steady-state equilibrium where: 
𝑦∗ = 𝑓(𝑘∗)                                                                                                         (2.15)   
And per capita consumption will be: 
𝑐∗ = (1 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑘∗)                                                                                               (2.16)   
 By differentiating the effective capital-labour ratio with respect to time we will have: 
?̇?(𝑡)
𝑘(𝑡)
=
?̇?(𝑡)
𝐾(𝑡)
−
?̇?(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)
−
?̇?(𝑡)
𝐿(𝑡)
                                                                                   (2.17)                                          
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?̇?(𝑡)
𝑘(𝑡)
=
?̇?(𝑡)
𝐾(𝑡)
− 𝑔 − 𝑛                                                                                         (2.18)   
According to the assumption of constant returns to scale the quantity of output per 
effective labour will be: 
?̂?(𝑡) ≡
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)
                          (2.19)   
= 𝐹 (
𝐾(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)
, 1)               
≡ 𝑓(𝑘(𝑡))                        
Since income per capita is 𝑦(𝑡) =
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐿(𝑡)⁄ , then 
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐴(𝑡)?̂?(𝑡)                   (2.20)   
  = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑓(𝑘(𝑡))  
It is worth mentioning that if ?̂?(𝑡) is constant, 𝑦(𝑡) income per capita will still grow 
since 𝐴(𝑡) grows over time. This indicates that growth models with technological 
improvement have a balanced growth path (BGP) rather than a steady-state path. 
Taking ?̇?(𝑡) from equation (2.11) and putting into equation (2.18) we will have: 
?̇?(𝑡)
𝑘(𝑡)
=
𝑠𝐹(𝐾(𝑡),𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))
𝐾(𝑡)
− (𝛿 + 𝑔 + 𝑛)  
Using capital per unit of effective labour   
?̇?(𝑡)
𝑘(𝑡)
=
𝑠𝑓(𝑘(𝑡))
𝑘(𝑡)
− (𝛿 + 𝑔 + 𝑛)                                                                (2.21) 
Rewriting equation (2.21) into the Cobb-Douglas production function will give us: 
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𝑘∗ = [𝑠 𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿⁄ ]
1
1−𝛼⁄
                 (2.22) 
Rewriting equation (2.22) into the production function will give us log income per 
capita at any instant in time. 
ln (
𝑌
𝐿
) = 𝛼 +
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑠) −
𝛼
1−𝛼
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)                                                   (2.23) 
Figure (2.1) demonstrates the terms of the investment equation, break-even 
investment and a steady-state path in the Solow model. The element (𝛿 + 𝑛)𝑘 
corresponds to the break-even investment. In other words, this is the amount of 
investment that requires constant capital per worker to be maintained. In a steady-
state path, all variables grow equally and there would be just one probable growth 
rate for the capital-labour ratio, which is zero, and 𝑘 is constant in a steady state. 
The figure illustrates that there is only one stock of capital (𝑘∗) where investment is 
equal to the break-even investment. When the economy is performing at this level 
of capital stock, the capital stock will stay constant due to the two forces acting on it. 
It can be said that at 𝑘∗, ∆𝑘 = 0 both the stock of physical capital and output per 
worker will be steady over time. For this reason 𝑘∗ is called “steady-state level of 
capital per worker”.  
Assuming that labour grows at the rate of 𝑛, capital grows at the same rate, and due 
to constant returns to scale, output should also grow at the same rate. If labour grows 
at the rate of 𝑛, the economy in the long run will reach a state of growth where 
investment, physical capital and output all grow at the same rate. This means the 
equilibrium in this model is stable when eventually the economy converges to its 
balanced growth path. Therefore, irrespective of the level of capital at the start point, 
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it always ends up with a steady-state level of capital. For instance, if the economy 
begins with less than the steady-state level of capital (left-hand side of 𝑘∗), then the 
level of investment exceeds the break-even investment for that level of capital. In the 
long-term the capital increases and will continue to increase until it gets to the point 
of steady-state 𝑘∗. Likewise, when the economy begins with more than the steady-
state level of capital (right-hand side of 𝑘∗), investment is less than what is necessary 
to keep constant capital per worker. Thus, the capital per worker will decrease to 
reach the steady-state level. Once capital per worker gets to the steady-state point, 
investment is equal to the break-even investment, and capital per worker does not 
need to decrease or increase. In other words, if 𝑠𝐴𝑘𝛼 > (𝛿 + 𝑛)𝑘 then the stock of 
capital needs to increase, but if 𝑘𝛼 < (𝛿 + 𝑛 + 𝑔)𝑘 , 𝑘 needs to decrease. Therefore, 
the steady-state point is the point where 𝑘∗ and ∆𝑘 are equal to zero. At this point 
(break-even investment) all variables grow at the same constant rate.  
Figure (2.1) demonstrates that there is only one stock of capital 𝑘∗ where the amount 
of investment meets break-even investment and there is a balance in the economy. 
It can be said that at 𝑘∗, capital stock would not change (∆𝑘 = 0). Consequently, 
output per se and stock of capital will be steady over time. According to the 
assumption of constant returns to scale, when 𝐿 grows at the rate of 𝑛, 𝑘 should grow 
at the same rate, and additionally 𝑌 grows at the same rate. It can be concluded that 
the equilibrium in the Solow model is stable. In other words, when labour grows at 
the rate of 𝑛 and technology grows at the rate of 𝑔, investment will grow at the rate 
of 𝑛 + 𝑔, and so does the aggregate capital stock. Therefore, no matter what level 
of capital the economy starts with, it ends up at the steady-state point. In accordance 
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with the diminishing returns to scale, the Solow model anticipates that any economy 
converges to its own steady-state point. 
Investment                                                                      Break-even 
Break-even                                                                     Investment  
Investment  (𝜹 + 𝒏)k 
(𝜹 + 𝒏)𝒌𝟐    
𝒊   
𝒊∗ = (𝜹 + 𝒏)𝒌∗  
                                                                              𝒔∗𝒇(𝑲) 
𝒊𝟏  
 
(𝜹 + 𝒏)𝒌𝟏                                                                                      
  
                                                                                                   
   
 𝒌 
 𝒌𝟏                                            𝒌
∗                 𝒌𝟐 
 
 
 
Figure (2.1) Steady-state Equilibrium with Population Growth and 
Technological Progress.   
Source: Adapted from Mankiw (2000: 83) 
As stated by Okada (1999), there are two reasons for convergence: technological 
circulation and diminishing returns to capital. There are different concepts of 
Capital stock increases because 
investment exceeds break-even 
investment  
Capital stock decreases 
because break-even 
investment exceeds 
investment 
Steady-state level of 
capital per worker  
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convergence in growth literature. In general, two versions of convergence are 
absolute and conditional convergence. In absolute convergence a group of countries 
have the same technology, exactly the same population growth and also the same 
savings rate. The only difference among them is the initial capital labour ratio. All 
countries will converge to the same steady-state capital labour ratio and output per 
capita, and definitely the same economic growth rate. Conditional convergence 
considers a group of countries that have access to the same technology and have 
the same population growth but do not have the same initial capital labour ratio and 
saving rates, yet they will converge to the same growth rate, although it could be at 
a different capital labour ratio. The notion of convergence in the Solow model 
forecasts two scenarios according to the steady-state point. 
The first one is that if two countries have exactly the same rate of investment but do 
not have the same levels of income, the country with the lower income will grow 
faster than the country with the higher income. The second one is that if two countries 
have the same level of income but the rate of investment is different, the country with 
the higher rate of investment will grow faster. It is also important to mention that 
these predictions are only true when there are no other differences in the countries. 
Romer (1994) criticized convergence by indicating that if the same technology were 
available in all countries, human capital would not move between countries.      
Conventionally, technological progress will improve the efficiency of labour and it 
grows at the same constant rate of 𝑔 each year. This form of progress in technology 
has been called “labour augmenting”. If the assumption that labour grows at the rate 
of 𝑛 is correct, the number of effective workers will grow at the rate of 𝑛 + 𝑔. The law 
of motion for capital is:  
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 ?̇? = 𝑠𝐴𝑘𝛼 − (𝛿 + 𝑛 + 𝑔)𝑘                                               (2.24)  
The Solow model indicates that the long-run growth rate is controlled by the rate of 
technological progress, which is not determined in the model. In other words, the 
Solow model considers the exogenous rate 𝑔 to be the driver of economic growth. 
Solow investigated the U.S. economic data over the period 1909-1949 and tried to 
answer the question: What does the data say about economic growth? He concluded 
that seven-eighths of the economic growth in the United States is due to 
technological growth (Sachs and McArthur 2002). His empirical assessment was in 
line with his theoretical suggestion about the role of technology in the United States. 
By including exhaustible resources in the Solow growth framework, surprisingly, the 
results remained mostly unchanged. Adding natural resources to the Solow growth 
model presents new dynamics and develops the possibility of substitutions in 
economic growth. In the production function with constant returns, capital and labour 
were considered the sole factor of production. The characteristic and powerful 
conclusion of the Solow model is that with technological development economic 
growth is exogenous since the long-run growth rate is not influenced by policies. In 
Solow’s terms, the critical question of why most countries in reality display an 
increment in their living standard over time boils down to an exogenous technology 
improvement. It is necessary to mention that Solow (1986) and Hartwick (1977) 
illustrated necessary conditions under which an economy dependent on natural 
resources can have sustainable economies.  The Solow-Hartwick rule needs non-
declining wealth, which can be achieved by reinvesting all the income from natural 
resources in other forms of capital.  
33 
 
2.3.2         The Standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 
Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) presented a growth model with an endogenous 
saving rate by including Ramsey’s (1928) optimization analysis. According to their 
model, saving and consumption are decided by households who are infinitely lived. 
They considered a closed economy where households want to maximize their utility. 
It is assumed that only one type of good is produced in the economy and the 
production function has constant returns to scale. In line with the Solow model, 
technology grows exogenously at the rate of 𝑔. Factors of production are paid 
according to their marginal product. In terms of population growth, it is assumed that 
a large number of identical households grow at the rate of 𝑛. Since both capital and 
labour are owned by households, in each period one unit of labour is supplied and 
one unit of capital is rented to firms. Individuals’ revenue is divided between saving 
and consumption to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. Depending on 
the budget constraint, the current value of consumption should not be higher than 
the sum of wealth and current value of income. 
In line with the assumption of a closed economy, any variation in capital in the firms 
is a result of household savings, which, in terms of effective units, can be depicted 
as: 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) − 𝑐(𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)                                                       (2.25) 
Households maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint they have.  
Applying Lagrange, taking logarithms and differentiating with respect to time and 
substituting the rent of capital (marginal product), the consumption function can be 
obtained. Considering a Cobb-Douglas production function, and assuming that 
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saving is given by 𝑠 =
𝑦 − 𝑐
𝑦⁄ , a system of differential equations in 𝑦 and 𝑠 can be 
expressed. The steady-state values of 𝑦 and 𝑠 are: 
𝑦∗ = (
𝛼
Φ
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
                                                                                                  (2.26) 
𝑠∗ =
𝛼Γ
Φ
                                                                                                          (2.27) 
In the above model, 𝑦 is predetermined and 𝑠 is a jump variable. When the economy 
gets to the steady-state point, its performance is similar to that of the Solow model 
on the balanced-growth path. Capital, output, saving and consumption are constant. 
In line with the Solow model, all per capita variables grow at the rate of  𝑛 + 𝑔.  
2.3.3        The Standard Overlapping Generations Model 
The previous section explained the RCK model with a representative household that 
lives forever and wants to maximize their utility. In this section, the Overlapping 
Generation (OG) framework will be discussed. The key difference between RCK and 
OG is that households will not live forever, as people are born, and old people die. 
The framework was introduced by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). The 
following OG framework is a relatively simple one based on Romer and Chow 
(1996). In contrast to the RCK framework, time is discrete in order to have more 
straightforward derivations. There are two different periods in each individual’s life: 
in the first one people work and save, whereas in the second one people do not work 
and use their savings for living costs. Considering a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
𝛼(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
(1−𝛼)              0 < 𝛼 < 1                                                                (2.28)  
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where 𝑌𝑡 is output at time 𝑡, 𝐾 is physical capital stock, 𝐴 is the level of technology 
and 𝐿 is labour.  
The assumption of perfect competition for domestic markets is held and capital 
depreciates at a constant rate of 𝛿. Rent of capital is the interest rate plus the rate of 
depreciation and labour receives wages according to the marginal product of capital.  
The utility function of a person while still working is considered as: 
𝑈𝑡 = ln(?̃?𝑡
𝑌) + 𝛽ln (?̃?𝑡+1
𝑂 )                                                                                 (2.29) 
where ?̃?𝑡
𝑌 depicts per capita consumption of a given person while working at time 𝑡, 
whereas ?̃?𝑡
𝑂 depicts consumption of the same one when she is old and not working 
at time 𝑡 + 1 and 𝛽 is the discount rate. It is important to mention that the logarithm 
form of the above utility function is a specific case of constant relative risk aversion 
utility, which is 𝑈 = 𝐶
1−𝜃
(1 − 𝜃)⁄ , where the parameter 𝜃 is one. The budget 
constraint of individuals in different periods of time varies. The combined budget 
constraint indicates that the current value of a working individual’s consumption is 
equal to the current value of her income. Therefore, a working person maximizes her 
utility function subject to the combined budget constraint. In order to simplify the 
analytical derivation of the model, it is considered that the depreciation rate is equal 
to one.  
Accordingly, a working person’s consumption is a fraction of output, which is 
constant. As a result, saving is independent of the interest rate while the person is 
working. As mentioned earlier, the logarithmic utility is unique when parameter 𝜃 is 
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equal to 1. In other words, consumption is not a function of the interest rate 
unless 𝜃 ≠ 1.  
In order to get the dynamics of the economy, the behaviour of individuals should be 
aggregated. The equation of motion for stock of physical capital can be rewritten as 
follows with some manipulation: 
𝑘𝑡+1 =
𝛽(1−𝛼)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝑛)(1+𝑔)
𝑘𝑡
𝛼.              (2.30)  
Hence, the steady-state level of capital per worker will be: 
𝑘∗ = (
𝛽(1−𝛼)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝑛)(1+𝑔)
)
1
1−𝛼
                                                                                  (2.31) 
which can be expressed as a Cobb-Douglas as: 
𝑘∗ = (
𝛼
(1+𝑟)
)
1
1−𝛼
                                                                                                 (2.31) 
where 𝑟 depicts interest rate in the equilibrium. According to 𝑘∗, no matter what the 
start point the economy always ends up at its steady-state level. The effective output 
in a steady state is: 
𝑦∗ = (
𝛽(1−𝛼)
(1+𝛽)(1+𝑛)(1+𝑔)
)
𝛼
1−𝛼
.                                                                                  (2.32) 
Therefore, the outcome indicates in a steady state that variables are growing at the 
same rate of growth, which is technology plus population growth. Thus, once the 
economy is on the balanced-growth path, this model is in line with the Solow model 
with respect to its steady state.  
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2.3.4 The Stochastic Solow Model  
Binder and Pesaran (1999) developed a Solow-Swan growth model; however, in 
their model technology and labour are considered to be stochastic processes. They 
state in their paper that using the stochastic framework addresses a number of 
drawbacks of the deterministic models and gives a better explanation of the growth 
process. We assume an economy where the aggregate production function is 
explained by a constant return to scale as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝐻𝑡𝐿𝑡)                                                                                             (2.33)           
where 𝑌𝑡 depicts real output, 𝐾𝑡 physical capital stock, 𝐻𝑡 human capital, 𝐿𝑡 labour 
input and 𝐴𝑡 the level of technology. It is assumed that 𝑓(. ) is twice continuously 
differentiable. In addition, it is also assumed that the country has specific initial 
endowments of technology and labour, which are exogenous.  
The law of motion for physical capital is as follows and it depreciates at the constant 
rate of 𝛿: 
𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝑘)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑘𝑡.                                                                                    (2.34) 
Similarly, the law of motion for human capital with a constant rate of depreciation will 
be: 
𝐻𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡 + 𝐼𝐻𝑡.                                                                                   (2.35) 
Aggregate saving is given by: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑠(𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝐻𝑡𝐿𝑡)𝑌𝑡.                                                                                           (2.36) 
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In addition, there is one restriction in the saving function, which is 
𝑆𝑡
𝑌𝑡
⁄ ∈ (0,1), and 
in the equilibrium we have: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝐻𝑡 .                                                                                                    (2.37) 
Applying the stochastic maximum principle and depicting the Lagrangian multiplier 
by 𝜆𝑡 gives us the first-order condition. If we assume both physical and human capital 
are depreciated at the same rate 𝛿𝐾 = 𝛿𝐻 = 𝛿, then at the optimum we have  
𝜕𝑓𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
=
𝜕𝑓𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝑡
.  
Considering a Cobb-Douglas production function we will have 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡
1−𝛾−𝜙
𝐾𝑡
𝛾𝐻𝑡
𝜙
𝐿𝑡
1−𝛾−𝜙
.                                                                                  (2.38) 
We can write  
𝐻𝑡 =
𝜙
𝛾
𝐾𝑡  
and we can rewrite  (2.38) 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡
1−𝛼𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼                                                                                              (2.39) 
where 𝛼 = 𝜙 + 𝛾, and 𝛼 depicts the combined share of both physical and human 
capital. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that saving function 𝑠(𝑘𝑡) from now 
on will be 𝑠(𝑘𝑡)𝑌𝑡, which illustrates the portion of households’ aggregate saving in 
period 𝑡 that is invested in physical capital. Therefore, for the capital accumulation 
function we can write  
𝑘𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝑠(𝑘𝑡)𝑌𝑡.                                                                               (2.40) 
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It is also assumed Inada conditions are satisfied and 𝑓 is twice continuously 
differentiable.  
As a result, the stochastic difference equation depicting the capital accumulation 
from the effective capital labour ratio is: 
𝑘𝑡+1 = exp (−𝜏 − ∆𝑢𝑡+1)[𝑠(𝑘𝑡)𝑓(𝑘𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡]                                           (2.41) 
where 𝜏 = 𝑛 + 𝑔 and ∆𝑢𝑡+1 = −(1 − 𝜌𝑎)𝑢𝑎𝑡 − (1 − 𝜌𝑙)𝑢𝑙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1. 
It is important to mention that 𝑢𝑡 = 𝑢𝑎𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡. 
Binder and Pesaran (1999)  have distinguished between cases where technology 
and population growth have a unit root and where they are stationary.  
I) Stochastic Solow with Unit Root in Technology and Population Growth 
In a case with technology and population growth with a unit root the law of motion 
will be:  
𝑘𝑡+1 = exp(−𝜏 − 𝜀𝑡+1) [𝑠(𝑘𝑡)𝑓(𝑘𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡]                                               (2.42) 
Binder and Pesaran (1999) in three steps established conditions under which {𝑘𝑡} 
could be ergodic. They indicated that with probability one {𝑘𝑡} does not get absorbed 
by the condition of 𝑘0. Then under some other conditions with probability  one again 
{𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘𝑡} is not dependent on the initial conditions 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘0. At the end they demonstrated 
whether 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘∞ and 𝑘∞ had finite moments up to order 𝑟. As a result, {𝑘𝑡} is ergodic.  
II) Stochastic Solow Model with Stationary Technology and Population Growth 
Binder and Pesaran (1999) indicated that this one is more complicated since {𝑘𝑡} 
depends on the primary value of the stock. They showed that for any finite initial 
conditions 𝑘𝑜 and 𝑢𝑜 , {𝑘𝑜} with probability one does not get absorbed by the bounds 
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of zero or positive infinity if the conditions mentioned in the appendix are satisfied, 
and also if the truncation condition, which is  
𝐹𝜍[log(1 − 𝛿) − 𝑛 − 𝑔] = 0,                                                                            (2.43) 
is satisfied, where 𝐹𝜍(. ), as indicated in Binder and Pesaran (1999), is the limiting 
cumulative distribution function of the composite shocks 
𝜍𝑡+1(𝜌𝑎, 𝜌𝑙) = −(1 − 𝜌𝑎)𝑢𝑎𝑡 − (1 − 𝜌𝑙)𝑢𝑙𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1                                             (2.44) 
Subsequently, under a specific assumption they show that asymptotically {𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘𝑙} 
probability one does not depend on the initial condition 𝑘0. Hence, {𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘𝑙} converges 
to the steady-state probability distribution function.  
2.4              The Augmented Solow Model  
Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented the Solow model by including a proxy for human 
capital accumulation. They illustrated that income per capita not only depends on 
population growth and accumulation of physical capital but also on the accumulation 
of human capital. They claimed that not taking into account the human capital 
accumulation is the reason for biased coefficients on saving and population growth. 
They tested data for 121 countries over the period 1960-1985 to see if they support 
Solow’s growth framework. They assumed that technological progress 𝑔 and the 
rate of depreciation 𝛿 are constant across countries. The results indicated a larger 
impact of saving and population growth than the Solow model prediction. They tested 
the same data after adding human capital accumulation. Their outcome 
demonstrated that leaving out human capital influences coefficients on physical 
capital, investment and labour force growth.   
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The MRW model was denoted as: 
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐾(𝑡)𝛼𝐻(𝑡)𝛽(𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))1−𝛼−𝛽                                                                     (2.45) 
where all variables are defined like the Solow model but 𝐻 is added as a stock of 
human capital. They differentiated between the rate of saving in human capital 
𝑠ℎ and the saving rate in physical capital 𝑠𝑘, and defined the law of motion for 
physical and human capital as follows on the assumption that human capital 
depreciates at the same rate as physical capital: 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑘𝑦(𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)                                                                      (2.46) 
ℎ̇(𝑡) = 𝑠ℎ𝑦(𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)ℎ(𝑡)           (2.47) 
MRW’s model concluded that the economy converges to the steady state as defined 
by: 
𝑘∗ = (
𝑠𝑘
1−𝛽
𝑠ℎ
𝛽
𝑛+𝑔+𝛿
)
1
(1−𝛼−𝛽)⁄
            (2.48) 
ℎ∗ = (
𝑠𝑘
𝛼𝑠ℎ
1−𝛼
𝑛+𝑔+𝛿
)
1
(1−𝛼−𝛽)⁄
        (2.49) 
Substituting (2.48) and (2.49) into the production function and taking logs gives the 
following equation, which demonstrates how income per capita depends on 
population growth and accumulation of both physical and human capital.  
𝑙𝑛 [
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐿(𝑡)
] = 𝑙𝑛𝐴(0) + 𝑔𝑡 −
𝛼+𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) +
𝛼
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(𝑠𝑘) +
𝛽
1−𝛼−𝛽
ln(𝑠𝑘)              
  (2.50) 
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Although MRW’S model was in line with the empirical studies, it was criticized by 
several authors for assuming an equal technological progress rate across all 
countries (Grossman and Helpman 1993; Temple 1998b).   
Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) suggested a further augmentation of the Solow 
framework by adding the endogenous accumulation of technological know-how. 
Following MRW, they chose a Cobb-Douglas production function as well; however, 
technology was assumed as a form of capital just like any other factors of production 
in the neoclassical model. In other words, they extended MRW’s model by assuming 
there are no externalities, like spillovers or increasing returns from technology. Since 
their model has three types of capital, which all depreciate at the rate of 𝛿, the 
logarithm of per capita income will be: 
ln(𝑦) = 𝛼0 +
𝛼𝑘
1 − (𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑇)
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑘)
+
𝛼ℎ
1 − (𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑇)
ln(𝑠ℎ) +
𝛼𝑇
1 − (𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑇)
ln(𝑠𝑇)
−
𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑇
1 − (𝛼𝑘 + 𝛼ℎ + 𝛼𝑇)
ln(𝑛 + 𝛿)                                               (2.51) 
The empirical part of their study used data from Barro and Lee (1994) except for 
investment in research and development (henceforth R&D) for OECD countries. The 
augmented Solow model in the study explains almost three-quarters of the variation 
in per capita income. However, the model explains up to 80 per cent of variations in 
growth by relaxing the assumption that economies are close to a steady state. In 
contrast to the MRW model, human capital is not significant in explaining the 
variation in growth rate. The statistically important variables are investment in 
physical capital, technological know-how and the condition of economy at the start 
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point. Nevertheless, their study was criticized by different scholars such as Temple 
(1998b), who concluded that the reason the coefficient on R&D is not significant is 
because at any conventional level heteroscedasticity is allowed.  
In another line of research, Long and Summers (1991) argued that there is a 
significant relationship between equipment investment and economic growth. 
Temple (1998a) investigated the correlation between equipment investment and 
economic growth and its compatibility with the MRW model. He included the stock 
of equipment as an input in a Cobb-Douglas production function. In other words, he 
disaggregates capital stock into equipment and structure. He believes 
disaggregation improves the performance of the MRW growth model. The paper 
finds some econometric difficulties in estimating the model, such as: i) endogeneity, 
ii) outliers, iii) simultaneity and iv) heterogeneity.  
Using the same model, Jalilian and Odedokun (2000) go one step further by 
developing the range of categories of investment utilized in the growth literature, 
breaking down the investment ratio into different categories: business investment to 
GDP, machinery equipment investment to GDP, transport investment to GDP, 
residential investment to GDP and other durable private investment to GDP ratios. 
For the empirical investment they used panel data through the fixed-effect technique. 
They studied 55 countries over the period 1965-1990 and a five-year period was 
chosen as a unit of time to avoid the impact of the business cycle. The outcome 
shows that human capital investment, the machinery equipment investment to GDP 
ratio and unspecified investment to GDP ratio are statistically significant in terms of 
economic growth.  
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Cavalcanti et al. (2011b) developed a standard growth model including natural 
resources as an input in the production function. In their model the rental price of 
natural resources is determined according to its marginal productivity. They 
assumed there are identical infinitely lived households in the economy and present 
the economy through a representative household that wants to maximize its utility. 
To do so, the representative household needs to decide on the path of consumption, 
resource extraction rate, investment in natural resources and stock of both physical 
capital and natural resources. Their theoretical model proposed a long-term 
association amongst per capita income, the investment rate and the real value of 
natural resources production per capita. They tested their theory empirically by 
estimating a panel error correction model, which indicates that oil abundance has a 
significantly positive impact on growth in both the short and long-term.  
It can be concluded that neoclassical theories in general assume a diminishing return 
to each input, which is translated into a smooth elasticity of substitutions amongst 
inputs. According to the neoclassical theories, economic growth is the outcome of 
technological progress and capital accumulation. Assuming a constant technological 
improvement and a steady growth in labour means per capita production depends 
on capital accumulation. Therefore, the law of diminishing marginal returns creates 
less output by increasing capital stock. Thus, in the long term, increases in output 
per capita can only be maintained by progress in productivity.  
2.5            Endogenous Growth Models  
By the late 1960s, there was not much interest in theoretical growth; however, in the 
1980s the interest was revived again by the work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) 
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Despite its role as the foundation of the modern economic growth framework, the 
Solow model is absolutely silent on some of its assumptions. One purpose of growth 
theory is to clarify the continuing rise in living standards in some parts of the world. 
In general, the engine of growth as described in Solow’s work was the assumption 
of exogenous technological progress. However, the model did not explain where this 
technological improvement comes from. According to the Solow framework, if 
technological progress does not occur in the economy, then the effects of 
diminishing returns will eventually cease economic growth. In addition, it was 
assumed that the level of technology is the same all around the world.  
In the Solow model, the principal variable beside capital accumulation is “labour 
productivity” (𝐴), whose exact meaning is not clear and it is assumed that labour 
productivity (𝐴) grows constantly and exogenously. In response, the capital stock is 
constantly increasing, enabling a continual increase in the level of output and 
consumption. The literature on endogenous growth focuses on explaining (𝐴) and 
replaces exogenous productivity with endogenous process. The effectiveness of 
labour is translated into knowledge and technology. This variable has increasing 
returns to scale in contrast to the Solow model. In addition, until 20 years ago the 
differences in the economic growth rate in different countries were not explained by 
neoclassical growth theories such as that of Solow. The Solow model does not give 
any reasons why population growth 𝑛 and rate of saving 𝑠 are different across 
countries. This gap in the literature of economic growth caused economists to think 
of a new growth framework. The endogenous model came into existence through 
the work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), who rejected the assumption of 
exogenous technological progress (Mankiw 2007).  
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A new strand of research was born arguing that technological progress rests on 
decisions that come from improvements and innovations made by profit-seeking 
businesses and depends on knowledge and human capital accumulation. 
Synthesizing endogenous technology into the growth paradigm brings the 
phenomenon of increasing returns to scale. Therefore, to improve the existing 
technology, the labour force needs motivation. On the other hand, according to the 
aggregate production function, capital and labour should be paid their marginal 
products, which means leaving nothing to pay for enhancement in technology, 
meaning endogenous growth theories cannot rely on competitive equilibrium. Arrow 
(1962) suggestion for solving this issue was the idea of considering technological 
progress to be a consequence of producing new capital, which was labelled “learning 
by doing”.    
2.5.1         The 𝑨𝑲 Model  
The 𝐴𝐾 model started with the work of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946), who 
proposed an aggregate production function with fixed coefficients. The first 𝐴𝐾 
model with interchangeable factors of production and knowledge externalities was 
introduced by Frankel (1962) in order to join the results of the Harrod-Domar model 
to the features of a neoclassical model. Romer (1986) developed the 𝐴𝐾 model with 
intertemporal consumer maximization, which is in contrast to the Solow and Frankel 
models. Arrow (1962) argues that productivity can increase by gaining experience, 
which can accumulate knowledge and introduces learning by doing externalities in 
the 𝐴𝐾 model. Lucas (1998) argues that human capital accumulation is a means to 
create and transmit knowledge. Rebelo (1991) explains, through the 𝐴𝐾 models, 
how heterogeneity in growth rate can be the effect of cross-country dissimilarities in 
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policies. Jones et al. (1999) used the 𝐴𝐾 model to investigate the impact of 
macroeconomic volatility on economic growth. Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) used 
the 𝐴𝐾 model to evaluate the influence of trade on growth.   
The simplest endogenous growth model is known as the 𝐴𝐾 style growth model, 
introduced by Rebelo (1991), in contrast to the Solow model with linear production 
technology in capital. However, what matters most is the linearity of the accumulation 
technology not the linearity of the production technology. It is assumed that the 
population growth rate, saving rate and depreciation are all constant. 
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐾(𝑡)                                           𝐴 > 0    
where 𝐴 is the level of technology and is constant. Here production depends only on 
the reproducible factor with no diminishing returns to scale.  
All other equations are the same as in the Solow model. Therefore, the law of motion 
for the capital labour ratio will be: 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝐴𝑘(𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)                         (2.51) 
Therefore, if 𝑠𝐴 > (𝑛 + 𝛿), the economy’s income grows forever, at a constant 
growth rate, without the assumption of exogenous technological improvements. 
Dividing (2.51) by 𝑘 denotes the growth rate of capital per worker in the economy, 
which is equal to the growth rate of per capita income. 
?̇?
𝑘
= 𝑠𝐴 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)                   (2.52) 
𝛾 = 𝑠𝐴 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)                           (2.53) 
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Equation (2.53) illustrates that the growth rate of per capita income increases with 
the rise of 𝐴 and 𝑠, and decreases with the depreciation of 𝑛 and 𝛿.  
The 𝐴𝑘 model has been criticized for the assumption of no diminishing returns to 
scale, which plays an important role in economic thinking. Nevertheless, the 
abandonment of diminishing returns to capital depends on how the variable 𝐾 is 
interpreted in the production function. If capital is considered in the traditional view, 
which includes only stock of plants and equipment, diminishing returns is a 
necessary assumption. Nevertheless, advocates of an endogenous model believe 
that if capital is considered in a broad way, constant returns to capital is more 
acceptable.    
2.5.2 The Frankel-Romer Model with Full Employment  
Another version of the 𝐴𝐾 model considers technological knowledge to be a capital 
good. Technological knowledge can be either used in combination with other 
production factors for final production or it can be stored and accumulated through 
R&D and other knowledge creation activities. In this model, knowledge is a capital 
good since capital is an aggregate of different sorts of capital goods in its broad 
meaning. Frankel (1962) assumed all firms have the same technology and the same 
factor prices; therefore, factors will be employed in the same ratios and thus 
aggregate output is written as: 
𝑌 = ?̅?𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼                                                                                                  (2.54) 
In addition, he assumed ?̅? is a function of the capital labour ratio.  
?̅? = 𝐴(𝐾 𝐿⁄ )
𝛽
                     (2.55) 
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It was assumed that even though ?̅? is endogenous, it is taken as given by business, 
since a business would just adopt the effects of its own investment decisions. 
Frankel gave attention to a case where 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1, and stated in this case that  (2.54) 
and (2.55) 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾. When capital rises, output rises in proportion, although there is 
persistent full employment and substitutability in the aggregate production function 
since knowledge inevitably surges in proportion. The difference from Harrod-Domar 
is that an increase in the saving rate would raise the growth rate constantly.  
2.5.3 An AK model with Utility Maximization  
Romer (1986) developed a Ramsey model in which the rate of saving is 
intertemporal utility maximization by a representative household. His contribution 
with the influential work of Lucas (1988) became a benchmark for the recent 
literature on endogenous models. He assumed a production function with 
externalities and concentrates on the situation in which the supply of labour per 
business is equal to unity and there is no capital depreciation. In Romer’s model, the 
saving rate is decided by the representative household and it is assumed there is 
one worker business with the dynamic optimization problem of: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∫ 𝑢 (𝑐𝑡)
∞
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡   subject to ?̇? = ?̅?𝑘𝛼 − 𝑐                                                   (2.56) 
where 𝑘 is the capital stock of the individual business,  𝑦 = ?̅?𝑘𝛼 is output, 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑡 is 
the current consumption and ?̅? represents aggregate productivity, which is taken as 
given by each business. In Romer’s model, aggregate productivity depends on the 
stock of capital and assumes constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.   
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Applying the Euler condition, the outcome will be according to rational expectations; 
individuals predict that the same level of capital will be chosen at each instant of time 
by all businesses. The Euler condition can be written as follows: 
−𝜀 ?̇? 𝑐⁄ = 𝜌 − 𝛼𝐴𝐾
𝛼+𝛽−1          (2.57) 
There are three cases to investigate based on the exponent 𝛼 + 𝛽. 
If 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1 means that there are constant social returns to capital, the economy 
maintains positive but finite growth rate of 𝑔. In this case, diminishing returns to 
capital are compensated by external enhancement in the technology ?̅?. In other 
words, in a steady state, output and consumption will both grow at the same rate, so 
this case implies: 
𝑔 =
𝛼𝐴−𝜌
𝜀
                                                                                                          (2.58) 
Romer assumed that 𝛼 + 𝛽 > 1 means increasing social returns to capital; in this 
case, growth will accelerate indeterminately. In the case of decreasing returns to 
scale, growth will cease asymptotically as in the neoclassical model with exogenous 
technology progress.  
If 𝛼 + 𝛽 < 1, which means there are decreasing returns to capital, growth will vanish 
asymptotically as in the neoclassical model without technological improvement.  
In a nutshell, the key outcome from this endogenous growth framework is that with 
a constant social returns to capital, characteristics of the economy like discount rate 
or the size of the economy will impact on the long-term growth. Although growth has 
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been explained as an endogenous process, it relies utterly on external accumulation 
of knowledge.   
2.5.4          Some other Endogenous Models  
Arrow (1962) introduced an endogenous theory on the alteration in knowledge, 
which stresses changes in production function. He argued that learning is the 
product of experience. He hypothesized that technical change can be ascribed to 
experience. He also stated that learning and experience can be captured in 
investment since any new machine has the ability to improve the current production. 
In his model he introduced cumulative gross investment as an index that can 
represent experience. Then he developed the same framework as Johansen (1959), 
where technological progress encompasses new capital. Shell (1967) looked at the 
process of knowledge acquisition from a different perspective to Arrow (1962), but 
unlike Arrow, he believes knowledge is produced intentionally by curious 
researchers.     
Lucas (1998) gave attention to the role of human capital in the growth model in the 
long run. In his model, previously accumulated human capital is the sole input for 
new human capital. He also mentioned that physical and human capital are both 
produced differently by different technologies; in his model, a fraction of time is used 
for working and the rest is used for studying.  
In another series of endogenous models externality was introduced in human capital, 
which mirrors human capital accumulation and raises the productivity of other factors 
of production. Nonetheless, Sala-i-Martin (1990) showed that this externality is not 
necessary for endogenous models. In this model, both physical and human capitals 
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have constant returns to scale. In addition, generating new human capital also has 
constant returns to scale. In summary, generating human capital is the driver of 
growth in the long run in endogenous models.  
Although the endogenous frameworks presented a good description of long-term 
growth, they suffered from a lack of theory on technological progress. To address 
this problem, Romer (1990), Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) introduced a new economic growth framework that 
embraces development and investment in R&D. In these models, innovation in 
industry is considered to be the driver of growth. They highlight the importance of 
R&D for economic growth. In the same line of research, Romer (1990) developed a 
new model where the main source of growth is technology improvement, which is 
similar to the Solow framework with labour-augmented technology but in this model 
technology (A) emerges from investment by agents and entrepreneurs with the 
incentive of maximizing profit. In his model, resources are devoted to R&D and the 
model is built on microeconomic bases. The driver of growth in Romer’s framework 
is R&D, which motivates firms to allocate resources.  
In any framework where building knowledge is driven by profit, the assumption of 
perfect competition must be ignored. If the owner of knowledge wants to sell it at 
marginal cost, the returns will be negative. Romer handles this problem by supposing 
that the creator of knowledge has monopoly rights to use it. He also assumes that 
knowledge encompasses different ideas that feed into (inputs into) production. In 
regard to these assumptions, the owner of a new idea can ask for a higher price than 
marginal cost. Non-zero profit can be a motivation for R&D. It is imagined that there 
53 
 
are a variety of ideas from 0 to A. The four essential inputs of this model are physical 
capital, human capital, labour and an index that exhibits the level of the technology.   
The accumulation of new capital is given by: 
 ?̇? = 𝑌 − 𝐶                                                                (2.59) 
To be specific, the accumulation of new designs (knowledge) should go according 
to the growth rate of 𝐴(𝑡). Research output depends on both the amount of human 
capital dedicated to research and the stock of available knowledge. Summing up 
across all researchers, the aggregate stock of knowledge grows according to the 
equation 
?̇? = 𝜙𝐻𝐴𝐴                                                                                       (2.60)  
where 𝜙 is a productivity parameter, 𝐻𝐴 is the human capital work in the research 
sector and 𝐴 is the total stock of knowledge. It is supposed that any firm involved in 
research has access to the total stock of knowledge. In other words, knowledge 
production has external impacts that come from knowledge spillover, as a novel 
design on the productivity of human capital in the entire research sector. Other firms 
can use the benefit from the research sector to produce capital and final output. 
However, any innovation on capital goods can be monopolized by firms and thus 
they can sell their novelty.  
The difference between (𝐴) in Lucas (1998) and equation (2.60) is that in the former, 
the stock of knowledge has an indirect effect since a new design will lead to the 
generation of new capital, which can be used to create output. However, in the latter, 
the research sector has a direct impact on output. What makes unlimited growth is 
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linearity in (𝐴), as Romer said “unbounded growth is more like an assumption than 
a result” (1990: 84). The other distinctive feature of this framework for creating 
endogenous growth is that the final output technology makes the long-term growth 
possible by generating different numbers of producer goods.   
Another strand of research was introduced by Grossman and Helpman 
(1991a:chapter 3), where in an endogenous growth model, intentional investment in 
R&D has a significant role. The difference in their model from Romer’s (1990) is that 
growth is the product of generating different consumer goods, which is likely to 
happen through intentional accumulation of knowledge. Entities expand the range of 
available products through involvement in research. Firms will hold a monopoly on 
any new product, which means that firms are entitled to any profit that arises from 
that product.   
Nevertheless, some recent researchers have stressed the significant role of non-
technological sources of differences in total factor productivity. For instance, Solow 
(2001) claims that the non-technological sources of differences in total factor 
productivity may have a more significant role than the technological factors mainly 
in developing countries. In line with this argument, there are some studies that 
concentrate on the importance of institutions on economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 
2001b; McArthur and Sachs 2001; Esfahani and Ramírez 2003). One essential 
factor for economic growth is capital, and not only physical and human capital but 
also all kinds of capital. “All models of growth, after all, stress the necessity and the 
power of capital” (Landes 1998: 171). By reviewing different growth models it can be 
concluded that there is a consensus that economic growth is impossible without 
capital.  
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Aghion and Howitt (1992) developed an endogenous stochastic framework built on 
Schumpeter’s1 process of creative destruction. It is distinct from the previous 
endogenous models in that it stresses the obsolescence of the old technologies 
derived from the accumulation of knowledge or innovation. In other words, it believes 
technological progress does not always create gains, but can create losses as well. 
In their framework a creator gets a patent for each and every newly created good. 
Then the creator can sell each patent to an entrepreneur who becomes a monopolist 
for those goods until the next innovation. Thus, monopolistic rents are just temporary 
as in Romer’s (1990) model. Nevertheless, there are two distortions in their model 
that act in opposite ways. The first is knowledge spillover and the second is business 
stealing impact or creative destruction.  
A two-sector model of endogenous growth with human and physical capital was 
provided as an explanation of the different economic development experiences in 
different countries. To analyse a two-sector endogenous growth model, two sectors 
are considered: goods and education. Each sector in the model produces one type 
of capital under conditions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition. 
Jones (1965) indicates how these assumptions could translate to what is called 
“magnification effects”. He indicates that a rise in the price of one sector’s output will 
cause a greater than proportional rise in the price of the factor that has been used in 
that sector. For instance, assuming the education sector is labour-intensive, a rise 
in the price of human capital increases the wage rate, and as a result the profit on 
                                                          
1 In the Schumpeterian model, growth is created by a random sequence of quality-
improving innovations. The model portrays innovation as an essential aspect of industrial 
competition.   
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human capital will decrease to reinstate the balance of return rates to each factor. In 
contrast to this, assuming a capital-intensive education sector, an increment in the 
price of educational output will decrease wages, which leads to a rise in the capital 
profit of human capital. A two-sector model of endogenous growth displays a saddle-
path stability for both sectors (Bond et al. 1996). 
In the 1950s when the neoclassical growth framework was extended, the main keys 
for economic growth were innovation and technological change; natural resources 
were not given high consideration. However, this does not mean that they were 
totally ignored. At that time the main natural resource that researchers thought about 
was land. (Solow 1956: 67) stated:  
“There is no scarce non-augmentable resource like land…the scarce-
land case would lead to decreasing returns to scale in capital and labour 
and the model would become more Ricardian.”  
 
This indicates that resources were not ignored completely in the neoclassical 
models. Nevertheless, in general, the endogenous growth literature is not concerned 
with the influence of natural resources. The difference between an endogenous 
growth model such as AK theory and the Solow growth model is that in endogenous 
growth frameworks economic growth is an endogenous result of an economic 
system and not of factors outside the model. Yet, within the neoclassical growth 
theory technological changes that are exogenous are the driver of growth. In neither 
of these two frameworks are exhaustible natural resources the main factor of growth.  
Stiglitz (1974) believes that one of the fascinating issues raised by the existence of 
exhaustible natural resources is that the fundamental notions of growth theory like 
“steady state” and “natural rate of growth” need to be reconsidered. In the Solow 
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model, the long-term growth rate is controlled by the natural rate of growth and is 
not dependent on the savings rate. In considering two factors, one reproducible 
(labour) and the other non-reproducible (natural resources), if one is growing 
exponentially and the other one is not growing, what is the rate at which the economy 
grows? In countries with exhaustible resources, “efficient growth paths that differ 
with respect to savings rate also differ, albeit asymptotically, with respect to the rate 
of growth” (Stiglitz 1974: 123).  
Romer described an endogenous long-run growth according to fundamental 
microeconomic structures. It is believed that endogenous growth models are closer 
to the reality, as confirmed by Grossman and Helpman (1993: 29), who stated: 
“Growth theory has taken a step in the right direction by including aspects of reality 
– imperfect competition, incomplete appropriability, international interdependence 
and increasing returns to scale – that surely are important to understand how much 
an economy will invest in knowledge of various kinds.” Although there is a consensus 
that a theoretical model of economic growth should move in the direction of 
endogenous frameworks, it has been illustrated that many leading endogenous 
models, such as (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Grossman and Helpman 1991a) are 
based on very strong assumptions that are not substantiated in applying these 
models (Solow 2000). Relaxing these strong assumptions would either lead to no 
endogenous model or infinite in infinite time. With regard to the empirical literature, 
it can be concluded that the majority of studies have continued to employ 
neoclassical models with augmentation. 
58 
 
2.6            Conclusion  
The growth models were reviewed from the early scholars in economics to the most 
recent ones. According to the neoclassical growth model, the main drivers of growth 
are technology and capital accumulation. On the other hand, the endogenous 
models indicate that economic growth does not happen exogenously outside the 
economic system, but rather takes place within the system. Innovation and human 
capital within the economic system affect the growth rate of the country. However, 
natural resources have no role in determining the long-run economic growth rate in 
either of them.  
On the other hand, some scholars are in favour of the idea that there is an individual 
growth model for each country, yet each country has a framework that can be 
followed after finding its capacities and reducing its deterrents. This explains why 
growth theories should be different for countries with different endowments. Yet, 
general growth models are used widely in the literature as a measure of economic 
performance for different countries. In other words, the growth route is highly 
heterogeneous.  
Various extended versions of the Solow model, such as Cavalcanti et al. (2011a) 
and Esfahani et al. (2013), have been used broadly to investigate the role of natural 
resources in economic growth. Endogenous growth frameworks have not been 
commonly used in the empirical work on natural resources. The relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth has been studied mainly through 
neoclassical growth models. Therefore this research employs an augmented 
neoclassical model in order to study the long-term association between oil income 
and output in Iran. Oil income enters the growth model through saving and capital 
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accumulation equations. The following chapter looks at the empirical studies on the 
role of natural resources in economic growth and the resource curse hypothesis.   
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Appendix 2  
Harrod’s Model 
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑌(𝑡)                                      0 < 𝑠 < 1       (I-S-Condition) 
𝐼(𝑡) = 𝑣?̇?(𝑡)                                          𝑣 > 0         Investment function 
 𝐼(𝑡) = 𝑆(𝑡)          
 𝐺(𝑡) ≡
?̇?(𝑡)
𝑌(𝑡)
=
𝑠
𝑣
      
𝑔(𝑡) = 𝑔𝑤 =
𝑠
𝑣
= 𝑛 = 𝜆𝜏                              Solution  
Domar’s Model 
?̇̅? = 𝜎𝐼    
𝑆 = 𝑠𝑌                                             
According to the equilibrium condition  𝐼 = 𝑆 and  𝑌 = 𝑌.̅     
The solution will be 
?̇?
𝑌
=
𝐼̇
𝐼
= 𝜎𝑠. 
 The Standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 
Given a specific risk aversion 𝜃 the utility of households can be written as 
𝑈 = 𝐴(0)(1−𝜃)
𝐿(0)
𝐻
∫ 𝑒−(𝜌−𝑛−(1−𝜃)𝑔)𝑡
𝑐(𝑡)(1−𝜃)
1−𝜃
∞
0
𝑑𝑡                                       
where 𝜌 is the discount factor and 𝑐(𝑡) is consumption per effective labour. It is 
assumed 𝜌 − 𝑛 − (1 − 𝜃)𝑔 > 0 
The present value of lifetime consumption in terms of effective units it can be 
demonstrated as: 
∫ 𝑒−𝑅(𝑡)
∞
0
𝑐(𝑡)𝑒(𝑛+𝑔)𝑡𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝑘(0) + ∫ 𝑒−𝑅(𝑡)
∞
0
𝑤(𝑡)𝑒(𝑛+𝑔)𝑡𝑑𝑡                         
Applying Lagrange, taking logarithms and differentiating with respect to time and 
substituting the rent of capital (marginal product of capital), the following equation 
can be written: 
𝑐̇(𝑡)
𝑐(𝑡)
=
𝑓′(𝑘(𝑡))−(𝜌+𝜃𝑔+𝛿)
𝜃
.                                                                              
It is assumed that 𝑐, 𝑦 and 𝑠 are functions of 𝑡 
?̇? = 𝛼𝑦 [𝑦
𝛼−1
𝛼 𝑠 − Γ]                                                                                  
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?̇? = (1 − 𝑠) [𝛼𝑦
𝛼−1
𝛼 (𝑠 −
1
𝜃
) − 𝛼Γ +
Φ
𝜃
]                                                       
where Γ = n + g + δ and Φ = ρ + θg + δ.  
The Standard Overlapping Generations Model 
The production function in terms of effective labour can be written as:  
𝑦𝑡 =
𝑌𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
= (
𝐾𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
)
𝛼
= 𝑘𝑡
𝛼.  
Population and technology are growing in relation to the following equations, 
respectively   
𝐿𝑡 = (1 + 𝑛)𝐿𝑡−1                       𝐴𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔)𝐴𝑡−1.   
Wage rate of labour and rent of capital (interest rate) are determined as follows: 
     (1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑡
𝛼 = 𝑤𝑡          
𝛼𝑘𝑡
𝛼−1 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿.  
The following shows the constraint while the individual is working:  
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡𝑊𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡?̃?𝑡
𝑌.                                                                                                    
And while the person is not working and using her saving the budget constraint is: 
𝐿𝑡?̃?𝑡+1
𝑂 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+1)𝐾𝑡+1.                                                                             
By combining these two we get: 
?̃?𝑡
𝑌 +
𝑐?̃?+1
𝑂
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= 𝐴𝑡𝑤𝑡                                                                                    
ℒ = ln ?̃?𝑡
𝑌 + 𝛽(?̃?𝑡+1
𝑂 ) + 𝜆 [𝐴𝑡𝑤𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡
𝑌 −
𝑐?̃?+1
𝑂
1+𝑟𝑡+1
].                                            
Then the first-order necessary conditions are as follows: 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐?̃?
𝑌 =
1
𝑐?̃?
𝑌 − 𝜆 = 0  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑐?̃?+1
𝑂 =
𝛽
𝑐?̃?+1
𝑂 −
𝜆
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= 0  
?̃?𝑡
𝑌 +
𝑐?̃?+1
𝑂
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= 𝐴𝑡𝑤𝑡.   
Consumption per effective unit of a working individual in equilibrium can be obtained 
by removing 𝜆 in the first- and second-order necessary condition as follows: 
𝑐𝑡
𝑌 =
(1−𝛼)
(1+𝛽)
𝑘𝑡
𝛼.                                                                                         
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And writing it in terms of output per effective worker will be 
𝑐𝑡
𝑌 =
(1−𝛼)
(1+𝛽)
𝑦𝑡.                                                                                          
Stochastic Solow Model  
Technology and labour are given exogenously as follows:  
log(𝐴𝑡) = 𝑎0 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑢𝑎𝑡  
log(𝐿𝑡) = 𝑙0 + 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡                                                                               
max   𝐸[∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑡∞
𝑡=0 𝑓(𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝐻𝑡𝐿𝑡|Ω0)]                                                                
subject to  
𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 + 𝐻𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝐾)𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝐻)𝐻𝑡                                          
where Ω0 depicts the information at time 0. 
𝐸 [𝛽
𝜕𝑓𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
 (1 + 𝜆𝑡𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝛿𝐾) − 𝜆𝑡−1|Ω0] = 0                                    
𝐸 [𝛽
𝜕𝑓𝑡
𝜕𝐻𝑡
 (1 + 𝜆𝑡𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽𝜆𝑡(1 − 𝛿𝐻) − 𝜆𝑡−1|Ω0] = 0                                    
Then writing physical and human capital in terms of effective unit of labour we will 
have:  
𝑘𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
           𝜂𝑡 =
𝐻𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
.                                                                         
Introducing new notation for output-labour, capital-labour and capital-output ratios 
we will have: 
𝑦𝑡 =
𝑌𝑡
𝐿𝑡
                  𝑘𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐿𝑡
                         𝑣𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝑌𝑡.
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Rewriting the Cobb-Douglas production function according to these notations will 
give us: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑡
𝛼 = 𝐴𝑡𝑣𝑡
𝛼
1−𝛼.                                                                           
Endogenous Growth Model  
An AK Model with Utility Maximization  
𝑢(𝑐) =
𝑐1−𝜀−1
1−𝜀
                                                                                              
Obtaining the Euler condition: 
𝜀 ?̇? 𝑐⁄ = 𝜌 − 𝛼?̅?𝑘
𝛼−1                                                                                        
in the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + ?̇? + 𝛿𝑘 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼(𝑢ℎ𝑁)1−𝛼ℎ𝑎
𝛾     
𝐻 + 𝛿𝐻 = 𝐵[(1 − 𝑢)𝐻]      
where 𝑌 is the final output, 𝐶 is the consumables, 𝐾 is investment in physical capital, 
𝛿 is the depreciation rate, 𝐴 and 𝐵 are technological parameters, 𝑢 is the fraction of 
time used working, ℎ is a measure of the average human capital, 𝑁 is the number in 
the labour force; therefore, the total effective labour is 𝑢ℎ𝑁, (1 − 𝑢),  which is the 
fraction of time the labour force spends studying. 
Romer expresses his model as follows: 
𝑌(𝐻𝑌, 𝐿, 𝑥) = 𝐻𝑌
𝛼𝐿𝛽 ∫ 𝑥(𝑖)1−𝛼−𝛽
∞
0
𝑑𝑖       
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                                         Chapter Three  
                RESOURCE CURSE AND OIL ABUNDANCE 
“Natural resource endowments would enable developing countries to make the 
transition from underdevelopment to industrial ‘take off’.”    
                                                                                                     (Rostow 1960) 
3.1            Introduction  
There is an understanding that natural resource abundance served as an engine of 
economic growth and made the “take-off” towards industrialization possible for some 
states such as Canada, Australia and the United States during the nineteenth 
century. Rostow (1960) believed that since natural resource endowments will make 
the transition from an underdeveloped to an industrial country possible, they can do 
the same for developing countries. It was mostly assumed that having natural 
resources should promote economic growth and reduce poverty. However, the 
literature changed in the twentieth century, and the existing literature from different 
locales provides considerable evidence that natural resource abundance leads to 
slower economic growth in developing countries.  
Changes in the general views on the role that natural resources can play in the 
economy created a significant body of research investigating the relationship 
between resource abundance and economic performance. A new theory was born 
as a result of the poor performance of countries endowed with natural resources 
compared to those countries without natural resources, indicating that natural 
endowments are a curse. The resource curse theory was an explanation of the 
negative association between resource abundance and economic performance.    
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The narrative behind the impact of natural resource abundance on economic 
performance is a complicated one that the conventional economic models and 
regressions do not express well. Preliminary evidence indicates that possessing 
natural resources was considered a strength for a country. However, the belief 
changed, and by the 1960s natural resources were more of a curse than a strength. 
Interestingly enough, the new scholars proved that the existence of natural 
resources is a double-edged sword. This chapter is going to review the literature on 
natural resources in regard to economic growth and specifically scrutinize the 
resource curse hypothesis.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces 
theories that explain the negative relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 explain the resource curse through economic 
and political factors. Section 3.5 deals with the empirical evidence on this matter 
followed by drawbacks in studies in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 talks briefly about 
policies for managing natural resources well. Section 3.8 in turn draws some 
conclusions.       
3.2            Resource Curse and Growth  
Growth literature provides evidence that resource-rich countries grow more slowly 
than their counterparts, giving rise to the resource curse hypothesis. Over the years, 
many scholars have developed a number of theories in an attempt to describe the 
lagging growth experienced by resource-abundant countries. The first theories that 
attempted to explain the negative relationship between natural resources and 
economic growth came from two structuralists: Prebisch (1949), concentrating on 
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the falling trend of exchange between primary and manufactured goods, and 
Hirschman (1958), focusing on the volatility of primary products. In addition, terms 
of trade between primary products and manufactured goods deteriorate over time. 
This means that for countries that export only primary goods, over time their goods 
become relatively cheaper than those in countries who export manufactured goods. 
Nonetheless, neither of these hypotheses was unequivocally confirmed by empirical 
studies (Moran 1983; Behrman 1987; Lutz 1994; Fosu 1996). The negative outcome 
of producing and exporting primary products was mentioned in other works, such as 
(Hirschman 1958; Seers 1964; Baldwin 1966; Gelb 1988). On the other hand, some 
scholars strive to demonstrate that export of primary goods can promote economic 
growth (Roemer 1970). 
In the 1960s, an idea emerged suggesting that natural resources might be more of 
a curse than a blessing. Up to the 1970s the main concern of the literature was 
primary products, but after the first oil shock the concern moved towards oil. Higher 
prices in oil generated large-scale revenues, which gave rise to the speculation of a 
negative impact of these revenues on the development prospects of the oil 
exporters. To address this concern, a new literature emerged to investigate the 
association between revenues from hydrocarbons and economic development and 
growth (Mabro and Monroe 1974; Neary and Van Wijnbergen 1986). 
The term “resource curse” was coined by  Auty (1993) to explain how countries rich 
in minerals struggled to use their endowments to boost their economy. Later the 
‘resource curse’ theory was used for all kinds of natural resources. The resource 
curse theory or “paradox of plenty”, which refers to the negative association between 
natural resources and subsequent economic growth, came to existence in a large 
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amount of literature (Wheeler 1984; Auty and Evans 1994; Sachs and Warner 
1995b; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs 1999; Sachs and Warner 
1999; Gylfason 2000). 
Looking at the economic performance of resource-rich countries over the past two 
centuries, researchers were convinced that they had experienced lower economic 
growth than those without an abundance of natural resources. There are a number 
of explanations for why countries with abundant natural resources find it a curse. As 
demonstrated in Figure (3.1), this chapter divides these explanations into two 
categories. The first one is economic explanations, such as the Dutch Disease, 
volatility and ignorance of human capital. The second one is political explanation of 
the resource curse, such as rent-seeking activities, poor institutional quality and 
corruption. In what follows, we begin by looking at the economic causes behind the 
so-called resource curse, which covers subjects such as the Dutch Disease, volatility 
and human capital. Then, we move onto political subjects such as rent-seeking 
activities, the quality of institutions and corruption.  
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Figure (3.1) Resource Curse Channels. 
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3.3 Economic Explanations of Resource Curse  
3.3.1 Dutch Disease  
 
Dutch Disease is one of the explanations for the resource curse; it explains the 
relationship between oil prices and the exchange rate (see (Corden and Neary 1982; 
Neary and Van Wijnbergen 1986; Krugman 1987; Matsuyama 1992). In the 1960s 
following the overvaluation of the Dutch guilder due to a new discovery of gas in the 
Netherlands, a new pattern was introduced called the “Dutch Disease”. The so-called 
“Dutch Disease” was possible result of a sudden increase in revenues from 
exhaustible resources, which hampered the industrial sector, considered the engine 
of economic growth, either through rises in private and public spending or the 
absorption of production factors (Neary and Van Wijnbergen 1986). In the light of 
the Dutch Disease an abrupt increase in revenues from natural resources can lead 
to real exchange rate appreciation.  
Needless to say, the association between oil prices and the exchange rate is a 
complicated one. It seems they are moving in the opposite direction in the short run, 
but this is not true for the long run. The suggested process is assumed in an 
economic model that distinguishes between internationally traded products on the 
one hand, and non-traded products and services on the other.  
The price of traded goods (manufactured and agricultural) is determined on the 
international market in US dollars. On the other hand, the price of non-traded goods 
(services) is determined in each country according to the law of supply and demand. 
After an oil export boom in the economy the demand for both traded and non-traded 
goods will increase. The higher demand for traded products can be met easily 
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through higher imports; however, the higher demand for non-traded goods needs to 
be met by the supply within the country, which does not happen immediately and 
needs some more time. Therefore, the price of non-traded goods relative to traded 
goods increases. This process, i.e. increases in the prices of non-traded products 
relative to traded ones, is labelled “real exchange rate appreciation”. In other words, 
the Dutch Disease occurs when a country that is exporting scarce natural resources 
faces a currency appreciation. By nature, a stronger currency is not a bad thing: it 
makes imports cheaper. The flip side of this appreciation is when some industries in 
the country become less reasonable on the global market.  
3.3.1.1      The Geometry of the Dutch Disease  
Figure (3.2) illustrates the famous traded-non-traded goods framework. The first 
figure on the left-hand side displays the production possibility frontier (henceforth 
PPF) of the country before the spike in oil prices, with a probable combination of 
traded goods (non-oil) on the horizontal axis and non-traded products on the vertical 
axis. The curve with dotted line represents the consumer indifference curve. Point E 
is where the economy is in its initial equilibrium, which is at a point of tangency of 
the indifference curve and the PPF. On the vertical axis 𝐸𝑁 is the level of non-traded 
goods and 𝐸𝑇 on the horizontal axis shows the level of non-oil traded production. In 
other words, the real exchange rate is the slope of the PPF at point E (price of traded 
goods to non-trade goods). A sharper curve will translate into depreciation in the real 
exchange rate.   
To explain the Dutch Disease it is assumed there is an oil shock in the country, which 
translates to an increment in the total output of traded goods comparing to the sum 
of oil and non-oil traded production. The PPF shifts to the right side by the amount 
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of increase in oil prices, 𝐻. The new equlibrium is presented on the right side as point 
𝐸∗. As can be seen in the figure, non-traded goods have climbed to EN*. The entire 
quantity of traded goods (oil and non-oil) has also increased by the amount of 𝐸𝑇
∗ +
𝐻. However, the quantity of non-oil traded production has decreased to 𝐸𝑇
∗ . It can be 
seen that the real exchange rate has increased because the slope at point 𝐸∗is not 
as sharp as at point 𝐸, suggesting an increase in the price of non-traded goods.  
It is evident that real exchange appreciation has made a readjustment of output in 
the non-oil section of the country. Higher prices of non-traded goods induce workers 
and capital to shift to non-traded production, which means that that capital and those 
workers will leave the non-oil traded sector. In summary, an increase in oil spending 
causes a shift of production away from traded production such as agriculture and 
manufactured exports towards services and non-traded production. These changes 
are certainly not a disease. An increase in non-traded goods at the expense of non-
oil traded goods does not by itself establish a “mistake” of market forces as 
Humphreys et al. (2007) indicated. A rise in traded production is met by higher 
imports; however, a rise in non-traded commodities should be met by higher 
domestic output of those commodities.  
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Non-traded                                                Non-traded 
 goods                                                          goods 
         
    
  𝐸𝑁
∗  𝐸∗ 
𝐸𝑁                                𝐸    𝐸𝑁                                                                         
                                                                                       𝐻                                                                       
                                                                                        𝐸𝑇
∗  𝐸𝑇 (𝐸𝑇
∗ + 𝐻) 
     𝐸𝑇                              Traded                                              Traded 
                                                                   goods                                                goods                            
  Figure (3.2): The Dutch Disease.     
Source: (Humphreys et al. 2007) 
These shifts in resources can only become a disease if there is something superior 
about the traded production sector that is being squeezed. For instance, assume the 
economy is exporting textiles before the boom in the oil sector. After a boom in the 
oil sector, labourers and capital investors are tempted to migrate to the non-traded 
goods sector. If the textile sector contributes significantly to economic growth and 
development, any decrease of it would spell trouble for the economy. Therefore, a 
spike in oil prices would cause a fall in a technologically leading sector of the 
economy, with negative effects in the long-term. However, there is a solution to this 
problem, as the government can curb the spillover of labour from the textile sector 
to non-traded production. The alternative option would, however, be to make 
targeted subsidies available for the textile sector.   
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Overall, the real concern about the Dutch Disease is when the non-oil export sector 
will shrink, thereby squeezing the main foundation of technological improvement in 
the country. Nonetheless, this concern is significantly overblown when oil incomes 
are correctly invested as a part of a country’s development plans. If oil revenues are 
invested in infrastructure, the productivity of labour, not only in the traded but also in 
the non-traded sector, will increase. If oil income is used by government to import all 
of the investment goods, there will not be any direct spending effect of oil revenue. 
There is no doubt that consumption increases, but only to the extent that the non-oil 
sectors (traded and services) grow subsequent to the higher public investment 
funded by oil revenue (Humphreys et al. 2007).  
The right side of Figure (3.3) depicts an upward and rightward shift in the PPF. At 
the same time, both the consumption and production of non-oil traded production 
and services surge. Point E** is the new real exchange rate, which might or might 
not rise compared to the initial point at E, although it is not very important, since the 
non-oil traded production grows in any event. It develops as an outcome of amplified 
productivity owing to public investment. 
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Figure (3.3) Public Investment through Spike in Oil Prices.                            
Source: (Humphreys et al. 2007: 198) 
 
There might be a slight Dutch Disease if the higher spending on public investment 
falls relatively on non-traded production rather than completely on imported capital 
goods; however, this effect originates from the investment boom rather than a 
consumption boom. In these circumstances, the increase in investment spending will 
lead to a rise in the real exchange rate and a temporary squeeze of tradable 
production, until the productivity-enhancing impact on tradable goods kicks in. All of 
these can be relatively quick since the benefits of investing in infrastructure can 
come on line quite fast. Therefore, any squeeze on tradable goods is probably 
temporary.  
As shown in Figure (3.4), it is also likely that a significant spike in oil prices, especially 
in poor countries, will only cause depreciation in the real exchange rate if the public 
investment funded by oil revenue raises the productivity of the non-traded sector. In 
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low-income nations, the most important non-traded good is staple food production in 
the consumer’s basket. However, due to high transport costs in rural areas, staple 
food production is mostly used by farmer households rather than being sold in the 
market. It is important to mention that food is the main element of consumption in 
poor areas. Therefore, if oil income is invested to increase the productivity of farmers 
by funding seed or subsidies, the PPF will shift upward, as can be seen in the figure. 
The general impact of significantly high oil prices could be a reduction in the relative 
price of non-tradable food and consequently a real depreciation. The slope at E*** 
is sharper than the slope at E. Furthermore, there is higher production in both non-
traded and non-oil traded goods. It is worth mentioning that there is no squeeze in 
non-oil traded production. 
 
Non-traded                                                Non-traded 
 goods                                                          goods 
         
    
  𝐸𝑁
∗  𝐸∗∗∗  
𝐸𝑁                             E      𝐸𝑁                           E                                        
                                                                                     H 
                                                                                        𝐸𝑇 𝐸𝑇
∗  
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                                                                   goods                                                goods  
Figure (3.4) Real Depreciation Following a Rise in Non-Traded Food.                           
Source: (Humphreys et al. 2007: 199) 
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To sum up, the Dutch Disease is mostly a concern when the oil income is used to 
fund consumption rather than investment. In the aforementioned circumstances, the 
non-oil traded part may squeeze on a constant foundation, with a negative impact 
on long-run growth. However, this is very improbable if the oil income is correctly 
invested in infrastructure or any public good. Then positive effects of amplified public 
investment on non-oil traded sector are probable to outweigh any adverse 
consequences of real exchange appreciation. The empirical tests do not offer strong 
support for the Dutch Disease being a justification of the curse of natural resources 
(Leite and Weidmann 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).  
In addition, another study by Auty (2001b) rejects this theory by illustrating the 
complication and variation of cases in countries with natural resource intensity, with 
some exceptions such as Norway. There are more explanations for the theory of the 
resource curse, which can be assumed to be symptoms of the Dutch disease. One 
of them is the lack of motivation for entrepreneurship (Sachs and Warner 2001). 
Another explanation is a reduction in saving; and therefore physical investment 
(Gylfason 2002; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). In the same line of research it was 
demonstrated that having natural resources causes lower investment in education 
and as a result lower human capital (Gylfason 2001; Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio 
2007). It is worth mentioning that the Dutch Disease hypothesis does not suggest 
that an oil boom is inclined to reduce the level of competiveness in non-resource 
sectors; and even if it does, economic policies must be able to soften this inclination.   
It is important to mention that in the aforementioned scenarios labour moves easily 
between the traded and non-traded sector, and also that labour is exogenously given 
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and it is constant. Behind these assumptions lies an assumption of perfect labour 
mobility and inelastic labour supply. Although these rules can apply to some 
countries, they look unrealistic for others. They defiantly ignore the chance that 
societal arrangements matter for any responds of an economy to alteration in natural 
resource revenue. This is exactly what the Dutch disease frameworks pursue. 
However, aspects of both labour supply and labour mobility are ignored in the current 
Dutch disease literature. It is important to mention that connecting labour market 
patterns to natural resource endowments can explain specific structures of the 
society. It is necessary to mention that gender grouping of the labour market and 
gender-based occupational segregation are two important factors of the labour 
market in regard to natural resources which are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
3.3.2 Volatility  
When oil prices used to be regulated mostly by the main international oil companies 
there was not much volatility in prices, so it was not an important factor. However, 
after the first and second oil shocks, volatility became an inevitable factor of the oil 
market. Furthermore, as a consequence of the collapse of the OPEC oil pricing 
system, crude oil prices are determined in the international market, which induces 
even more volatility in oil prices. It turns out that volatility has a significant impact on 
the role that oil plays in the economy and this needs to be considered in econometric 
models.  
A strand of literature indicates that volatility is the key reason for the poor 
performance of resource-rich countries (Blattman et al. 2007; Van Der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke 2009). As Humphreys et al. (2007) illustrate, there are three channels for 
volatilities in resource revenues. The first one is the rate of extraction; volatility can 
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arise due to the nature of extraction. Usually in the first years after an oil discovery 
the stock is abundant and this speeds up the extraction. Nevertheless, the pace of 
extraction decreases when the stock gets low and becomes difficult to access. The 
second channel is the differences in the timing of payments by buyers and 
contractors, and the last one is the oscillation in prices that can happen due to 
political turmoil, the discovery of new resources, a change in supply and demand 
etc. For instance, the Iranian revolution in 1979 caused an oil shock because the 
country is a major oil exporter.  
In addition, another example of volatility affecting an oil exporting country is 
economic sanctions on a major oil exporting country, for instance the sanctions on 
Iran’s oil in 2011. Due to the nuclear programme, the US and EU imposed tough 
sanctions on Iran’s oil export, which made her GDP slump overnight. Volatility was 
translated into the country’s gold and exchange rate market. It is worth mentioning 
that the embargo on Iran’s oil also affected Saudi Arabia and Iraq’s oil production as 
they had to increase their shares to fulfil the abrupt shortage in the international 
market.  
Furthermore, volatility can be aggravated by international borrowing by a resource-
abundant country. Developing countries rich in resources like oil and gas can use 
their wealth as collateral and borrow against their future income. This rarely can 
happen for developing countries without natural resource endowments. The problem 
here is that when prices are high the risk is low; therefore, the value of future oil 
income surges. As a result, this accelerator effect reduces the interest on loans, and 
in the future will intensify the impact of the boom. On the other hand, once prices 
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fall, the value of collateral reduces. Consequently, the decelerator effect reduces the 
interest rate and again intensifies the impact of the downturn.  
Both the government and private sector need to deal with the volatility in the oil 
market. A diversified economy can be better off than one that only focuses on oil, all 
things being equal. Blattman et al. (2007) investigated the economic growth of 35 
countries during the period 1870-1939 and their results showed that countries that 
concentrate on commodities with considerable price volatility suffer from volatility in 
their terms of trade, and foreign direct investment. They also concluded that those 
countries experience lower economic growth than those that focus on commodities 
with less volatile prices or those that are industrialized.  
Oil is produced in different countries all around the world and any attempt to raise 
the price or reduce the volatility rationally needs collaboration from, if not all, certainly 
most oil producers. Most endeavours to establish international cartels in order to 
prevent volatility in the oil market have not been successful. The Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 1960 in an attempt to 
“coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its member countries and ensure the 
stabilization of the oil market in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular 
supply of petroleum for consumers, a steady income for producers and a fair return 
on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry” (Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries 2017).  
Many economists believe OPEC is a profit-maximizing cartel, and according to the 
definition of a cartel, cartels divide the market, defend prices and establish quotas. 
However, OPEC has by no means divided the market or defended oil prices (Alhajji 
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and Huettner 2000). There is no agreement over whether OPEC’s efforts to increase 
prices or reduce the fluctuation in the oil market have succeeded. Some of the 
sudden increases and decreases in the world market in the last 50 years have 
arguably been attributable to alterations in OPEC’s dynamics1 (Frankel 2010). In the 
meantime, some new oil producers outside OPEC proposed a reduction in OPEC’s 
shared monopoly power even when it was performing in union. However, there are 
a number of measures that can be taken to act as a buffer against volatility, such as 
wealth funds and appropriate government policies.       
3.3.3 Human Capital in Energy-exporting Countries  
The way we explain education is challenged by the paradigm shift to explaining 
development in less economic terms. Human development is the key concern and 
sustainable development is presented in terms of people’s choices (UNDP, 1990). 
Amartya Sen proposed the capability approach which provides a conceptual 
framework of aforementioned view. According to him human development is the 
process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy expressed as their 
capabilities in doing so. In addition, he believes education expands the individual’s 
‘functioning’s’; and therefore, enhances their capabilities.   
Sen (2001), a development economist, highlights the significance of social returns 
from education for economic growth. Economic growth frameworks have expressed 
a positive correlation between human capital, economic growth and development. 
According to Gylfason (2001), countries with natural resource endowments have 
lower investment in education as a percentage of GNP. His results show that natural 
                                                          
1 For example, the Arab oil embargo in 1973, which was followed by a collapse in the 1980s when members 
refused to follow their quotas. 
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resources seem to crowd out human capital, thereby slowing the process of 
economic development. In Gylfason’s view, in countries where natural resources are 
the main asset, the development of other resources such as human capital will be 
ignored. In the same line of research, Birdsall et al. (2000) realized that resource-
rich developing nations have lower public expenditures on education than other 
developing countries.  
Seminal works of Romer (1986) and Lucas changed the neoclassical growth theory 
by highlighting mechanism and incentives which are connected to dynamics of 
growth. Their methodology puts human capital as a critical factor to create 
technological development which translates to steady state economic growth. These 
frameworks of growth share the notion of Arrow (1962) of existence of significant 
externalities in the accumulation process. The most common way of measuring 
human capital is school enrolment ratios due to availability in many countries.  
However, this is not a perfect index since it only reflects the current flow of education. 
To this end, many scholars such as Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) created 
more elaborate measures for human capital.  
Wade (1992) indicated that in Latin America, the owners of natural resources are 
controlling states, and they do not have any motivation to invest in education. The 
logic behind this idea is that resource-rich countries have plenty of foreign exchange; 
therefore, they do not need to invest in other skills to be able to export manufactured 
goods. Two reasons for this are the policies of the education system and institutions. 
In essence, spending on education does not always lead to good educational quality; 
in addition, education expenditure and quality are facilitated by institutions and 
policies. In other words, the roots of the political and economic channels for the 
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resource curse are interrelated and usually overlap. Gylfason (2001) believes that 
oil-abundant countries with ample oil income ignore the importance of investing in 
human capital.  
Although the majority of studies in the resource curse literature consider education 
to be the only factor for human capital accumulation, this is not in fact the case. 
Another important dimension of human capital accumulation is health as a driver of 
sustainable growth. Kim and Lin (2017) study the impact of natural resource 
abundance on education and health, applying dynamic panel co-integration methods 
in order to consider the heterogeneity in the association across nations. Their results 
indicate that resource dependence has a significant impact on both education and 
health. However, there are significant cross-country differences in regard to 
education and health in relation to natural resources. Interestingly, it is shown that 
the education-improving impact of resources is more significant in states with higher 
income and higher institutional quality. On the other hand, the health-decreasing 
impact of resources is more dominant in states with lower income and poor 
institutional quality.   
One important aspect of human capital is education which is prerequisite for rapid 
economic growth all around the world. In regard to Iran, the higher education sector 
has undergone remarkable growth in the last two decades. The country has 
witnessed a rapid extension of the private sector. The state is responsible for both 
financing and administration of elementary and secondary education through the 
Ministry of Education. According to UNESCO data published by the World Bank in 
2014 Iran’s education sector spent 2.95 percent of its GDP on education. This 
number indicates 19.7 percent of government expenditures. In the same line of 
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research data from World Bank on adjusted saving, education expenditure refers to 
the current expenditures in education, such as wages and salaries, excluding capital 
investments in buildings and facilities.  
 
Figure (3.5) Adjusted Net Saving: Education Expenditure   
Source: The World Bank  
In the period of 1976 to 1982 the education expenditure was the highest, then after 
1982 it dropped significantly but in the years to follow it remained relatively stable. 
Although there is significant evidence at the micro level to support a connection 
between government education expenditures and human capital, this does not 
translate to a link between education expenditures and economic growth in the 
macro-level data.  
3.4 Political Economy  
Another channel through which the resource curse hypothesis can be felt is political 
economy, which encompasses rent-seeking activities, corruption, civil wars, 
inappropriate policies and armed conflicts. There is a vast body of literature on how 
natural resources invite rent seeking and corruption, which have adverse effects on 
the economic performance of nations (Ross 1999; Baland and Francois 2000; Auty 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
84 
 
2001a; Torvik 2002; Robinson et al. 2006; Wick and Bulte 2006). Miguel et al. (2004) 
show that economic shocks play a role in creating conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) present evidence indicating that natural resources are the source of armed 
conflict. They claim there is a non-linear relationship between natural resources and 
armed conflicts; however, they do not clarify why the results for prosperity among 
resource-rich countries are different. In the following, three channels of political 
economy are discussed.  
3.4.1 Rent-seeking Activities  
Lane and Tornell (1996) demonstrated that in a country with a few elites, where all 
have access to production, both the rate of return on productivity and growth can be 
reduced. The logic behind this is that when productivity is higher, each group tries to 
attain a superior share of production by demanding more transfers, while more 
transfers raise the tax rate and decrease the net return on capital. Therefore, the 
direct influence of productivity can be outweighed by redistribution effects. One line 
of research highlights the adverse impact of rent-seeking activities correlated with 
natural resource endowments (Torvik 2002; Robinson et al. 2006). Torvik (2002) 
demonstrates in his framework that a large amount of natural resources raises the 
number of entrepreneurs involved in rent-seeking activities and reduces the number 
of entrepreneurs engaging in productive activities.     
It is revealed that the subsequent fall in income is higher than the increase in income 
from natural resources. As a result, natural resource endowments create lower 
welfare. Unproductive and ineffective authority can explain the extent of poor 
performance. Since the oil revenue goes to the state, it definitely affects state 
capacity. Inasmuch as earnings from oil abundance encourage rent-seeking 
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behaviours, the government converts to a kind of “honeypot” in which rival interests 
attempt to take a substantial share of resource incomes by taking the state’s portion. 
The result will be a vicious cycle where everyone tries to achieve parts of the 
bureaucracy while states, in turn, pay their cohorts by funnelling favours their way. 
This can translate into the absence of corporate cohesion and power to exercise 
efficient public policy. According to Baland and Francois (2000), ‘‘when a large 
proportion of individuals are engaged in rent-seeking already, such an increase 
inclines the economy towards more rent seeking and may actually lead to a decline 
in aggregate income” (Baland and Francois 2000: 529).  
Since the recipients of resource rents become politically powerful and are usually 
governments, they can prevent economic reform or turn it to their advantage. The 
“rent-cycling” theory stresses the association between the economy and politics in 
developing resource-abundant countries. This theory was born out of an observation 
that resource rents and foreign aid influence policy implementation (Tollison 1982).  
Kruger et al. (1991) stress the point that resource rents may be disconnected from 
what generated them; therefore, the chance of a political contest to capture them is 
high. As a result, income from resources will affect both the structure of the economy 
and political incentives of the government. Rent-seeking behaviour, particularly by 
powerful politicians, creates corruption and inadequate governance, which leads to 
crowding out social capital. As a result, institutional quality deteriorates, leading to 
corruption.    
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3.4.2 Corruption  
There is an understanding that having natural resources in a country increases 
corruption: Leite and Weidmann (1999) discovered that resource dependence has a 
significant statistical effect on corruption. Countries with the greatest resource 
abundance, in particular oil exporting ones, have the highest level of corruption (Karl 
2007). In the same line of research, Arezki and Bruckner (2009) believe that oil 
revenues increase corruption in resource-rich states. As mentioned before, oil is the 
catalyst for a long-standing tendency of the government to become overextended. A 
lack of well-developed financial and insurance markets, substantial fluctuations the 
terms of trade, and the government access to resources during high prices period, 
have contributed to the expansion of public sector (Ersel and Kandil 2006). Studies 
suggest that the level of corruption is much higher in states in which the civil service 
is quite large, and for employment and promotion, instead of relying on merit, it relies 
on the political elite’s interest. Therefore, attempts to restructure the civil service are 
unfeasible in order to keep the patterns of corruption.  
Political economy has recognized that good governance and democracy are crucial 
for tackling the corruption that can be the potential result of resource endowments. 
Corruption can happen in different ways in a country, one of which is in the policies 
that the government applies. Another one that happens quite often in resource-rich 
countries is bribing. Policy corruption can include corrupt impacts on the enactment 
and pattern of policies. It can also be administrative corruption, which refers to 
misuse of administrative office to gain benefits that are not legal to approve 
operational activities. Administrative corruption can also be a direct corrupt action by 
agencies for their own benefit when they are responsible for trading a country’s oil. 
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Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) find evidence that natural resource abundance raises 
corruption due to poor quality of institutions, and reduces investment, human capital 
and R&D.    
In the worst case scenario, corruption can lead to a “corruption trap”, whereby 
payments at the topmost political institutions inspire corruption, to the point that a 
significant fraction of both the private and public sector are engaged. It should be 
mentioned that corruption not only happens in the production and export of natural 
resources but is also due to the tremendously high-level and challenging-to-absorb 
investment in both upstream and downstream stages, where it is hard to track 
resources that have disappeared. The huge income from oil creates a voracious rent 
seeking that destroys the development of institutions through corruption (Leite and 
Weidmann 1999). In resource-rich countries, the earnings from resources, especially 
in a concentrated form, acts like a magnet for political competition. Furthermore, 
political parties, in order to stay in power, propose different ways of redistributing 
income from resources to favoured groups.  
3.4.3 Institutional Quality  
One strand of research explains the resource curse hypothesis through the 
differences in countries’ institutional arrangements. Institutions have received 
substantial attention not only in growth literature but also in the economies of 
countries with natural resource endowments. There is a growing literature on the 
prominence of institutions in elucidating the resource curse hypothesis as 
emphasized by the World Bank publication (Harford and Klein 2005). Economy is 
inevitably embedded in a group of non-market organizations. Yifu Lin and Nugent 
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(1995: 2306-7) define institutions as a “set of humanly devised behavioural rules that 
govern and shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping them to form 
expectations of what other people will do”. As Rodrik (2007) indicates in his book, 
institutions are necessary for markets since they are not “self-creating”, “self-
regulating”, “self-stabilizing” or “self-legitimizing”.  
The direction of the relationship between oil revenues and institutional quality has 
been controversial. Lately, economists and politicians have drawn attention to the 
relationship between good governance, high-quality institutions and economic 
growth. Good governance comprises powerful rule of law, strong property rights, low 
corruption and policies that meet the needs of the economy. The result of good 
governance is an environment that provides opportunity for investment. According 
to Askari (2007: 230), the investment climate is “the set of factors for firms to 
productively invest, employ and expand”. It is important to look at sets of factors in 
institutions that increase incentives to invest both for domestic and foreign 
investment. 
 
  
Figure (3.6) Incentives for Investment  
The question here is: what are high-quality institutions and good governance, and 
how do we measure them? Human beings believe that today’s formalized rule 
constructions control the performance of organizations and institutions. This means 
that many constructions have developed into their current form of structure, which 
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existed at some point in time in history to satisfy social aims. There is a cluster of 
institutions that matter for long-run economic growth, such as independent judiciary, 
property rights enforcement, institutions that provide access to health care and 
institutions that can provide equal opportunity for education. 
Rodrik and ebrary (2003) indicate that the foundations of long-run economic growth 
are institutions that deliver reliable property rights and concrete rule of law, and bring 
into line economic incentives with social costs and benefits. Institutions in countries 
with or without natural resources are “the rules of the game in a society, or more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 
1990: 3). Institutions are vital for economic growth since they structure human 
interaction. The institutional strength and efficient regulations can act as shock 
absorbers for the economy of a country. As Rodrik (2007: 153) indicates in his book, 
 “a clearly delineated system of property rights; a regularity apparatus 
curbing the worst forms of fraud, anticompetitive behaviour, and moral 
hazards; a moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social 
cooperation; social and political institutions that mitigate risk and manage 
social conflicts; the rule of law and clean government, these are social 
arrangements that economists usually take for granted, but which are 
conspicuous by their absence in poor countries.”  
Measuring institutional quality is a controversial topic; different researchers have 
used different methods and indicators to measure it. Empirical research on the role 
played by institutions in producing growth suffers from a number of issues: i) a lack 
of institutional quality indexes; ii) endogenous variables; iii) collinearity; and iv) the 
existence of omitted variables (Alonso and Garcimartín 2013). A comprehensive 
cross-sectional and time series data set, “the Quality of Government Institutes” 
(henceforth QoG), was presented at the University of Gothenburg. They used a 
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notable number of indicators linked to the quality of government. The variables can 
be categorized into three different collections. The first group is the central feature 
of QoG, including corruption and democracy. The second group is variables that 
suggested the development of QoG, such as forms of government, religion and 
social fractionalization. The last group is variables relating to the posited 
consequences of QoG, like human development and environmental sustainability.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001a) in their study introduced the risk of expropriation as a crucial 
indicator of institutional quality. Chong and Calderon (2000) used different indexes 
for institutional quality in their research. They used the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) and Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI). Their data set 
covered measures on corruption, bureaucracy, risk of expropriation and other 
issues. In another study, Rodrik et al. (2004) used indices of the rule of law and 
property rights for measuring institutional quality. Acemoglu et al. (2001a) 
considered expropriation risk to investors as an institutional quality indicator. 
Acemoglu et al. (2003) in their study introduced a “cluster of institutions” for the 
quality of institutions, which is the extent of restraints on the administration. Their 
hypothesis is that weak institutions create inequality and dictatorship, and there are 
no constraints on politicians who wish to plunder the country.  
Mehlum et al. (2006b) took a different approach to clarify the role of institutions; they 
distinguish between two types of institutions: producer-friendly and grabber-friendly. 
According to them, in producer-friendly institutions, rent seeking and production are 
complementary activities. On the other hand, in grabber-friendly institutions, rent 
seeking and production are competing activities. Institutions are grabber-friendly due 
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to the poor rule of law, inefficient bureaucracy and corruption, which encourages 
specialization in unproductive activities that are bad for economic growth. On the 
other hand, producer-friendly institutions can absorb entrepreneurs, which creates 
higher growth. Their results show that resource-rich countries only perform poorly if 
they do not have good-quality institutions (e.g. poor rule of law or high risk of 
expropriation).  
Kunčič (2014) categorized institutions into three different groups – legal, political and 
economic institutions – and introduced a number of proxies for each group. Another 
index used for institutional quality is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
Although it has been harshly criticized by other researchers such as Oman (2006), 
Knack (2006) and Kurtz and Schrank (2007), most of the critiques of the WGI were 
soundly rejected by Kaufmann et al. (2011). It is important to mention that all the 
existing indicators capture the actual quality of institutions imperfectly.   
One explanation of why a high economic growth rate is not a systematic 
consequence of natural resource abundance is the wrong policies adopted by 
government, such as the lack of a sound tax system in oil exporting countries. In 
most resource-rich countries, natural resources are under public ownership; 
therefore, the government pays its expenses mainly from the resource earnings, 
which reduce the need for taxation. Since the ruling elites do not need to depend on 
tax revenue, they carry on with their instructions without much representation 
(Mahdavy 1970; Salehi Esfahani 2006). Since the government does not rely on taxes 
and gets a large portion of its income from oil, it does not feel responsible for 
providing enough public goods (see, for instance, (Lane and Tornell 1996; Leite and 
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Weidmann 1999; Tornell and Lane 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Apart from the 
influence of natural resource abundance on policy outcomes, revenue from natural 
resources has affected political institutions in resource-rich countries. Another policy 
in most of the developing resource-rich countries is the provision of generous and 
inefficient subsidies for energy and preventive trade policies, as Salehi Esfahani 
(2006) mentions. 
There was no consensus over whether good institutions lead to economic growth or 
economic development and growth will create good institutions until Ngerman and 
Sokoloff (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2001a) offered convincing evidence that 
institutions are the reason for the poor performance of resource-rich countries. In the 
former, the causation is shown to be inequality driven by scale economies, and in 
the latter, the authors explain the causality by observing historical dissimilarities that 
influenced the establishment of institutions in colonies of the European countries.     
Efficiency in administrative and judicial systems is essential for good institutions. 
However, constructing a robust bureaucracy and judiciary creates some difficulties 
for developing resource-rich countries. First and foremost, improving these 
institutions needs capable administrators in national governments to plan and carry 
out policies. Although there are specific approaches for initially starting and slowly 
rebuilding the system, some difficulties need to be faced in applying these methods. 
For instance, it is challenging for leaders to grant autonomy to juries and bureaucrats 
to allow them to proceed with required alternations.      
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3.5 Empirical Studies 
Scholars have concentrated on investigating empirically the relationship between oil 
price fluctuations and main macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, rate 
of employment, government expenditure and inflation. However, the literature has 
still not reached a consensus. The following section will review some studies on the 
role of oil income in the economics of developing countries. The outline for the 
empirical analysis of growth-accounting models is explained in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995).  
A cross-sectional specification framework has frequently been used in resource 
curse and economic growth literature following the influential work by Sachs and 
Warner (1995b). They demonstrated a negative relationship between natural 
resource abundance and economic growth for 97 countries by introducing different 
explanatory variables for resource abundance. For instance, (Gylfason et al. 1999; 
Rodriguez and Sachs 1999; Bulte et al. 2005), among others, follow Sachs and 
Warner’s approach by estimating the growth equation as: 
(
1
𝑇
) log (
𝑌𝑇
𝑖
𝑌0
𝑖⁄ ) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 log(𝑌
𝑖) + 𝛿′𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                 (3.1) 
Their explanation was that economic growth in country i in the period 𝑡 to 𝑇 would 
be a negative function of initial output 𝑌0
𝑖 and a vector of other structural factors of 
the economy (𝑍𝑖). They test in their study whether resource dependence is among 
the structural factors (𝑍𝑖). Their results showed that for the period 1970 to 1989 
natural resource abundance depressed economic growth. Sachs and Warner 
(1995b) kicked off the econometric evidence of slow economic growth with economic 
dependence on natural resources. Most researches who support the resource curse 
94 
 
theory tend to follow Sachs and Warner’s cross-sectional approach (Gylfason et al. 
1999; Rodriguez and Sachs 1999; Bulte et al. 2005). However, their approach has 
been criticized on a number of grounds and has given rise to a number of studies 
that find a positive or ambiguous relationship between natural resource endowments 
and economic growth. Some studies shed doubt on the theory of the resource curse, 
including (Arezki and Van der Ploeg 2007; Alexeev and Conrad 2009; Cavalcanti et 
al. 2011a; Cavalcanti et al. 2012; Esfahani et al. 2013; Esfahani et al. 2014). 
Subsequently a number of statistical studies, such as (Delacroix 1977; Davis 1995; 
Herb 2005), showed no evidence of a curse for resource-rich countries. A number 
of these studies have questioned this approach and have used other types of 
regression, namely panel data, vector auto-regression or autoregressive distributed 
lag, due to their advantages for studying economic growth.  
Eltony and Al‐Awadi (2001) studied the effect of oil price fluctuations on 
macroeconomic variables in Kuwait using a VAR model. Their results illustrated that 
oil shocks are an essential factor in explaining fluctuations in macroeconomic 
variables in Kuwait. They found evidence of the effect of oil price fluctuations on 
government expenditure. Raguindin and Reyes (2005) studied the impact of oil price 
fluctuations on Philippine macroeconomic variables from 1981 to 2003. They found 
evidence that an oil shock will lead to a long decline in the real GDP. Interestingly, 
their asymmetric VAR framework showed that oil price reductions had a greater 
effect on each macroeconomic variable’s fluctuation than oil price surges.   
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) illustrated that the adverse impact of an abundance of 
natural resources on institutions is largely because of using initial GDP values as 
control variables. They stated that it appears that natural resource abundance 
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increases per capita GDP without concurrent development of institutions in the 
country. They concluded that, for the reason given, and since institutions in nations 
with natural resources are positively correlated with GDP, the results would be 
biased towards a negative impact of natural resources on institutions by considering 
GDP as a control in a regression of the quality of institutions on oil wealth. 
El-Anashasy (2006) investigated the effects of oil price fluctuations on Venezuela’s 
economy over the period 1950 to 2001. He used a VAR model to study the link 
between oil prices, government income, GDP, government consumption and 
investment. The results indicate a long-term relationship between economic growth 
and fiscal balance. In addition, he found evidence that oil incomes not only have an 
effect on long-term economic performance but also create fluctuations in the short 
run.    
Berument et al. (2010) investigated the impact of symmetric oil price shock on 
industrial production for MENA countries using several VAR models for each country 
from 1960 to 2003. They found different results for different countries through their 
impulse response analyses. The results for Iran, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates show that oil price 
fluctuations have a positive and statistically significant impact on their GDP. Although 
the results for Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Yemen were positive, they 
were not statistically significant.  
Olomola and Adejumo (2006) studied the role that oil price shocks played in the 
output, inflation, real exchange rate and money supply in Nigeria over the period 
1970 to 2003 applying a VAR model. Their results indicate that oil price shocks do 
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not affect output and inflation; however, they have a significant impact on both the 
real exchange rate and money supply in the long term.  
Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) analysed the impact of oil price changes on real 
GDP per capita, public consumption, imports, the real exchange rate and inflation 
using the VAR approach. Their findings showed that higher oil prices will lead to 
appreciation in the real exchange rate. They believe this is one of the syndromes of 
the Dutch Disease where imports and domestic output per capita increase 
considerably. Furthermore, government expenditures increase in the mid run.   
Leite and Weidmann (1999) did not find any direct effect of natural resource intensity 
on economic growth from 1970 to 1990; however, they demonstrated a significant 
indirect impact through the influence of resources on corruption, which negatively 
influences economic growth. The outcome was confirmed by other works such as 
Isham et al. (2005)  and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). They investigated 
the impact of natural resources on wider indexes of institutional quality and policies. 
They indicated that for a given level of institutional quality, natural resource intensity 
has no direct effect on growth. Rather, natural resource endowments show their 
negative impact indirectly through institutional quality, although this is only the case 
when resources are geographically concentrated like oil.  
Lederman and Maloney (2003), without controlling for institutions, concluded that 
resource endowments measured by resource export per worker and in ratio to GDP 
have a positive impact on growth. On the other hand, resource concentration and 
export dependence have an adverse impact on growth. They believe the negative 
effect is because of a reduction in the accumulation of both physical and human 
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capital and deterioration of the terms of trade. In another panel study, Torres et al. 
(2012) illustrated in a single panel estimation with random effects that oil 
endowments that are measured by production did not hamper economic growth from 
1980 to 2003 in oil producing countries.  
Lane and Tornell (1996) augmented a neoclassical growth model by substituting 
powerful groups for the representative household. The model encompasses a 
different notion, which is called the “voracity effect”. They define it as “a more than 
proportional increase in redistribution in response to an increase in the raw rate of 
return” (1996: 213). Their results demonstrated that, in a country with powerful 
groups and poor institutional quality, the voracity effect only operates if the 
substitution elasticity is high. In general, it can be said that there is no consensus 
over the resource curse hypothesis. There is no agreement over the most accurate 
method of measuring resource abundance and statistical technique for analysing the 
impact of natural resources. 
According to Collier and Laroche (2014), one of the essential measures that needs 
to take place in resource-rich countries is that of high-quality institutions that are 
suited to their development path. As they emphasized, since developing countries 
are on a different development path their needs are different and thus they need 
institutions that meet their own needs. They suggested that five sets of rules are 
necessary for resource-rich countries to benefit from their natural resources. The 
first one is transparency; the second is that governments will be required to specify 
the amount of asset incomes they dedicate to asset accumulation; the third is that 
governments must set up a rainy-day rule to guarantee that government expenditure 
and consumption will not face difficulties; the fourth one is to make sure that 
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investment is contributing to development and economic growth in the long term; 
and the final rule states that countries should stop borrowing and focus on saving. 
Only if savings go up can the ‘rainy-day’ rule work. 
Ross (2012), drawing on statistical analysis, demonstrates that the oil curse 
hypothesis is not always true. In chapter six he shows that there is no evidence for 
oil acting as a curse for economic growth in the long-term, stressing the long-term 
growth rates between oil rich and oil-scare states for the last fifty years.  While he 
highlights that the economic growth has fluctuated more in oil rich countries he also 
challenges the findings that have illustrate a reverse association between oil 
endowments and the quality of institutions on methodological grounds.  
Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) argue in their book that it is not natural resources 
wealth which created a relatively poor economic performance, but the ownership 
structure that countries choose to manage their wealth is responsible for the poor 
outcome.  They identify four different types of ownership, and of the four types in 
which the bulk of the endowments is under, private management is the best. On the 
other hand the type in which the state displaces both private and foreign investors is 
the worst. The other types are either a leading role for foreign firms or with a division 
between private and state management. The last two types fall in between the best 
and the worse.  
3.6 Drawbacks of the Studies   
All empirical studies that either confirm or doubt the resource curse hypothesis used 
econometric approaches. There are a number of grounds on which their econometric 
approaches to the negative link between resource abundance and economic growth 
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can be questioned. First, the studies do not take into account the time dimension of 
the data since they mostly rely on cross-sectional methods.  
The general trend in the literature for studying the natural resource abundance and 
economic growth relationship is to use cross-sectional method based on the 
superiority of the data set. Within a cross-sectional approach, the differences in 
countries such as the initial level of output per capita, the quality of institutions, the 
political system and the level of technology have not been considered. In other 
words, the problem of homogeneity arises. Furthermore, cross-sectional methods 
are subject to endogeneity problems (Cavalcanti et al. 2011b) and endogeneity, is 
the main reason for being sceptical about their results. The most common response 
to the endogeneity1 problem has been the use of the instrumental variables 
technique suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). Most panel data studies 
overcome the endogeneity problem by using homogeneous panel techniques like 
the traditional fixed- and random-effects estimators, which usually use an 
instrumental variable technique and generalized methods of moments estimators. A 
wide range of instrumental variables has been proposed, so one can find an 
instrument that is correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable. As Durlauf 
et al. (2005) indicated in their study, it is not easy to identify valid instrumental 
variables. Discussion about instrumental variables raises another significant 
although neglected problem in empirical research on economic growth, and that is 
the association between model specification and instrumental variable selection. It 
                                                          
1 It should be borne in mind that there may be different reasons for the correlation between the residuals 
and an explanatory variable, such as omitted variables and measurement.   
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is not possible to discuss the validity of instrumental variables without referring to the 
choice of the specific growth determinants.  
Despite the fact that with homogeneous panel data frameworks the intercept can be 
diverse among countries, other parameters are assumed to be identical; 
consequently, the model suffers from a high degree of homogeneity. In addition, a 
cross-sectional growth regression augmented with the ratio of primary-product 
exports to GDP suffers from endogeneity of explanatory variable issues. Lederman 
and Maloney (2002) tested Sachs and Warner’s hypothesis but they allowed for 
endogeneity and used different periods of time, and their outcome did not confirm 
Sachs and Warner’s results. Furthermore, in the same line of research, Arezki and 
Van der Ploeg (2007) used instrumental variable techniques to overcome the 
endogeneity problem of explanatory variables. By controlling for institutional quality, 
openness and initial income, Sachs and Warner’s findings did not survive.  
The other pitfall of the cross-sectional approach is that it suffers from omitted 
variables since it overestimates the impact of initial output per capita and as a result 
underestimates the speed of conditional convergence. The standard method to 
overcome the problem of omitted variables is to use proxies or instruments; however, 
this methodology makes strong assumptions that are usually not met in reality. An 
alternative is to use the application of non-stochastic weighting suggested by 
Robinson (1991), which is a form of sample splitting or random weighting considered 
by Hidalgo (1992), or a random search procedure proposed by Gozalo (1993). The 
omitted variable is a serious model misspecification, and all the mentioned methods 
can only alleviate the problem, not resolve it. Although it can be argued that the 
difficulty that arises from the omitted variables problem applies to historical and case 
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studies, it is expected that the researcher has an understanding of important forces, 
which are difficult to quantify.    
Another drawback of this approach is that the cross-sectional approach does not 
take into account the time dimension of data. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, 
Cavalcanti et al. (2011b) argued that most existing work concentrates on the impact 
of resource endowments on the economic growth rate, while most growth 
frameworks based on the Solow/Ramsey theory indicate that the impact on growth 
should be temporary but could be forever for the level of per capita income. This is 
in line with the empirical results provided in the work by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997). In addition, the studies that found a negative association between natural 
resources and economic growth usually looked at the time span of 1960-2000.  
To address these drawbacks, different researchers used different approaches. 
Some used panel data approaches, such as (Cavalcanti et al. 2011b), and their 
results were in contrast with the standard resource curse and economic growth 
literature. Their outcome sheds doubts on the robustness of Sachs and Warner’s 
and their followers’ results. One alternative, as mentioned earlier for studies looking 
at a number of countries, is the use of panel data, which increases the efficiency, 
and also richer models can be estimated; however, it could create biases if the 
parameter homogeneity assumptions are not correct. The ultimate advantage of a 
panel data approach over a cross section is that it makes it possible for a researcher 
to have flexibility in taking into account differences across countries.   
Some other scholars, such as (Luintel and Khan 1999; Garratt et al. 2003; Dritsakis 
et al. 2006; Mahadevan and Asafu-Adjaye 2007; Uğur 2008; Esfahani et al. 2013; 
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Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013; Esfahani et al. 2014) among others, used vector 
error correction models, and followed this approach by estimating a regression as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽𝑦0 + 𝛽𝑦𝑦1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽𝑦𝑥1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑦𝑥𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑦
     (3.2) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the natural logarithm of per capita output (economic growth),  𝛽𝑦0 is 
intercept coefficients at lag 𝑝, 𝑣𝑡
𝑦
 is the stochastic term or the error term at time t 
and 𝑥 is the matrix of other variables. Exogenous variables can easily be added to 
the right-hand side of the VAR equations, without including any additional equation 
in the model. The VAR approach is suitable due to its ability to avoid imposing strong 
restrictions and its ability to consider the dynamic structure of the framework. Another 
advantage of VAR frameworks over traditional large-scale macro-econometric 
models is that the outcome is easily interpretable.  
Different studies have used different proxies to measure resource abundance. The 
most popular measure of resource abundance is the share of resources in either 
export or GDP following Sachs and Warner (1995b). However, the share of 
resources in export expresses resource dependence rather than resource 
abundance, which was pointed out by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). 
Brunnschweiler (2008) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), using resource stocks 
data from the World Bank, illustrate that resource abundance does not have negative 
impact on growth. However, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) believe this effect 
is not significant after accounting for a number of statistical issues (although they 
say that not taking into account the volatility channel might lead to the conclusion 
that there is no impact from natural resources on growth).  
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Wright and Czelusta (2004) differentiate between natural resource endowments and 
export dependence. Ding and Field (2005) claim that while resource abundance 
cannot be a curse for a country, natural resource export dependence can be. Then 
they run a recursive framework and demonstrate that the negative impact of natural 
resource export dependence and abundance fades. They find an inverse correlation 
between human capital and export dependence and claim that the curse may be 
because of the level of dependence on resources, which is the result of poor 
development of human capital.   
3.7 Successful Management of Natural Resources    
There is evidence that some countries have been very successful in using their 
natural resources. One important factor in successful stories on natural resources is 
high-quality institutions, which can turn natural resources into an asset rather than a 
challenge. In states with good institutions such as decent protection of property 
rights, a sound tax system and the rule of law, natural resources have a very 
significant positive impact on growth. In general, more natural resources can provide 
the private sector with sufficient investment opportunities, in turn generating positive 
externalities for other sectors. The importance of institutional quality has already 
been discussed. 
Improving other sectors along with natural resources export is another key factor for 
successful management of natural resource endowments. For instance, in Norway 
most of the oil resources are found offshore, which requires high-technology 
equipment to extract. In the initial extraction phase in 1973, Norway was dependent 
on foreigner companies, but very soon after the first phase the country developed its 
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own industry and created a world-leading industry for offshore extraction. This 
means Norway was able to export its human capital, technology and physical capital 
for oil extraction to countries with offshore resources. In other words, this was in 
contrast to the so-called Dutch Disease explanation, in which it is believed that the 
main economic reason for the resource curse in resource-rich countries is the 
crowding out of non-oil exports.  
One way of managing earnings from oil is to ensure that oil incomes are put aside 
into a national saving fund in high-price periods (Davis et al. 2001; Davis et al. 2003a; 
Davis et al. 2003b). Many resource-rich countries have established commodity funds 
for investing their earnings in boom times, usually in international portfolios. The first 
and largest commodity funds are in the Persian Gulf, owned by Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates (Frankel 2010). It has been argued in the literature that the 
establishment of a commodity fund does not automatically do anything special to 
ensure that political elite will not spend when it is flush (Davis et al. 2003a; 
Humphreys and Sandbu 2007).  
To make sure the funds are used for enhancing economic growth, they should be 
used transparently with clear instructions that politicians should not intervene with 
the aim of maximizing the financial well-being of the country. The Norwegian State 
Petroleum Fund (Norwegian Pension Fund) is usually used as a model (Holmøy 
2009). In essence, Norway’s legal system places a number of limitations on what 
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policymakers are allowed to do, and the money is used with political aims that go 
unnoticed when held up as an example for developing countries to follow1.  
The Norwegian Petroleum Fund was established in 1990 with the logic that the return 
on extraction of oil is greater than the return on leaving it as reserves. Not 
surprisingly, in 2008 the total value of the Norwegian Petroleum Fund was 400 billion 
US dollars, which made it the largest sovereign oil fund in the world. It is worth 
mentioning that the oil fund is successful in Norway because it is under public 
scrutiny and a group of independent economists always make the decisions 
concerning it. In addition, everything about the Norwegian Petroleum Fund is very 
transparent. Iran, another oil-rich country, established the Oil Stabilization Fund 
(OSF) in 1999, which was a government-controlled sovereign fund. Unlike the 
Norwegian fund, the OSF was highly secretive and the decisions were made by 
politicians rather than economists. The OSF did not last long because the new 
government in 2004 decided to abolish it.  
According to Amuzegar (2005), there are three fundamental reasons for creating an 
oil stabilization fund. First, it is essential to remove, or at least decrease, the expense 
of stop-go public expenditures related to the ups and downs of oil prices in the 
international market. The second aim is to maintain fiscal discipline through 
decoupling government expenditure from oil price fluctuation; therefore, plans on 
public spending would not be changed by the behaviour of oil prices. Finally, one 
objective is to circumvent extreme appreciation and depreciation of the national 
                                                          
1 The political objectives are thought of as social responsibility. “Norway Proposes to Do Well in Its 
Investments by Doing Good”, New York Times, May 4, 2007, p. C4. 
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currency as a result of fluctuation in oil rents, which can be prevented by an oil 
stabilization fund.    
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) believe that equality in the society and minimal 
government intervention are the key reasons for managing resources successfully. 
However, Acemoglu et al. (2002) challenges this view with the case of Botswana, 
which is successful in turning its resources into a blessing but both inequality and 
government invention are significant. Therefore, he concludes that what lies behind 
the success in Botswana is high-quality institutions and a good political system. In 
general, it can be said that to manage natural resources well, a number of factors 
are important, including appropriate policy implications, high-quality institutions and 
a fund to distribute wealth among different generations.  
3.8 Conclusion  
The effects of natural resources on economic performance are by no means 
universal. Economic growth is determined by several and different factors across 
countries. Furthermore, growth factors are interrelated in multidimensional ways, 
creating a specific case in each country. This point has essential implications for the 
methods that should be used for studying growth and also for the consequences in 
each country. Broadly speaking, natural resource endowments do not necessarily 
lead to poor economic performance; it is best to consider this as a double-edged 
sword. Theoretical reasoning and statistical evidence show that natural resource 
endowments can have both negative and positive effects on economic performance.  
Institutions and policies have significant roles; therefore, they have to be tailored to 
each country’s circumstances. By bringing together a number of analytical 
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perspectives, the evidence illustrates that natural resources are not a curse. In other 
words, empirical and historical studies demonstrate that natural resource 
endowments do promote economic growth and development when combined with 
knowledge regarding innovation, good policies and high-quality institutions. Without 
doubt, institutions and policies are different in every country due to the local 
circumstances. However, with innovation and the right policies, there is no reason 
for resource-rich countries to face a curse.  
Oil income can offer a way out of the poverty trap. It is essential to use oil revenue 
on public goods, which act as the platform for private investment, development and 
economic growth. When in boom times petrodollars are invested in different public 
goods, the result is that private investment and economic activities will lead to higher 
income, better budgetary resources, involving non-oil earnings, and consequently 
more opportunities to fund public goods through a general increase in economic 
activities. If for any reason oil earnings decline, a strengthened private sector should 
manage to  offset this (Humphreys et al. 2007).  
This chapter suggests that although the resource curse literature is far from reaching 
a consensus, it has been progressing, particularly in the estimation approaches; 
therefore, it is getting closer to offering a precise and complete response to the 
resource curse theory. A different result, which arises from applying a variety of 
measurements for resource abundance, and empirical methods offer a number of 
hints to answer the hypothesis. It should be mentioned at the same time that it is 
more difficult to compare different answers in order to find a united cohesive 
response. In general, policies, institutional quality and volatility seem to be the most 
reasonable explanation of the role that natural resources play in a country. 
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Appendix 3  
 
Table (3.1) Summary of Studies on the Impact of Natural Resource Abundance on Economic Performance  
Study  Natural resource 
measurement  
Period / 
channels of 
transmission 
Econometric 
Method  
Findings  
Auty (1993)   Descriptive  Resource curse  
Gelb (1988)   Descriptive Resource curse 
Sachs and 
Warner 
(1995, 
1997, 1999, 
2001) 
Ratio of natural 
resource export to 
GDP 
1970-1990 
Looking at 
economic 
growth  
Cross-
sectional  
Inverse association between 
natural resource export and 
economic growth 
109 
 
Gylfason 
(2001) 
Natural capital in 
national wealth 
1970-1998  
Human 
capital  
Regression 
analysis  
Natural resources crowd out 
human capital; therefore 
lower economic growth   
Gylfason 
(2006) 
Natural resource 
intensity, which 
means the extent 
to which a country 
depends on its 
natural resources 
1960-2000 Cross-
country 
evidence   
Natural resources crowd out 
foreign capital, social 
capital, human capital, 
physical capital and financial 
capital; therefore lower 
economic growth 
Gylfason 
and Zoega  
(2006) 
Share of natural 
capital in national 
wealth 
1965-1998 Regression 
analysis  
Relying on natural 
resources reduces saving 
and investment thereby 
lowering the level of 
consumption and output per 
capita  
Mehlum et 
al. (2006) 
% of GDP as 
natural resource 
export  
1965-1990  
Institution  
Cross-
sectional  
Institutions are decisive on 
the resource curse, 
resource curse exists in 
countries with inferior 
institutions 
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Kim and Lin 
(2015) 
Primary product 
exports 
1990-2012 Heterogene
ous panel 
co-
integration 
techniques 
Natural resource abundance 
exerts a negative effect on 
per capita income 
Mehara 
(2009) 
Oil income  5-year 
average data 
over the 
period 1965-
2005  
Panel study Negative effects of oil 
revenues are not universal 
but appear only over the 
‘‘threshold’’ level of oil 
revenues 
Berument et 
al. (2010) 
Oil price shocks 
effect  
1952-2005 Structural 
vector 
autoregressi
on  
Shock in oil prices has a 
statistically significant and 
positive effect on economic 
growth 
James 
(2014) 
The value of crude 
oil and natural gas 
production relative 
to GDP 
1970-1990 Cross-
sectional  
Positive relationship 
between resource 
dependence and economic 
growth in 1970s and 
negative in 1980s, however 
in general positive 
relationship   
Boyce and 
Emery 
(2010) 
Natural resource 
export  
 
1970-2001  Panel data  Resource abundance is 
negatively correlated with 
growth rates but positively 
correlated with income 
levels 
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Brunnschwe
iler (2008) 
Per capita mineral 
and total natural 
resource wealth 
1970-2000 OLS & 
2SLS  
Positive direct empirical 
relationship between natural 
resource abundance and 
economic growth 
Alexeev and 
Conrad 
(2009) 
Logarithm of 1993 
hydrocarbon 
deposits per capita 
/ logarithm of 1 
plus the country’s 
per capita 
production of oil in 
2000 
1965-1970 2SLS 
estimations  
Positive impact of natural 
resources on growth  
Yang and 
Lam (2007) 
Real oil prices 
from BP  
1960-2002 Co-
integration 
analysis  
They find oil booms lead to 
lower GDP or less 
investment in only three 
countries out of 17 
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                                            Chapter Four  
                      THE OUTLOOK OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY  
“Where oil is first found is in the minds of men” 
     Wallace Pratt 
4.1 Introduction  
There is a widespread belief that countries without oil or any kind of natural 
resources are better off than countries with natural resources. Even across countries 
with natural resources the impact of these resources is not the same. How did some 
governments use their income from natural resources in a way that led to economic 
prosperity? The answer lies not only in how countries spend the money from oil 
revenues but also in the quality of institutions, politics, culture and social norms. Yet 
there is no consensus on the role that oil can play in the economy, so it is worth 
exploring this topic further.  
The aim of this chapter is to weave seamlessly together the two related themes of 
the history of oil and the economic growth of Iran. Remarkable chunks of government 
income in Iran are obtained from non-tax income – to be specific, in the form of oil 
receipts. Iran has not been successful in developing the private sector and a sound 
tax system. It might broadly be said that in developing oil exporting countries, there 
have been widespread failures in oil revenue management leading to poor economic 
performance and sluggish economic growth.    
This chapter proposes an overall view of the history of the Iranian economy focusing 
on oil. In addition, it collectively lays out a broad framework for thinking about 
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different issues in regard to oil endowments and their impact on the Iranian economy. 
In doing so, the discovery of oil, the history of oil production, development plans and 
the general performance of the Iranian economy will be discussed. Loosely 
speaking, the history of the Iranian economy can be divided into two main periods, 
i.e. before the Islamic revolution and after the revolution. Needless to say, in both 
periods oil has been the cornerstone of the Iranian economy. Nevertheless, because 
of the importance of oil to industrialized countries, the decision-making on oil has 
never been purely economic. Therefore, in analysing the role that oil has played, the 
political economy of the country needs to be considered as well.  
The general aim here is to examine the macroeconomic performance and policies in 
Iran over the time span of 1955 to 2014. The documentation of Iran’s development 
indicates that Iran was transformed from a farming-based economy in the 1960s to 
almost a modern economy in the 1970s by alterations in the traditional sectors. Iran 
is a large resource-rich country that has experienced a number of important events 
in the course of this study, including oil booms and busts, revolution, sweeping 
institutional changes, an eight-year war with her neighbour Iraq and severe 
economic sanctions.  
The following sections will examine the role of oil incomes in the Iranian economy 
from the time it was discovered until 2014. In addition, the following pages 
incorporate efforts to explain the role that oil has played in the Iranian economy, 
while looking, furthermore, at different channels through which oil income can impact 
on the economy. Studies have usually focused on the short-term impact of having 
oil and have generally eschewed the long-run impact. Therefore, this work looks at 
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the role of oil historically over the long-term. Needless to say, the role of oil revenue 
as a key factor in enhancing economic development derives not only from its direct 
effect on the economic framework but also more significantly from its pervasive 
influence on social life, politics and culture. This study considers all relevant 
channels that could affect the economy of Iran through oil endowments. In addition, 
it will provide a detailed picture of the economic structure of Iran over the course of 
the study.   
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Following this introduction, Section 4.2 
starts with the history and development of the oil industry in Iran. Section 4.3 talks 
about the development plans in Iran starting from 1946, and this is followed by 
Section 4.4, which analyses the macroeconomic performance of the country before 
the revolution. The subsequent section goes to the second period of the study and 
focuses on the changes after the revolution, which is followed by analysing the 
development plans after the revolution. Section 4.5 briefly analyses the brief 
experience of the Oil Stabilization Fund. Finally, Section 4.6 provides a summary 
and some concluding remarks regarding Iran’s economic performance.  
4.2 The Iranian State and the History of Oil  
For the years before 1908, oil did not exist in the Iranian economy, and even after 
its discovery, for a long time oil did not have a significant role in the economy since 
Iran’s share from oil profit was insignificant. On the one hand, in the late nineteenth 
century, Iran internally under the Qajar dynasty was in economic disarray. On the 
other hand, from the outside, in the north, Iran was surrounded by the Tsarist empire 
and in the east by Britain. Hence, the country did not have clear rules and 
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regulations, and also Iran’s Shah had a fragmented authority and to earn some 
money he agreed on different concessions. As a result, Britain and Russia were 
competing over Iran and it can be concluded that Britain won.  
The story of oil in Iran started in 1901 when William Knox D’Arcy, an Englishman, 
singed a concession with Muzafaro-Din Shah, the king of Iran. British agents 
supported D’Arcy in the Shah’s court and outmanoeuvred Russian objections; also, 
a few countries were bribed in return for supporting Britain. According to this 
agreement, D’Arcy was given rights to explore, develop and produce any oil fields in 
almost three-quarters of Iran for 60 years. In return, the king of Iran accepted 
payment of £20,000 in cash and 16 per cent of net annual profit (Article 10 of the 
D’Arcy Concession). In 1901, exploration for oil began in the west of Iran led by 
D’Arcy. However, after almost two years there were only two wells producing 25 
barrels a day, which was an insignificant quantity in terms of commercial production. 
Later, the exploration moved to the southern part of Iran in order to get closer to 
export facilities. Although, during this time, oil was discovered, on the one hand, the 
extent of the discovery was not commercially significant, and on the other, D’Arcy 
was running out of money for continuing this oil exploration.  
In 1905, he found another source of finance by selling the majority of his rights to 
the Burmah Oil Company. The endeavour to find oil continued and a large number 
of oil well tests took place. In 1908, the cost of searching for oil rose to half a million 
pounds without any successful results. Therefore, the British government decided to 
shut down the exploration in Iran. However, George Reynolds, the chief explorer in 
Iran, decided to continue operation until the order was confirmed by post. Luckily 
enough, before the letter reached Reynolds (the geologist who had been hired by 
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D’Arcy), oil was found in commercial amounts in Masjid-i-Suleiman (a city in the 
south of Iran) on 26 May 1908. This new discovery led to the establishment of a new 
corporation, which was called the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC), in London 
with an initial capital of two million pounds.  
By 1913, one of the biggest refineries had been built in Abadan (a city in the south 
of Iran) and export of crude oil started shortly after. At the same time, the British 
government, during Churchill’s time, injected two million pounds into the company 
and as a result acquired 51 per cent of the total shares. Consequently all oil 
production in Iran was controlled by the British government. Later on, when Churchill 
decided to run the British naval fleets on oil, the demand for Iranian oil increased 
dramatically. Therefore, oil production increased significantly during the First World 
War. Oil production in Iran, which had been 5,000 barrels per day in 1913, increased 
to 33,000 in 1920, and by 1929 it had reached over 115,000 barrels a day. However, 
most of the demand for Iranian oil was from the Royal Navy, which received a 
significant discount rate.  
 “The formation of the Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1909 and first 
production in 1912 was a major factor in the British Admiralty deciding to 
switch from coal to oil on the eve of the First World War. Also because 
Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty wanted Britain to own 
directly at least part of the nation’s oil needs, this led to the purchase of a 
British government stake in APOC. For the time being Iran just happened to 
be the country where the oil was discovered, and was treated as little more 
than an ignorant, but important, shareholder who had to be humoured from 
time to time.”    
                                                                                                                                                                          (Graham 1979: 43) 
In the first 40 years after discovering oil the Iranian governments received only 14 
per cent of the income (Mirjalili 1993). In the words of Emami: 
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“By the end of the 1950s, after nearly half a century, it was estimated that 
the oil industry provided Iran with 450 million dollars (9 per cent of total 
profit) in cash and helped to build three major ports, 2500 kilometres of 
roads, a few thousand houses and a number of hospitals. In addition, the 
oil industry employed an average of about 25,000 Iranians (3,500 non-
Iranians) for mostly unskilled jobs. By contrast, during the same period the 
British government received $1,680 million in taxes, and British 
stockholders received $670 million, limited to an initial investment of 
$4,200,000.”                                               
                                                                                   (Emami 1980: 12) 
Although oil production increased 23 times between 1914 and 1929, royalties to the 
Iranian government according to the D’Arcy Concession amounted to only 16 per 
cent of net profit. In other words, royalties were increased less than fivefold. Given 
the significant surge in oil production and rising profit of APOC, the share of Iran 
from this profit was questioned by the king of Iran, Reza Shah (Kinzer 2003). It is 
important to mention that the income from APOC never surpassed 19 per cent of the 
total income of the Iranian government before 1929 (Ferrier and Bamberg 1982). 
Furthermore, between 1914 and 1924, the taxes that the company paid to the British 
government exceeded the royalties paid to Iran; however, from 1924 to 1929 the 
royalties were marginally larger than the taxes paid by the company to the British 
government (Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013).   
As mentioned earlier, APOC’s main customer was the British government, and in 
1914, Britain demanded that 6 million tons of oil fuel should be provided to the British 
Admiralty over the course of 20 years. As a result, the Royal Navy, during the First 
World War, received 66 to 69 per cent of AOPC’s total refined oil; however, even 
after the First World War, in 1919 and 1920, APOC supplied 53 per cent of its total 
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production to the Royal Navy (Ferrier and Bamberg 1982). According to the D’Arcy 
Concession, the oil was supplied to the Royal Navy by APOC at discount; therefore, 
the profit from the cooperation was more significant than the taxes paid by the Iranian 
government.  
Between 1928 and 1932, the Shah of Iran raised concerns about the royalties that 
Iran used to receive. Hence, after negotiations between the Iranian government and 
APOC, the British government started to revise the D’Arcy Concession and 
eventually Reza Shah (the king of Iran) cancelled the concession in 1932. 
Nevertheless, a new concession was signed in 1933; the new agreement extended 
D’Arcy’s Concession, which was supposed to expire in 1961, to the end of 1993. In 
addition, 80 per cent of the total area granted for exploration and extraction in 
D’Arcy’s Concession was reduced. However, APOC was allowed to decide on 
100,000 square miles to keep for exploration (Bamberg 1994).  
The most important change in the new agreement was that royalties were based on 
actual production of oil rather than profits. The new calculation of royalties led to a 
significant surge in the Iranian oil revenue between 1930 and 1950, with oil 
production increasing from 126,000 to 648,000 barrels a day. Yet, British taxes 
between 1940 and 1950 were more than twice more than Iranian royalties. Although 
oil had been produced in commercial amounts since 1908 in Iran and the oil industry 
was developing significantly, only a very small amount of money from oil was used 
for development of the country. Regardless of the steady rise in the production of oil, 
a fixed proportion, which was 10 per cent (£120 million), was given to the Iranian 
government in the form of royalties, taxes and share of profits from 1911 to 1951.  
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During the period 1911-1919 the royalties that the government received amounted 
to £335,000, which increased to £10.5 million during the 1920s. During the 1930s, 
due to the worldwide depression, the positive impact of the 1933 agreement ceased 
to be felt; therefore, the royalties received by the government of £26.9 million were 
lower than the expected amount. Due to the fragmentary character of data on the 
budget of Iran, it is very difficult to evaluate the exact role of oil income in the 
government budget. Nonetheless, based on the available data, rough assessments 
can be made. Up until 1927, oil receipts were mainly spent on current expenditures. 
This period was followed by World War II, and a significant decrease in development 
expenditures because of the inflation caused by the war. It can be concluded that 
from 1910 to 1949, the contribution of oil incomes to the total government income 
did not exceed 13 per cent.  
By 1950, Iran was the fourth-largest oil producing country in the world. The Anglo 
Persian Oil Company was renamed the Anglo Iranian Oil Company by Reza Shah. 
In March 1951, after a series of disagreements between the AIOC and the Iranian 
state, followed by political intervention by Britain in Iranian domestic affairs and a 
rise in the interest in nationalism, oil was nationalized by the Majlis, and Mohammad 
Mosaddegh, who masterminded this action, became Prime Minister. Through this 
action the AIOC started protesting, which was backed by the British government. 
Because of the rejection of the AIOC’s objection by the Iranian government, the 
AIOC started proceedings against Iran in the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague. In fact, the British government’s claim was that Iran had acted one-sidedly 
by nationalizing its oil and breaking its deal with the AIOC. However, the international 
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court, on 22 July 1952, supported Iran’s position. Following Mosaddegh’s arrival in 
office, Iran’s oil was controlled by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).  
There are a number of factors that can be considered reasons behind the 
nationalization of oil. First, after World War II the oil industry in the world became a 
very important sector. Second, with the development plans in 1949 a reliable source 
of exchange rate was needed and incomes from oil revenues were a good source. 
It is worth mentioning that the Iranian government rejected the request to grant oil 
concessions to Russia in the north of the country. The nationalization of oil led to a 
significant reduction in oil production and consequently government income. The 
Iranian government reacted by encouraging non-oil exports, and bonds were issued 
to meet financial requirements.  
Consequently, oil imports decreased from 6.2 billion rials in 1950 to 5.3 billion rials 
in 1953, whereas non-oil exports increased from 3.49 billion rials to 8.3 billion rials 
over three years. In 1952 and 1953, Iran was able to produce only 4 per cent of the 
level of oil production that had been reached in 1950. The reaction of Britain to oil 
nationalization was an economic boycott on oil production and oil export from Iran. 
As a result, the oil income dropped from $400 million in 1950 to $1.85 million in 1953 
(Emami 1980). Although the reduction in production was because of the lack of 
technical skills since British personnel had left Iran, the key reason for the fall in 
production was the embargo on the Iranian oil by Britain. 
Mosaddegh was removed in August 1953 by a coup organized by the CIA and 
backed by Britain when the negotiations between the Iranian and British 
governments did not reach an outcome in favour of the British government. A new 
round of negotiations took place between the new Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, 
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the British government and the American government. The result was the 1954 
Consortium Agreement, which allowed eight European and American companies to 
extract petroleum from the 100,000 square mile area covered by the 1933 
concession. In return for $1000 million dollars, the Anglo-Iranian company turned its 
share over to the new established consortium. It was agreed that the $1000 million 
dollars would be paid in instalments by the members of the consortium and 25 million 
pounds by the Iranian government over ten years. In accordance with the new 
agreement, the AIOC agreed and turned over its possessions in Iran to the newly 
established NIOC. In return, the Iranian government agreed to pay a net amount of 
76 million pounds over a period of ten years.  
The shares of the consortium were allocated as follows: 40 per cent of the shares 
belonged to British Petroleum (BP), 14 per cent to Royal Dutch Shell, 6 per cent to 
the Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP) and the rest (40 per cent) was shared 
equally between five American companies (Exxon, Gulf Oil, Mobil, Socony and 
Standard Oil of California). Based on the new agreement, the profit would be shared 
between Iran and the consortium members on a 50-50 basis. Oil production 
increased to 353,000 barrels a day by the end of 1955, and by 1959 it was 951,000 
barrels a day; this level of production was 50 per cent above the level in the pre-
nationalization period.  
In line with the new oil law in 1957, the NIOC agreed on three joint-venture contracts 
with independent international companies in order to explore the areas that were not 
included in the consortium. The companies were the Italian company AGIP 
Mineralia, the Pan American Petroleum Corporation and a Canadian company, 
Sapphire Petroleum Limited. However, the agreement with the Canadian company, 
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due to the lack of progress in oil exploration, was abandoned. The new agreements 
were quite similar to the pervious consortium, the period for all of them was 25 years 
and there was a 75-25 per cent division of the net profits in favour of the Iranian 
government.    
According to the new agreements, all exploration costs would be borne by the foreign 
companies, hence the failure of any of them to obtain a commercial level of oil would 
not create any problems for the NIOC. The new-style agreement of Iran was followed 
by a number of other Middle Eastern oil exporting countries. In essence, this played 
an important role in the foundation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). These kinds of agreements paved the way for a kind of 
agreement whereby the oil income of countries is based on oil prices rather than 
quantity. As a result, the price of oil started to play a significant role in the 
international oil market.  
In 1979, the Islamic revolution happened and the system by which oil revenues were 
managed changed dramatically. The policy on exports and oil production after the 
revolution was to balance government income and its expenditure. The initial step 
was terminating the consortium’s role in oil production and also ending its 
advantaged position as the main customer of Iranian oil. The preference of the 
Iranian state ever since the revolution has been for government to government 
contracts. The government in Iran, like all other Middle Eastern major oil exporting 
countries, has acquired all oil export earnings since the revolution. The earnings 
from oil always go to the Central Bank and the government account is credited, and 
thus foreign reserves increase. 
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4.3 Development Plans in Iran  
An important phase in the economic development of Iran started with development 
plans in the period 1946-1979. The story of Iran’s economic development plans 
started in April 1946 when the Iranian government established an Organization of 
Development Planning and hired a foreign firm located in San Francisco for 
consultation. The history of development plans can be divided into pre-revolution 
(1949-1978) and post-revolution (1978-2014) periods.  
In 1946, the First Development Plan was drafted and presented three years later to 
the cabinet; it was a seven-year plan for reconstruction and development. The 
proposed budget for the first plan was 21 billion rials. The first development was 
broken down into different sectors, including agriculture, roads, railways, ports, 
airports, industry and mines, communications and social projects (Amuzegar and 
Fekrat 1971). The main source of finance for the first plan was oil income, which 
provided one-third of government expenditure in the 1940s. Therefore, the 
government started negotiations with the AIOC for higher royalty payments. 
However, oil nationalization in 1951 caused a severe cut in the oil revenues of Iran. 
As a result of the sharp decrease in oil revenue, the First Development Plan was 
crippled. At the same time, the Iranian economy faced financial difficulty, which made 
it even more difficult to get credit from alternative sources. The resumption of the oil 
consortium and the rise in oil income made the Plan Organization active again. In 
the last remaining years of the First Plan, a number of short-term “impact projects” 
were prepared and were supposed to be implemented. In the meantime, a new 
planning board was prepared to review the First Plan and prepare a new plan for 
another seven-year period. Since during the First Development Plan period (1949-
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1955) the oil production was ominously disturbed, the effects on the Iranian economy 
were damaging. 
The Second Plan was organized for another seven-year period from 1955 to 1962 
with a budget of $933 million. A quarter of this money was supposed to be used for 
projects that started in the First Plan but were not finished. However, the budget was 
increased by 20 per cent almost a year later. The budget was supposed to be 
allocated to different sectors in the country as follows: 29.88 per cent to agriculture 
and irrigation, 40.48 per cent to transport and the rest to social services. Again the 
main source of financing the Second Development Plan was oil income. It was 
agreed initially that almost 80 per cent of the revenue from oil should be used for 
development expenditure annually. However, due to special circumstances, such as 
an increase in the current public expenditure and a decrease in foreign financial aid, 
the share of the Plan Organization decreased to 60 per cent at first and then to 55 
per cent.  
The Third Plan was proposed, with a budget of 190 billion rials, for the period 1962-
1967. However, the change in the budget did not stay the same and decreased first 
to 145 billion, and then increased, first to 200 and then to 230 billion rials. Once again 
the income from oil was supposed to finance over 74 per cent of the development 
plan. This time the plan was implemented relatively irregularly. For instance, in 
agriculture, due to a difficult winter and low private investment, the rate of growth 
decreased from 4 per cent, which was planned, to 2.8 per cent annually. On the 
other hand, the industrial sector, unlike its unimpressive beginning at the end of the 
Third Plan, was growing at the rate of 12.7 per cent per year. In the industry sector 
new industries received the most significant share of distributions, such as the 
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manufacturing of petrochemical products. The steel industry, which started in the 
Third Plan, was carried over to the next plan. The steel and petrochemical industries 
contributed most significantly to the enlargement of the oil industry. Other sectors, 
such as transport and communication and road building, flourished as well.  
The Fourth Plan was launched for the period 1968-1973 with the key objective of 
increasing the real GNP by 9.3 per cent annually. The general aims of the Fourth 
Plan were: i) heavy industrialization in a number of sectors such as steel, aluminium, 
copper and petrochemicals; ii) expansion of water resources; iii) development of the 
power supply and national rail system; iv) consumption and export of natural gas; v) 
improvement of rural and urban areas; vi) becoming as self-sufficient as possible in 
terms of food and raw materials; vii) expansion and diversification of exports; and 
viii) progression towards modernization (Plan organization 1968). 
The Fifth Plan was proposed for the period 1973-1978 and had very ambitious 
targets compared to the previous development plans. Its initial cost was estimated 
at 32 billion dollars, which was roughly three times higher than the budget for the 
Fourth Plan. This time it was expected that oil income would finance almost half of 
the cost, which was about 17 billion dollars. As a result of severe alterations in the 
international oil market, the seemingly ambitious targets of the Fifth Plan turned out 
not to be too ambitious after all. Unlike the previous development plans, the Fifth 
Plan did not face any financial constraint owing to the two subsequent 
unprecedented price spikes in the international oil market. Nevertheless, there were 
other bottlenecks such as a lack of human capital, inadequate infrastructural facilities 
and even a lack of some raw materials (Plan and Budget Organization 1975). The 
budget of the revised Fifth Plan was almost 122.8 billion dollars, of which about 80 
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per cent was financed from oil and gas revenues. However, the revised Fifth Plan 
called for consideration in terms of both qualitative and quantitative aims. The most 
prominent quantitative target of the plan was reaching the annual economic growth 
rate of 25.9 per cent.  
During the Fifth Plan the country witnessed improvements in different sectors, such 
as higher national income, higher standards of living, and a better social welfare and 
socio-economic environment. Although the Fifth Plan created an improvement in 
industrial sectors and paved the way for economic development, it was not 
successful in controlling inflation. Therefore, the fast economic development along 
with the existing bottlenecks of a lack of human capital and high inflation in the 
already overheated economy shed some doubt on the outcome of the Plan. With the 
first oil shock in 1973, the oil income of the country increased dramatically. The 
government had two options for spending the money from oil – one option was to 
increase its expenditure and the other option was to adjust expenditure in line with 
the capacity of the economy, and the government chose the former. Ever since then, 
oil has been an inevitable source of government budgeting. Due to this government 
policy, high inflation became a new challenge in the country. Nonetheless, inflation 
was not the only problem that the country was facing in regard to prices. As Bahmani-
Oskooee (1996) said, the enormous devaluation of the Iranian currency was 
translated into a new problem for the economy: “stagflation”. This phenomenon 
unbalances the economy since depreciation in the value of the currency on the one 
hand increases aggregate demand and on the other hand reduces aggregate supply 
as a result of more expensive imports.    
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No sector in the Iranian economy managed to avoid the adverse effects of high 
inflation. For instance, housing and construction were the first sectors to suffer and 
subsequently problems spread to other sectors. The government tried anti-
inflationary policies, but it was quite late and also some of them were inappropriate. 
Therefore, there was no adequate measure to combat the soaring prices. The result 
was dissatisfaction, not only for rural migrants but also for industrial and rich groups. 
All in all, the consequence of people’s dissatisfaction was an alliance between the 
Bazaar, the clergy and the intelligentsia in 1978 and the revolution in 1979. Needless 
to say, the roots of the Islamic revolution can be traced back to the economic 
activities in 1973-1974 when the NIOC took over the consortium, followed by 
inappropriate responses of the government to unprecedented oil price hikes.   
4.4 The Role of Oil in Development before the Islamic Revolution  
This section investigates the direct and indirect influence of the oil industry on the 
Iranian economy before the revolution. By direct influence we mean the outcome 
from the direct contact of foreign industry with domestic sectors of the country. On 
the other hand, indirect effects are those that provide financial assistance for the 
government like royalties, taxes and income, which can speed up the growth and 
development process. In the pre-nationalization oil period, this industry went through 
constant progress and increased production; however, only a small proportion of oil 
production was used for the development of the country. By 1950, Iran was the 
fourth-largest oil producing state in the world. However, regardless of the steady rise 
in her oil production, Iran’s share of the money remained constant at about 120 
million pounds up until 1951. One of the factors that had adverse effects on the oil 
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revenue of the Iranian government was the discount prices that the British Admiralty 
used to obtain oil. It has been estimated that Britain saved $500 million in the first 50 
years of APOC.  
There should be no doubt that Iran owes both her significant rate of growth and 
economic development during the period 1960-1977 to her oil revenues. In regard 
to indirect effects of oil export, the oil industry has rescued Iran from any foreign 
exchange limitations for her development plans. It can even be said that the 
implementation of all development plans, particularly the last three, was only made 
possible by the income from oil. More than 66 per cent of the Third Plan, almost 63 
per cent of the Fourth Plan and about 80 per cent of the Fifth Plan were financed by 
petrodollars. In other words, since the capital-absorbing capacity of the economy 
had developed and there were other sources of income for government expenditure, 
it was possible to use oil income for economic development purposes.  
In terms of stimulating the industrial sector in Iran, oil again played a significant role. 
It can be said that from 1965 to 1975 an immense industrialization was initiated. The 
very first endeavour to modernize industry began in the period 1934-1939, which 
was during Reza Shah’s industrial promotion campaign. It happened after the 
increase in oil income in 1933 and before the war. In fact, between 1934 and 1940 
almost 200 industrial plants were in operation. These industries were producing 
sugar, textiles and matches. The most significant changes in the structure of 
industrialization happened during the 1960s. The fundamental change was the 
formation of a small manufacturing sector making consumer goods for local markets. 
Not surprisingly, the very first heavy industry in Iran was in the fields of oil and 
petrochemicals. Iran managed to be self-sufficient in some capital and consumer 
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goods. In addition, the policy of heavy industry based on import substitution was 
quite successful. For instance, the production of refrigerators surged from 147,000 
units in 1969 to almost 421,000 in 1975. As a result, the domestic demand was met 
and the surplus was exported. The same thing can be said about other household 
durable goods such as water heaters, televisions, air conditioners and gas stoves. 
Due to the fragmentary nature of Iran’s budget figures for the aforementioned period 
and the unavailability of data on government income, it is very difficult to assess the 
influence of oil income on economic performance precisely. Nevertheless, based on 
the existing evidence it can be said that up until 1927 the money from oil was spent 
on current expenditures. In the 1930s, the income from oil played a part in 
development expenditures. However, the period after World War II was 
characterized by a substantial decrease in development costs, due to inflation 
caused by war. These expenditures dropped from 30-40 per cent during the 1930s 
to almost 18 per cent in 1940. They even fell to 12 per cent in 1947. They were used 
to buy arms, construction for the Iranian railway and foundation of a number of 
government enterprises.  
Since the 1930s, government expenditure has been increasing in Iran. It is important 
to mention that until 1955, this expenditure was used to finance through taxation. 
After 1955, the oil revenues started to become the main source of the government 
budget. During the nationalization of the oil industry, Iran almost lost her oil 
revenues. It is worth mentioning that during the struggle for the nationalization of the 
oil industry the Bank of England restricted conversion of Iran’s sterling holdings 
(Mahdavy 1970). The result was devaluation of the Iranian currency, with the value 
of the dollar increasing from 40 rials in 1950 to 124 rials in 1953.  
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However, devaluation of the currency, in contrast to Western expectations, 
stimulated the Iranian economy. Iran managed to export manufactured products like 
mill textiles and matches. At no time before 1929 did the revenue from oil exceed 19 
per cent of the total Iranian state income (Ferrier and Bamberg 1982). It is worth 
mentioning that the employment effects of the oil industry in Iran were not significant; 
the peak time was before the oil nationalization in 1949, which was 78,162 Iranians, 
most of whom were unskilled labour (Bamberg 1994). It can be concluded that this 
is not in line with the common hypothesis of the resource curse, which believes in a 
shift of labour force from productive sectors to the oil sector.  
While oil export was a significant part of the total export, almost 51 per cent between 
1936 and 1959, the share of foreign exchange receipts from oil exports was rather 
small. During these times, non-oil exports were the main factor in balancing Iran’s 
external account.  
The contribution of oil to the Iranian economy was increasing, and by the first oil 
shock, oil revenue started to play a significant role in the Iranian economy. Although 
oil income was not the main source of the government’s income, it represented a 
significant contribution to the economy as a source of exchange receipts. During 
1947, 66 per cent of Iran’s average annual foreign exchange earning was from oil 
royalties and sterling was received in payments for local currency. After oil 
nationalization, the influence of oil income on the Iranian economy can be examined 
from two different points of view. First, the money from oil was used for traditional 
public services such as defence, justice, welfare, health and education. Second, oil 
income was a source for financing development plans.  
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Oil revenue can make the government on the one hand independent, but on the 
other hand it can make it more vulnerable to crises. For instance, Katouzian (1981: 
324) said: 
                           “Oil revenues accrue to the state directly as large and independent 
sources of finance: the state does not even have to depend on the domestic 
means of production for their revenues… Once these revenues rise to a 
high level, making up at least 10 per cent of the national output, they begin 
to afford the state an unusual degree of economic and political autonomy 
from the production forces and the social classes of the country.”  
 
To sum up, Iran before the revolution was moving towards becoming an industrial 
country. This was the result of both the government’s policies and financial resources 
from oil revenue. The government policy to speed up the industrialization process 
was high protection along with subsidy. Given the detrimental effects of inflation on 
the poor, the state paid a substantial amount in subsidies to protect them. On the 
one hand, Lautenschlager (1986) indicated that the rich were the ones who benefited 
from subsidies for imported goods. On the other hand, it was proposed by Karshenas 
and Pesaran (1995) that subsidies were necessary to moderate the inflationary 
pressure on the poor specifically after the policy of exchange rate unification in 1993.  
4.5 The Iranian Economy after the Revolution  
In 1979, with the Islamic revolution, the political and economic policies of Iran 
changed dramatically. Ever since then, the country has been transformed into an 
Islamic country with a large public sector. Since the revolution, the Iranian economy 
has experienced four cycles: a deep recession immediately after the start of the 
Islamic revolution in 1979 and the eight-year war with Iraq; a minor recession 
between 1987 and 1989; a decent revival following the ceasefire with her neighbour 
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Iraq; and severe economic sanctions from the United Nations and United States due 
to uranium enrichment programmes.  
Regardless of the Islamic government’s initial purpose of decreasing the country’s 
dependence on the oil sector, during this 34-year period the economy and 
government budget were closely tied to oil receipts. For some years after the 
revolution, the country had to deal with internal and external conflicts, the new 
political system and substantial extension of state controls over markets and 
businesses. It is important to mention that a number of internal and external issues 
also influenced Iran’s economic climate.   
Among the internal factors the most significant ones were the exodus of human and 
physical capital, political turmoil, uncertainties in economic activities in regard to 
private properties and favouring Islamic commitment over professional expertise in 
management choices. The challenges of managing deregulated markets built up a 
large foreign debt followed by a balance-of-payment crisis’ in 1993-1994 (Esfahani 
and Pesaran 2009). As a result, the reforms in the credit and foreign exchange 
market failed to respond (Esfahani et al. 2013). Noteworthy external considerations 
were the very long and expensive war with Iraq (losing both human and physical 
capital), significant volatility in the international oil market, the freezing of Iranian 
foreign assets abroad in regard to invading the US embassy and hostages, and 
economic sanctions due to the uranium enrichment programme. The 
aforementioned events explain the unsatisfactory economic development in the 
post-revolution period. Although their effects were mitigated by foreign exchange 
reserves, and some policies, the economy’s performance was not successful. The 
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performance of the oil sector was significantly affected by the damages that occurred 
in the war with Iraq.  
Oil production dropped from 5.6 million barrels a day (b/d) in 1976 to 1.4 million b/d 
in 1980-81. Although it increased again to 2.2-2.9 million b/d for the rest of the 
decade, it was still less than Iran’s OPEC quota in some years, although it exceeded 
it in the rest. Iran managed to increase her production after the war with Iraq to 3.2-
3.4 million b/d, but it was still less than its peak production in the 1970s. 
Consequently the share of oil income in GDP fell significantly from 30-40 per cent in 
the 1970s to 9-17 per cent in the 1980s. A number of different factors are responsible 
for the decline in oil production: the Islamic government’s decision to cut oil 
production; the setting of Iran’s oil field on fire by Iraq during the war; volatility in oil 
prices; and poor maintenance of wells due to the shortage of capital and technology. 
Despite all these drawbacks, oil revenue continued to account for almost 90 per cent 
of foreign exchange receipts in the country.  
In terms of the industrial sector, the development was not satisfactory either. On the 
one hand, due to the political climate and revolutionary regulations of the initial years 
after the revolution, the substantial exodus of entrepreneurs and skilled workers, as 
well as physical capital, was a loss for the country. On the other hand, as a result of 
the freezing of Iranian assets abroad, along with economic sanctions and 
undesirable government policies in regard to multinational corporations, both foreign 
specialists and foreign investors left the country.  
The situation got worse with a sharp reduction in oil income, which led to a significant 
cut in the import of industrial and raw material. Due to the difficulties of war, very 
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slow economic growth and growing public expenditures, the government faced a 
budget deficit almost every year after the revolution. In some years, the budget deficit 
was even larger than the government’s total revenue. As the budget deficit was 
totally financed by the quantitative easing by the Central Bank, the money supply 
increased almost ten times during this time. As a result of this increase in liquidity, 
prices went up both in retail and wholesale. Since many items in the consumer 
basket were subject to price ceilings, the true rate of inflation spiked. The 
government statistics indicate that the consumer price index increased by 637.5 per 
cent between 1979 and 1991 (Amuzegar 1992).  
The first phase after the revolution was devoted to institutional reconstruction, and 
the economy was poorly managed. Although one of the aims of the new regime was 
economic recovery, during this period the regime considered a new guideline, 
“economics of divine unity”, whose foundations were not based on conventional 
economic thoughts and rational allocation of resources. Therefore, rapid recovery 
was an unrealistic goal due to the problems and especially the spiking inflation, 
which created dissatisfaction toward the end of the Shah’s regime. The Iranian 
economy faced a deep recession immediately after the revolution, and among a 
number of reasons for this one must emphasize the exodus of a massive number of 
skilled workers, the flight of capital and the withdrawal of Iranian managers and 
technocrats. The country’s output continued to fall by 6.4 per cent whereas inflation 
continued to increase by 10.5 per cent (Alnasrawi 1986).  
Another important reason for the recession was the hostage crisis in 1979, which 
ended in the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States. Along with the removal 
of $9 billion out of a total of $15 billion of assets from Iranian control, the Carter 
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administration was successful in getting the support of other industrial countries in 
imposing economic sanctions against Iran. It is important to mention that massive 
nationalization of industries after the revolution was also a contributing factor to the 
inefficiency and low productivity in industry. In 1982, 130 nationalized industries went 
under the direct governorship of the three ministries that were ratified to conduct 
industrial policies. In addition, 450 industrial units went under the direct governorship 
of the National Iranian Industrial Organization. Apart from nationalization, several 
industrial units went under the governorship and into the possession of different 
institutes established after the revolution. Obviously they suffered from the lack of 
managerial skills and numerous changes leading to inefficiency. In terms of the 
agriculture sector, it can be said that it fared better than other sectors of the 
economy, since the lack of skilled workers, capital and technology did not negatively 
affect developments in this sector.  
One year after the revolution Iran was invaded by her neighbour Iraq and went 
through an eight-year war. The massive cost of war and substantial fluctuation in oil 
income resulted in enormous budget deficits. The solution for financing the deficit 
was borrowing from the Central Bank since external borrowing was not possible due 
to resistance from the Iranian government. Thus, the government’s significant debt 
was the main reason for inflationary pressure and acceleration in the economy. 
Another consequence of war was the destruction of the most important sector of the 
country, the oil sector.  
Within a few days of the outbreak of the war, Iraq had managed to put Iran’s oil 
exporting facilities out of operation. Iran’s production decreased from 1.3 million b/d 
to 450,000 b/d. The loss of oil exporting capacity in Iran was by far the most 
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disturbing economic result of the war. Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, oil had been 
the main contributor to GDP. In addition to the loss of oil revenue, the cost of 
rerouting imports from ports on the Persian Gulf through the Soviet Union and Turkey 
made the imports more expensive. Additionally, the diversion of resources because 
of the needs of the war increased Iran’s dependence on foreign suppliers.    
It can be concluded that the revolution and eight-year war with Iraq created several 
structural difficulties that required a long time to overcome. As mentioned earlier, 
among the impacts of the revolution and war were a significant reduction in oil 
production, market and income losses, a lack of foreign reserves, and the destruction 
of cities and infrastructure such as roads, harbours, pipelines and refinery. In 
addition, the growth of industrial and agricultural sectors was crippled and military 
supplies were depleted. Moreover, the loss of human capital created a labour 
shortage and serious internal refugee problems. All of these problems added to the 
general economic difficulties.  
4.6 Economic Plans after the Revolution  
 
The ceasefire with Iraq in August 1988 and the need for a proper development plan 
to reconstruct the country led to the launch of the new First Five-year Plan for the 
period 1989/90 to 1992/94. Despite the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1988, Iran’s 
per capita gross national product (GNP) was returning to its level of 21 years earlier. 
The new government’s policy to rectify the condition was liberalization, improving 
education and setting economic development as a major policy goal. The First Post-
revolution Plan (1989-93) targeted the reconstruction of the economy through the 
sale of public enterprises, the reduction of trade barriers, tax reform and 
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reconstruction of the banking system, among other things. In 1989, Tehran’s stock 
market was reopened, and in the First Five-year Development Plan there was a legal 
outline for privatizing it. Therefore, the stock market became accessible again for 
selling public enterprises. The core objective of the plan was to achieve 8 per cent 
growth in GDP annually, which can be translated to a 5 per cent average annual 
increase in per capita income.  
In addition, the Plan assumed a significant drop in the fiscal deficit from 2146 billion 
rials in 1988 to 92.5 billion rials by the end of 1994 (Ghasimi 1992). In order to 
moderate the rate of inflation from 28.9 per cent to 8.9 per cent the following steps 
were taken. First, the policymakers expected that the estimated decrease in fiscal 
deficits would reduce the pressure on the domestic banking system. Subsequently, 
the indebtedness of the public sector to the Central Bank, which was the main factor 
in accelerating liquidity, would diminish. Eventually, the growth rate of liquidity can 
be expected to drop from 23.2 per cent to 3.8 per cent (Ghasimi 1992). In terms of 
revenue from oil, the plan predicted a rise in oil prices from $14.2 per barrel to $21.4 
per barrel, which can be translated to a spike in the oil revenue from $7.3 billion to 
$17.9 billion by the end of 1994. In other words, foreign exchange earnings from oil 
should be enough for almost 71 per cent of the plan requirements in order to import. 
In terms of the industrial sector, it should be said that during the 1980s it had the 
least satisfactory performance. During the 1980s, most of the time a negative growth 
rate was registered, ranging from -9.1 to -1.6 per cent.  
The growth rate of GDP in the first year of the plan was 4.3 per cent compared to 
the target of 10.8 per cent. At the beginning of the second year, due to the 
considerable development of the services in 1990, 10 per cent growth was achieved. 
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In 1994-1995, a sequence of events including a drop in oil prices, mismanagement 
of the economy in general and the exchange rate specifically brought economic 
growth to a halt.   
Apart from conceptual inconsistency, ever since the revolution the overall 
performance of the economy during the five-year plan was the best. It is important 
to mention that a number of unexpected factors, such as a significant idle industrial 
capacity free from war, a huge spike in oil prices, a rise in imports and a reduction in 
population growth, helped the situation. Although the average growth rate of GDP 
was about 7 per cent and in general social indicators had improved, a number of the 
plan’s quantitative targets had not been achieved. By the planners’ own admission, 
the objectives of privatization, the exchange rate and trade liberalization had not 
been implemented successfully (Amuzegar 2001). A number of factors, including 
low returns on public investments, a rapid increment in public demand and declining 
foreign exchange reserves, increased inflationary pressures and this lasted until the 
mid-1990s.  
The Second Plan was initially supposed to be launched on March 20th 1994; 
however, for a number of reasons, such as internal and external imbalances from 
previous miscalculations and a slump in international oil prices, the Plan was 
postponed until March 1995. All the unresolved and accumulated problems of 
wartime collectively came out in 1994/95. The most significant one was the 
unification of a complex exchange rate system inherited from wartime regulations, 
which was one of the main targets of the First Plan. In March 1993, the exchange 
rate depreciated from 70 Iranian rials (RIs) per US dollar to IR 1600 to the US dollar. 
Nevertheless, given the unstable economic situation, short-run foreign debt and 
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failure of the Central Bank to service external debt along with escalating inflationary 
pressures, the unified exchange rate system was abandoned in December 1993. 
The exchange rate depreciated further to 1,750 Iranian rials per dollar in 1994, along 
with strict policies on foreign exchange accessible for travel and trade restrictions. 
In 1996, Iran applied to join the WTO for the first time, but was not successful. In 
total, Iran applied to join the WTO 22 times but the application was rejected on every 
occasion.   
As a result of these strict policies, the country was successful in reducing monetary, 
fiscal and external payment imbalances. In addition, the Central Bank managed to 
refinance the external arrears payment through bilateral agreements with Iran’s 
trade partners. Yet inflation stayed high at around 35 per cent and the annual growth 
of GDP remained at about 1.6 per cent, which was its lowest level for years. Imports 
were cut to a third of their level in 1991 in order to increase foreign exchange 
reserves. Simultaneously a new exchange rate of 2,345 Iranian rials per US dollar 
as a rate for export was added to the official rate. All these measures together helped 
change the current account balance into a surplus.  
Therefore, the Second Development Plan (1995-2000), which had been postponed 
for a full year on the evening of the launch, still encountered some growth-inhibiting 
bottlenecks. The Second Plan was introduced taking into consideration all the 
problems and was more realistic in its goals and less ambitious in its calculations. It 
promised to speed up the structural improvements that had been promised in the 
First Plan and to continue with macroeconomic adjustments. The Plan had 16 central 
targets but three parts of the Plan needed specific attention. For GDP growth, 
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aggregate investment, employment, liquidity, foreign trade and population-specific 
quantitative goals were considered.  
It is important to mention that each category was broken down into more detailed 
goals. There were detailed projects in oil, gas, metals, minerals, water and public 
transport. The target for annual GDP growth was 5.1 per cent on average, with an 
increase of 6.2 per cent in domestic investment annually. Government consumption 
was supposed to decrease by about 0.9 per cent annually. Furthermore, the inflation 
target was about 12.4 per cent per year. In terms of trade, imports were supposed 
to rise by about 4.3 per cent, oil exports at the rate of 3.4 per cent and non-oil exports 
by around 8.4 per cent. It was expected that these objectives would significantly 
decrease the ratio of public consumption to GDP, and lead to spending a substantial 
portion of public expenditures on investment, and also reducing the annual budget 
deficit to zero. Despite the implementation of the First and Second Plan, the 
unification of the exchange rate, the structural change of the economy and the 
ceasefire with Iraq, the government was not very successful in their attempts to 
improving economic conditions. The economy was facing 20.1 per cent inflation, and 
a high unemployment rate of 16.2 per cent. The Second Plan failed to remove 
subsidies and unify the exchange rate. In addition, it increased the country’s foreign 
debt to $30 billion (Valadkhani 2001). 
The new government in 1997 with President Mohammad Khatami indicated that 
Iranians “deserve a better deal” after the revolution, eight-year war and reforming 
and constructing after war. The new government promised to deal with these 
difficulties with appropriate policies. The measures proposed by the new government 
were balancing budgeting, privatization, finishing projects before starting new ones, 
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and adjusting the exchange rate. The government’s solution to challenges in the 
economy was a strategy called the “Economic Rehabilitation Plan” (ERP). The new 
manifesto listed the economic challenges of the country as follows: reducing 
unemployment, investment to be able to finish ongoing projects, reducing 
monopolies, improving the treasury’s fiscal structure, decreasing high inflation and 
providing a better positon for Iran with its major trading partners.  
However, the ERP was not very successful in achieving its goals. A precipitous 
reduction in the oil prices played a significant role in the failure of the ERP. A decline 
in government oil incomes from 1997 caused a chain of challenges such as 
worsening external debt, a rise in budget deficit, reduction of imports, increase in 
inflationary pressures, devaluation of the Iranian rial and in general a recession. 
Hence, all eyes turned to the Third Development Plan proposal (2000-2005) and the 
ERP never achieved any of its objectives. 
The Third Development Plan was proposed with the following six central targets: 
first, a more transparent economic system; second, reforming the government 
budget; third, reforming the tax system; fourth, privatization of government 
enterprises; fifth, taking down monopolies and promoting competition; and finally, 
protecting vulnerable groups by launching an inclusive social safety net. Yet, unlike 
the last two plans, the most significant concern of this plan was an increasing 
unemployment rate. The reason why all of a sudden reducing the rate of 
unemployment became a key target for the economy was the high number of young 
people who were looking for jobs. One of the government policies after the revolution 
was encouraging population growth, particularly in the 1980s. Therefore, the 
population pyramid in Iran can be referred to as a “time bomb” (Valadkhani 2001).  
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In the years from 1996 to 2000, about 296,250 new jobs were created annually, while 
each year about 692,750 new job seekers entered the job market (Valadkhani 2001). 
A Third Plan predicted that in the course of 2000-2005, on average every year 
between 750,000 and 800,000 job seekers would look for jobs; however, if the 
country continued with the approach of its last Plan, each year roughly half a million 
people would be added to those job seekers who cannot enter the job market. The 
Third Plan indicated that GDP would need to grow by about 6 per cent each year 
just to maintain the current rate of unemployment. Over the course of 1994 to 1999, 
real GDP grew by just 3.1 per cent every year, and during the last decade it grew by 
only 3.2 per cent per annum. The aim of the Third Plan was to reach a growth rate 
of 8.5 per cent, while according to Valadkhani (2001: 12), “the private sector in Iran 
has been treated as residuals”. In 2000-2001, the spike in oil prices allowed the 
government to establish the Oil Surplus Fund for saving oil revenues above a 
specific level. The purpose of the fund was to mitigate the negative impact of extreme 
fluctuation in the international oil market and accumulate cash reserves to help 
reduce the unemployment rate and promote exports. In addition, the fund was used 
by the state to stabilize the exchange rate by intervening in the foreign exchange 
market. Consequently, the Iranian rial’s value increased from 9,040 rials per US 
dollar in August 1999 to 7,970 rials per US dollar in August 2001. Moreover, because 
of higher oil receipts, for nine months in 2000 Iran’s trade balance was positive at 
$10.6 billion.  
By the end of the Third Development Plan, Khatami’s administration had prepared 
the Fourth Development Plan. Then President Ahmadinejad took office, and the new 
president promised economic justice and fairness. The most significant economic 
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change of his government was a reduction of the generous subsidies of government. 
Apart from this, the country experienced increasing Western sanctions as a 
consequence of the government’s political policies. The new government refused to 
endorse the Fourth Development Plan (2005-2010), which had been prepared under 
the previous government’s administration.  
Abruptly, Ahmadinejad shut down the 60-year-old Plan Organization (which had 
been responsible for Iran’s economic development plan since 1945). In terms of 
publishing data on fundamental economic indexes in the first round of Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency, his administration stopped revealing data on growth. Interestingly, data 
on both inflation and unemployment revealed by the Central Bank and Statistical 
Centre were inconsistent. Data on foreign exchange reserves were categorized as 
“confidential” and never released. Budget deficits became secret by considering 
borrowing as revenue (Amuzegar 2013).  
The main targets of the new government were justice, fighting against poverty, 
corruption and discrimination. Yet the president believed there was no need for an 
economic plan and that these objectives would be achieved without any plans. The 
new government started with a highly expansionary policy whose first step was to 
increase the fiscal budget. The higher fiscal budget was provided by the Central 
Bank printing more money. The annual budget increased significantly from 
1,590,000 billion rials in 2005 to 7,280,000 billion in 2013, with a deficit each year. 
In addition, the state sector’s debt to the Central Bank increased from 236 trillion 
rials to 1,152 trillion. The oil receipt that this government received was different from 
all the previous Iranian governments.  
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A spike in oil prices gave the country $700 billion compared to $440 billion received 
by governments since the Islamic revolution, and interestingly, five times the receipts 
between the finding of oil and the termination of the Pahlavi regime. The country was 
facing a double-digit price hike from perpetual budget deficits and increasing debt to 
the Central Bank. The policy of government to deal with this demand created by 
economic disequilibrium was concentrating on the supply side. To do so, the 
government decided to dictate three fundamental cost factors of households and 
businesses: the exchange rate, the interest rate and basic energy prices. The 
outcome was not very satisfactory in any of these three areas. The Iranian currency 
was kept artificially overvalued. This resulted in: a reduction in the ability of domestic 
producers to enter the international market; a decreasing domestic production 
capacity of import by almost 30 to 40 per cent; stopping a significant number of 
workers; and exacerbating the country’s non-oil trade balance.  
Needless to say, the artificially overvalued currency caused Iran to depend more 
heavily on the world economy even for necessary food items, and as a result capital 
flight. Along with these problems, due to the political policies of the government, a 
new round of tough sanctions was imposed on the Iranian Central Bank and oil 
sector in 2011. Consequently the Iranian rial plummeted against the dollar and lost 
two-thirds of its value. This moved the economy towards an era of uncertainty. In 
2009, the exchange rate was 10,000 rials per US dollar and the inflation-adjusted 
equilibrium according to the Central Bank’s estimation was 24,000 rials.  
Strangely enough, the government applied a new policy of interest rate regulation, 
holding interest rates on savings below inflation and keeping bank fees on loans 
below free-market levels. The subsequent outcome of low returns on deposits 
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encouraged people from productive investment to move capital from banks to real 
estate, the US dollar and the gold market. The result of losing saving deposits forced 
commercial banks to borrow from the Central Bank, which led to a significant debt. 
Alongside these problems, energy prices were also artificially low for a long period, 
which caused profligate energy consumption and the growth of energy-intensive 
industries that were vulnerable to international economic shocks. It is worth 
mentioning that energy smuggling to neighbour countries became a problem as a 
result of these policies.  
All of these problems were reflected in major economic indexes. The growth rate of 
GDP was 6.9 per cent in 2005, which was on a downward trend until it got to -1.7 
per cent and -5.4 per cent in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The official consumer 
price index, which was 10.4 per cent in 2005, started to rise gradually, eventually 
exceeding 40 per cent, which was the world’s third highest in 2013 when 
Ahmadinejad left office. The reason behind the high inflation and increase in liquidity 
was three projects implemented by the government. First, there was a project called 
“Quick Returns”, aimed at creating 2 million new jobs. The second project was “Low-
cost Housing in City Margins”. The third project was a novel project of cash payments 
based on reconstructing subsidies on energy. However, all three of these projects 
were considered unsuccessful. According to Amuzegar (2013), the housing project 
alone was responsible for 40 per cent of liquidity.  
As well as all the inappropriate government policies, ever since the revolution the 
United States has imposed sanctions on Iran. They were originally started by 
President Jimmy Carter in 1979. According to these sanctions, Americans were 
banned from importing any manufactured goods from Iran. In addition, exports of 
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both American goods and services to Iran were prohibited. However, the sanctions 
changed in 2005 when the Iranian government decided to develop nuclear 
technology and resume uranium enrichment. Because of this decision by the 
government, the United States imposed numerous sanctions against Iran in different 
sectors, including transportation, banking, oil, gas, petrochemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.   
The logic behind these strict sanctions was that any income from Iran’s energy sector 
can fund Iran’s nuclear programme. The sanctions became really strict in 2010. 
Since then, any company from any country around the world would have been under 
US sanctions if a single shipment of fuel to Iran had been worth more than $1 million, 
or in the course of a year shipments had been worth more than $5 million. Needless 
to say, these conditions were applied to any service associated with fuel trade with 
Iran. Initially, Iran’s oil export decreased from almost 2.5 million b/d in 2011 to almost 
1.1 million b/d in 2013. Apart from the reduction in oil export, the international oil 
prices dropped, which made the situation even worse. Furthermore, according to the 
sanctions, $120 billion of Iranian reserves abroad became inaccessible. The 
country’s economy shrank by about 9 per cent from mid-2012 to March 2014.  
In 2010, sanctions targeted the gas and oil sector of the country and significantly 
affected the Iranian economy. On January 20th 2014, an agreement to lift some 
sanctions went through and this gave Iran the chance to revive its economy. Relief 
from sanctions gave Iran the option to freely export oil, which can be paid for directly 
with hard currency. In addition, Iran’s banking system has been reintegrated into the 
world financial system and the country can access its hard currency reserves 
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abroad. A number of international energy firms started to invest in Iran’s energy 
sectors from the time sanctions were removed.  
The Fifth Plan (2010-2015) was prepared under Ahmadinejad’s administration and 
approved by the Majlis. Nevertheless, the Fifth Plan remained mainly at the planning 
stage. In terms of the role that oil has played historically in Iran, it can be said that 
oil income, both before and after the revolution, has been influential in financing 
Iran’s development plans.  
Although Iran is one of the main oil exporters in the world, Jalali-Naini (2003: 18) 
states that “basic development in Iran since the mid-1950s has been a planning 
framework in which the oil industry, as the ‘leading sector’ and the engine of growth 
supplies surpluses (saving) for investment in other sectors”.  For sure government 
policies have played a key role in Iran’s economic performance over the last forty 
years. Data of the central bank of Iran and Hakimian (1999) (in appendix four) show 
that all: the real gross domestic product, the gross national saving and the gross 
fixed capital formation consistently grew during 1960 to 1978 in line with the growth 
in the private sector. Nevertheless, the high co-movements in the aforementioned 
variables came to an end when the first oil shock happened. Higher oil income 
fuelled an economic boom which caused inflation and affected economic growth 
adversely in the late 1970s. 
More recent theoretical work has derived a specific linkage between saving and 
development. According to them if adjusted net savings are positive, the present 
value of social welfare is increasing. On the other hand, if adjusted net saving is 
negative it means the present value of social welfare is decreasing and also the level 
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of social welfare in the future along with development path should be lower than 
present social welfare. In the case of Iran this data is very limited as it can be seen 
in figure (4.1).  
  
Figure (4.1) Adjusted Net Saving  
Source: The World Bank  
4.7 Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) in Iran  
The Iranian Oil Stabilization Fund existed for a short period between 1999 and 2004. 
However, the establishing of oil funds in other oil-rich countries goes back to the 
failure of the price-stabilizing power of OPEC (Amuzegar 2005). The Iranian Majlis 
have never received an official balance sheet from the OSF despite a clear order by 
law; therefore, the figures in this research were obtained from Amuzegar (2005), 
who put together these data from various sources such as the Fund’s secretary’s 
general statements, Majlis deputies’ speeches and reports in the local press.  
The law’s provisions state that the $74 billion surplus income from oil should be 
placed in the OSF. The overall oil income projected in the Third Development Plan 
built on expected oil prices was $56.7 billion based on expecting oil prices to be 
between $12 per barrel and $19 per barrel. Nevertheless, with the spike in oil prices 
to about $35 per barrel, the oil income increased by more than twice what was 
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predicted and reached $130.7 billion. However, deposits in the OSF in five years 
amounted to almost $29.1 billion. Meanwhile the Majlis raised the oil share in the 
budget each year. Adding its own interest the value of assets in the OFS turned to a 
total of $30.2 billion.  
On top of depriving the OFS of the $74 billion to which it was entitled, the Majlis 
overlooked the original aim of the fund and the fund’s board, which was followed by 
continual authorized withdraws of almost $17 billion to finance different projects. For 
instance, $9.4 billion was allocated to urgent projects aimed at providing relief for 
drought-stricken farmers and end-of-year bonuses for government pensioners, as 
well as payments for petrol imports. About $7.6 billion was allotted to the Central 
Bank for losses that occurred in foreign exchange unification. In addition, some other 
money was paid as grants to disabled war veterans along with supplements for 
subsidies on essential commodities. It is worth mentioning that none of the above-
mentioned projects were related to the purpose of the Fund.  
Almost $11 billion credit was allocated for loans to the private sector.  However, only 
$6.8 billion was approved for some projects. The usual length of these loans was about 
eight years and the annual interest rate was 2 per cent. For some specific projects the 
length was extended to ten years. Most of the credit for the private sector went to 
projects in mining and the industrial sector, and what remained was allocated to 
transportation, technical services and agricultural sectors. In general, only a small 
portion of the OSF was used by the private sector due to the unappealing terms of the 
loans.  
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The reason why these loans were unattractive was that they were in foreign currencies, 
and in addition they had to be used for foreign purchases, and paid back in foreign 
exchange. Consequently, although the interest rate was 3-5 per cent, which was 
significantly lower than the interest rates of commercial banks, the ultimate borrowing 
costs could have run much higher due to the volatile exchange rate. With the Iranian 
rial on the downward trend, the exchange-adjusted effective annual interest rate to be 
paid back was 20 per cent. In other words, the loan was charging a 15 per cent rate for 
rial depreciations. In general, from $30 billion of assets, almost $17 billion was used in 
the public sector, and $3.7 billion was used as loans to the private sector. By the end 
of the Third Plan, the OSF had reached $13 billion in total including $9.4 billion in cash 
and $3.5 billion in outstanding loans.  
In general, it is not easy to conclude how the economic performance of Iran would have 
been if oil was not there. In order to get an idea of how Iran would have performed 
without oil we compare Iran’s important economic indexes with South Korea. Iran’s 
GDP per capita in 2016 was 5,027 dollars which is far below of South Korea’s 27,535. 
The education expenditure of South Korea was 69,858 which is significantly above 
Iran’s 10,995. Unemployment rate in Iran was 12.5%; however, the same index in South 
Korea was 3.2%. It is important to mention there are significant cultural and religion 
differences between two countries which can to some extent explain the different 
outcome. However, bearing in mind all differences in 1955 Iran’s GDP per capita was 
higher than South Korea which changed dramatically in the course of five decades.  
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4.8 Conclusion  
May 2008 was the 100th anniversary of discovering oil in commercial quantities in 
Iran. In other words, oil has been produced in Iran for over a century, and yet there 
is no general agreement on its role or whether it is a blessing or a curse for Iran. The 
country is the oldest oil producing country in the Middle East. Moreover, oil has been 
the main export of Iran for a long time and it is the world’s number one strategic 
good. As oil revenues have increased to the point where they dominate the Iranian 
government’s revenue sources, the government has changed from an extractive 
state into a distributive one. Relying heavily on oil revenue subjects the government 
to extensive fluctuations in its main source of income.    
All in all, during the period 1901-1951, the impact of the oil industry on the Iranian 
economy, apart from employment and domestic use, was insignificant. However, oil 
revenue financed over 66 per cent of the Third Plan, 63 per cent of the Fourth Plan 
and almost 80 per cent of the Fifth Plan. In 1951, oil was nationalized in Iran by 
Prime Minister Mosaddegh. This action by the Iranian government caused difficulties 
for newly established industries. The data illustrate that oil receipts were the source 
of financing economic development plans. 
It has been shown in this chapter that Iran progressively transformed from a farming-
based society to a modern economy through significant changes in the traditional 
socio-economic order. Public planning, urbanization, diversification and investment 
in infrastructure all helped in this process. Needless to say, most of the plans and 
projects were financed by oil rents. The government managed to achieve sustained 
growth through controlling imports, management assistance and helping the private 
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sector. For almost a decade until 1978, the state was successful in achieving its 
economic goals.  
Since the 1980s, the Iranian economy has grown unevenly. Although since the mid-
1970s the share of oil revenue as the major source of foreign exchange in the 
economy decreased, the oil sector continued to play a central role in the economy. 
In essence, oil export was reflected in the growth of real output between 1981 and 
1986, which was about 8 per cent annually. Likewise, the major weakness in the oil 
sector was the main reason for the fall in real output in 1988 of about 10 per cent. 
Again in 1989, this pattern continued, when economic growth was 4.3 per cent as a 
result of the recovery in oil production and export.   
All in all, oil has been Iran’s economic lifeblood, and since the 1970s the well-being 
of the Iranians has been tied to the international oil prices. It can be concluded that 
a positive correlation between the oil sector and economic growth has always existed 
in Iran. An evaluation of the economy’s post-revolutionary performance is not very 
satisfactory: the growth of GDP on average in the last 35 years was 2 per cent per 
year, somewhat less than the annual population increase, which was about 2.4 per 
cent.  
If oil revenues are only used in short-sighted plans, they increase consumption 
without creating dynamic impacts on the production structure of the economy. 
Moreover, if rents are considered temporary income for the government, the result 
will not be any different. As previously mentioned, oil has been produced long 
enough to be part of the long-term output equation in Iran. This overview is intended 
to provide a fairly comprehensive economic history of Iran over the last 54 years. In 
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addition, it outlines the major events that lie behind the data that will be presented in 
the econometric analysis in the following chapters.   
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Appendix 4 
 Table (4.1) Development Plans in Iran before the Revolution   
Development Plans  Percentage financed by oil  
First Plan (1949-55) 37% 
Second Plan (1956-62) 73% 
Third Plan (1963-67) 66% 
Fourth Plan (68-72) 63% 
Fifth Plan (73-78) 80% 
Source: Plan and Budget Organization  
Table (4.2) Real GDP, Saving Investment Growth Rates (percent) 
Era Period GDP Saving Investment 
Pre-Revolution 1960-78 9.0 16.2 11.4 
Post-Revolution 1979-03 2.5 6.2 4.3 
War years 1980-88 -1.5 6.5 -1.5 
First Plan 1989-94 7.5 7.7 4.6 
Second Plan  1995-99 3.2 5.2 10.1 
Source: Plan and Budget Organization  
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                                                Chapter Five 
             THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
“The proximate causes of economic growth are the efforts to economize, the 
accumulation of knowledge, and the accumulation of capital.”  Lewis (1955) 
5.1              Introduction 
This chapter aims to build up theoretical foundations for testing the impact of oil 
income on the Iranian economy. Chapter Two highlighted the significant features of 
economic growth and explained economic growth theories in detail. Thus, the 
reviews of related growth theories and empirical literature on the resource curse in 
Chapters Two and Three will be used as a basis to inform the foundation of the 
econometric model undertaken in this thesis. It is worth mentioning that theoretical 
models of growth mainly concentrate on either technology or human capital as the 
main drivers of economic growth. It could be said that the potential role of natural 
resources has been ignored in modern growth theories. Likewise, most empirical 
research on economic growth eliminates countries with natural resource 
endowments from their cross-country analysis. This chapter aims to introduce a 
suitable theoretical framework, which fits the purpose of this study. This thesis is in 
line with studies that look at the long-term impact of oil revenue on economic growth 
since its general purpose is to determine the effects of oil revenues on economic 
growth in Iran over the period 1955-2014.  
In order to introduce a theoretical framework to test our hypothesis, it is necessary 
to use either a neoclassical or an endogenous growth model. Previous chapters 
emphasized some significant features of reality introduced into growth theories. They 
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did so through endogenous growth theories like increasing returns to scale and 
innovation. However, the considerably different features of endogenous models 
compared to neoclassical ones need very special parameters, which make them too 
difficult to test empirically. Therefore, using a neoclassical framework augmented 
with some of the main variables in an endogenous framework looks to be a more 
reasonable option for investigating the relationship between oil income and 
economic growth.  
Different studies have developed a number of modifications to the neoclassical 
framework to stress the role of some determinants in explaining economic growth. 
For instance, the human capital added to the Solow model was illustrated in the work 
of Mankiw et al. (1992). Another version of an augmented Solow model was 
introduced by Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) by adding accumulation of 
technology through R&D. Knowles and Owen (1995) presented an augmented 
Solow model by adding health and longevity. In the same line of research, this study 
will use the neoclassical model as the basis for its theoretical framework.  
Following the introduction, Section 5.2 introduces a theoretical model, which enables 
the estimation of the impact of oil revenues on economic growth. Section 5.3 
discusses the data for different variables that the econometric model will take into 
account. Furthermore, the source of data and their quality and reliability will be 
discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 deals with choosing the right methodology and 
explaining the details for choosing that method. Section 5.6 analyses data to be used 
in an econometric model. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn in Section 5.7.  
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5.2             Theoretical Model  
As discussed in Chapter Two, within the neoclassical models, natural resources, and 
in particular oil, which this research is concerned with, have no role in determining 
the long-term economic growth rate. Therefore, long-term economic growth is not 
driven by natural resources (Ayres and Warr 2010). In the neoclassical models that 
will be the foundation for our theoretical framework, the growth rate is determined by 
the exogenous technological growth rate and capital accumulation. However, some 
scholars, such as Hartwick (1977), have suggested that to achieve sustainable 
economic growth in resource-rich countries, natural resources should be completely 
transformed into physical capital. In neoclassical models the growth rate is 
determined by the exogenous technological growth rate and capital accumulation. It 
is worth mentioning that the revenue from the sale of natural resources pays for 
capital accumulation, therefore it affects growth.  
The versatility of the neoclassical models enables the analysis of issues that are 
omitted from the basic model. For instance, in the Solow model, oil can be a factor 
of production. On the other hand, endogenous growth theory rekindled attention 
towards innovation in generating long-term economic growth. Although the driver of 
growth in endogenous growth models differs – for instance, human capital in Lucas 
(1988), knowledge in Romer (1990), and technology in Grossman and Helpman 
(1991a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) – natural resources are not among the factors 
of growth. However, resources, including natural, human, physical capital and 
technology count in any economic growth model since they form the Production 
Possibility Frontier (PPF) of a country. According to the endogenous growth 
literature, the accumulation of human capital, knowledge or technology happens as 
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a result of a decision by private and public sectors in the economy that would create 
growth.  
A strand of growth literature that highlights the impact of oil revenue on economic 
growth was discussed in Chapter Three. The conclusion indicated that the empirical 
evidence on the role that natural resources play in economic growth is rather mixed. 
The inconclusive nature of theoretical and empirical studies provides the basis for 
further empirical research on this issue. To evaluate empirically how oil affects the 
Iranian economy, a theoretical framework is necessary. 
There are two leading theoretical approaches that have mainly been used in the 
literature. One is the optimization of problems faced by a “representative household” 
or firms, which uses the Euler first-order condition to solve long-term issues, as 
adopted by Cavalcanti et al. (2011b). The other one is the theoretical model that 
Esfahani et al. (2014) developed for major oil exporting countries. This research is 
built on the theoretical outcomes of Esfahani et al. (2014). The results provide further 
evidence on the empirical validity of the long-term relationship between oil and 
output. Therefore, by considering the role of oil income in the production function, 
the theoretical framework is developed.  
The model is basically a variation of a neoclassical growth model that is developed 
by including oil income as an additional factor that is added in the capital 
accumulation process. It is assumed that saving that turns into investment for capital 
accumulation consists of two parts: one is saving from oil output, and the other is 
from non-oil output. According to the finance-led growth hypothesis, the existence of 
an efficient financial system has a positive impact on growth. In this literature, any 
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economy will grow faster if the financial system, mostly banks, can allocate 
resources efficiently. In addition, since the process of turning savings into investment 
should take place through a financial system, the role of financial development in the 
economic output equation will be considered. Moreover, the effects of natural 
resources and financial development through an interaction term will be analysed.  
The very first assumption in using the following theoretical framework is that the oil 
revenue-output ratio should stay relatively high and it would remain high in the case 
of Iran for a reasonably long period. Oil was discovered in Iran over a century ago, 
after a massive exploration and production, and the British Petroleum Statistical 
Review of World Energy suggests another 85 years of extraction (British Petroleum 
2016). Furthermore, the reserves in Iran are not limited to those that have been 
extracted, as the oil in the north of Iran has not been touched yet. Taking those 
reserves into account, Iran has remarkable oil reserves. Needleless to say, oil 
reserves are not constant and they depend on oil prices; therefore, with higher prices 
the reserves will increase. It can be concluded from the above that oil can be 
considered a factor of production in the output equation in Iran since oil resources 
are not a short-term discovery, unlike the Dutch Disease and resource curse 
hypothesis, which consider the income from resources transitory.  
5.2.1           Long-term Output Equation for Iran  
The approach here is to adopt a growth accounting model, where economic growth 
is the measure of economic performance, and for economic growth we look at real 
output per capita. It is assumed that output in Iran is a neoclassical production 
function with a diminishing marginal product of physical capital. According to Inada 
conditions, the marginal products of capital and output move towards infinity as their 
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values move towards zero, and towards zero as their values move towards infinity. 
Considering a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, we 
have:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼                                     (5.1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is output, 𝐾𝑡 is physical capital, 𝐿𝑡 is labour and 𝐴𝑡 is the level of productivity. 
It is believed that 𝐿𝑡 is exogenously given and grows according to the following linear 
processes:  
ln(𝐿𝑡) = 𝐿0 + 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑡                                                                                           (5.2) 
where 𝐿0 is the initial endowment of labour, 𝑛 is the growth rate of labour at a steady-
state point, and following the literature, 𝑢𝑙𝑡 follows general linear processes, probably 
with a unit root.  
The value of capital in terms of per capita will be: 
𝑘𝑡 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐿𝑡
                                                                                                                  (5.3) 
Therefore, the production function can be written in per capita terms as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑘𝑡
𝛼                                                                                                              (5.4) 
Since the study aims to look at the impact of oil revenue on the Iranian economy, 
let’s indicate the real value of oil export 𝑂𝑖𝑡 as follows: 
𝑂𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝑋𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑂𝑜𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓
                                                                                                   (5.5) 
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Since any surge in oil prices leads to an increase of the oil prices in relation to the 
prices of investment goods the real returns on investments in these sectors of the 
country will increase. Thus, it is important to mention that per capita income will 
automatically increase if the oil revenue increases which is considered in the 
theoretical model. 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑡 is the exchange rate in terms of the US dollar, 𝑝𝑜𝑡 is the price of oil per 
barrel, 𝑂𝑜𝑡 is the number of barrels of oil exported and 𝑖𝑛𝑓 is inflation. 
𝑜𝑖𝑡 refers to the real oil income in terms of per capita. 
𝑜𝑖𝑡 =
𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑡
                                                                                                                (5.6) 
Following the literature, a Keynesian capital accumulation function can be written as 
follows: 
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑠𝑦 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘                                                                                       (5.7) 
where 𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝐼 is investment and 𝑠 is the share of gross saving in output per capita. 
Assuming a proportion of savings (1 − 𝜑) is used as the cost of financial 
intermediation, the saving investment identified for the economy is 𝐼 = 𝜑𝑆.  
Some scholars such as Modigliani (1970) and many others provide evidence that 
there is a positive correlation between saving and output for a significant number of 
countries. This positive correlation supports the Solow growth model in which a 
higher saving rate causes transitory growth to a higher steady state level of output. 
There is a growing evidence that the causality can run the other way around which 
is from growth to saving, called the Carroll-Weil hypothesis. Although the powerful 
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empirical association between saving and investment has been stressed, there is no 
consensus explanation about this link or its direction.  In this research, following the 
Solow model we assume saving increases investment and following that the output 
increases.  
It is considered in a major oil exporting country like Iran that savings come from two 
sources, either from the oil output of the country or the non-oil output of the country. 
The equation below illustrates the saving function of the country:  
𝑆 =  𝜇(𝜍𝑡)𝑋𝑡 + 𝜆(𝜍𝑡)𝑂𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑂𝑡 is the oil output and 𝑋𝑡 the non-oil output, and 𝜇(𝜍𝑡) and 𝜆(𝜍𝑡) are the 
shares of non-oil output and oil revenue that are saved and invested. In addition, 𝜍𝑡 =
(𝑆𝑡, 𝑥𝑡)’ is the vector of state variables. It is assumed that both 𝜆(𝜍𝑡) and 𝜇(𝜍𝑡) lie in 
the range of (0,1)1. The investment function can be rewritten as follows: 
 𝐼 = 𝜑(𝜇(𝜍𝑡)𝑋𝑡 + 𝜆(𝜍𝑡)𝑂𝑖𝑡)                                                                                    (5.8) 
It is assumed that the combination of non-oil output and oil output generates the 
Iranian output. In equation (5.8) 𝜇(𝜍𝑡) is the share of saving in non-oil output per 
capita, 𝜆(𝜍𝑡) is the share of saving in oil output per capita, 𝑛 is population growth and 
𝛿 is physical capital depreciation. 
𝑋𝑡 + 𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌  
It is important to mention that oil can included in the production function of non-oil 
production, however; an econometric model with oil as an input can suffer from 
                                                          
1 0 < 𝜆(𝜍𝑡) < 1 and 0 < 𝜇(𝜍𝑡) < 1 
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endogeneity. Given this problem we consider the role of oil in the economy through 
the oil output. Arora et al. (2013) indicated in their work that how including oil revenue 
in non-oil output can cause endogeneity.  
Going back to the Keynesian capital accumulation rule:  
𝑑𝑘
𝑑𝑡⁄ = 𝑠𝑦 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘                  (5.9)  
where 𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑡⁄  is the rate of change in per capita physical capital, which is considered 
to be equal to saving minus population growth and capital depreciation. By setting 
(5.9) equal to zero the steady-state solution for the physical capital per capita will 
be:   
 𝑘 =
(𝜇(𝜍𝑡) + 𝜆(𝜍𝑡))𝑦
(𝑛 + 𝛿)⁄                                                                         (5.10)     
Taking the logarithm of both sides of the equation and replacing the steady-state 
solution for 𝑘, the steady-state solution for output per capita is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗ = [1 (1 − 𝛼)⁄ ] [𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼lnφ (
𝑠
𝑛 + 𝛿⁄ )]       (5.11) 
Mankiw et al. (1992) state economy moves towards its steady-state solution 
according to  
 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0 = 𝜃(𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0)                 (5.12) 
where 𝜃 is the adjustment towards a steady state. 
Following Mankiw et al. (1992) we have 𝜃 = (1 − 𝑒−𝜂𝑡)   
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where 𝜂 is the speed of convergence. From (5.11) we can work out the growth of 
per capita output, which is  
𝑔𝑡 = (
𝜃
𝑡⁄ )(𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗ − 𝑙𝑛𝑦0)                                                                          
Replacing 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡
∗ by its equivalent from (5.11) we have the relationship for actual 
growth of per capita output: 
𝑔 = (𝜃 𝑡(1 − 𝛼)⁄ ) [𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑡 + 𝛼 ln 𝜑 (
𝑠
𝑛 + 𝛿⁄ )] − (
𝜃
𝑡⁄ )𝑙𝑛𝑦0                                 (5.13) 
Since oil prices are identified in the international market, and are the main drivers of 
oil income, what will explain them best is a random walk model with drift. The 
rationale behind choosing a random walk with drift is that in line with the literature on 
oil prices, there is no useful information on historical oil price movements. In addition, 
the history of oil price fluctuation shows that prices are unpredictable. Furthermore, 
the oil price graph indicates that there are intercepts and trends that can be 
translated to a random walk with drift (slow steady movement and deterministic 
trend). 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝑖𝑡+1) = 𝑔
𝑜 + ∆𝑣𝑡+1                                                                                      (5.14)           
Where 𝑔𝑜 is the drift coefficient, and 𝑣𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. (0, 𝜎𝑣
2), then oil income per effective 
labour will be: 
∆ ln(𝑂𝑖𝑡+1) = 𝑔
𝑜 − 𝑛 + ∆𝑣𝑡+1 − ∆𝑢𝑙𝑡+1                                                                 (5.15)   
To test the long-term relationship between real oil revenue and other variables in the 
economy, real oil income can be decomposed to: 
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ln (
𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑡
⁄ ) = ln (
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓⁄ ) + ln (
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑂𝑜𝑡
𝐿𝑡
⁄ )                                                             (5.16)     
where (
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓⁄ ) refers to the exchange rate divided by inflation and (
𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑜𝑡
𝐿𝑡
⁄ ) 
denotes the number of barrels times price of each barrel divided by labour. 
Since the study has adopted a neoclassical model, and in the neoclassical 
framework one key determinant of economic growth is investment, this study looks 
at the quality and efficiency of investment. To do so, we look at the financial 
development, and the interaction between financial development and oil income. It 
is important to mention that in Iran, the government participates significantly in the 
financial sector. The role of financial development will be taken into account through 
total factor productivity. It is assumed that total factor productivity takes the following 
generic form: 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝐷𝑡, 𝑂𝑖𝑡, 𝑉𝑡)         (5.17)  
where 𝐹𝐷𝑡 is financial development, 𝑂𝑖𝑡 is oil income and  𝑉𝑡 is volatility. Needless 
to say, volatility is inevitable in any income from natural resources, particularly oil. 
As a result, it can be concluded that volatility is transformed to other parts of the 
economy in Iran since the lion’s share of the government’s income is from oil. 
In (5.17), 𝑉 is a proxy for volatility in the economy, which has been measured by 
volatility in oil prices. Here we take into account the role of financial development 
and oil revenue with an interaction function. Where 𝑓 is a transition function, 𝐹𝐷 
stands for financial development.  
In addition, dummy variable will be added to account for specific events in Iran such 
as the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988). It is 
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worth mentioning that the general literature concerning the interaction between 
growth and FD suggests a positive correlation between them. According to the 
literature on economic growth, there is a positive link between growth and financial 
development. To include this interaction in our model, we include an interactive term 
as follows:  
𝐴𝑡 = 𝛽0𝐴0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑉 + 𝛽3(𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝑂𝑖)                                                         (5.18) 
The question of whether oil revenue is likely to have a positive long-term effect on 
economic growth can be tested by an econometric analysis including log per capita 
output, log per capita oil income and total factor productivity. In order to test the 
effects of oil revenue on output per capita, we enter oil income in the growth function. 
Therefore, to summarize, replacing 𝐴𝑡 by its equivalent from (5.18) in (5.13) we have 
𝑔 = 𝜓1𝑙𝑛𝐴0 + 𝜓2𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷 + 𝜓3𝑉𝑡 + 𝜓4(𝐹𝐷 ∗ 𝑜𝑖) + 𝜓5 ln 𝜑 (
𝑠
𝑛 + 𝛿⁄ ) + 𝜓7 ln (
𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓⁄ ) +
𝜓8 ln(𝑃𝑡
𝑜𝑂𝑡
𝑜) − 𝜓9𝑙𝑛𝑦0                                                                              (5.19)     
In the above equation, the factor (𝑠 𝑛 + 𝛿⁄ ) has been separated out, becoming an 
additional variable. Equation (5.19) constitutes the basis of the theoretical framework 
of this research since it enables the achievement of its general purpose, which is to 
estimate the impact of oil revenue on the Iranian economy over the period 1955-
2014. As previously mentioned in Chapter Three, reviewing the resource curse 
literature, political economy considerations such as rent-seeking activities and 
corruption are obviously important. Here we assume they are likely to reveal 
themselves in the equilibrium level of capital stock and can impact on the steady-
state growth of the country.  
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5.3            Data for Various Variables and Sources  
In the literature on natural resources, the most common variables are the ratio of 
natural resources to GDP, and GDP growth. However, in more recent studies, both 
of these variables have been criticized and some new variables have been proved 
to generate different results. The new variables are real output per capita and natural 
resources export. In addition, some scholars tried to explain the relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth through other variables, such as institutional 
quality, political economy, financial development, volatility etc. In this thesis, the 
following are identified as variables explaining the relationship between natural 
resources and economic growth.      
5.3.1         Real Output per capita 
Evidence has proved that, in finding the determining factor of output growth, the 
outcome can be sensitive to what is employed to measure the level of output 
(Temple 1999). Unlike most studies, which concentrate on the impact of natural 
resource abundance on economic growth, this research uses the level of per capita 
output as the dependent variable. In addition, the study employs a growth accounting 
framework, where economic growth is used as a measure of economic performance. 
By economic growth here we mean the level of output per capita. Using the growth 
rate of GDP as a measure of economic growth in resource curse studies has been 
subject to criticism on a number of grounds. First of all, the majority of frameworks 
in the Solow/Ramsey tradition indicate that the influence on growth should be 
temporary, but could still be perpetual for the level of per capita output. In addition, 
the rate of growth does not take into account the population of the country. For the 
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aforementioned reasons, this research uses per capita GDP as a measure of 
economic growth.    
The measure of per capita output used in this research corresponds to the 
purchasing power adjusted values of GDP from version 9 of the Penn World tables. 
The variable chosen from a number of alternatives in the data source is the 
calculated output-side at chained PPPs (in mil. 2011 US$) denoted as RGDPE. As 
is demonstrated in the following figure, output per capita increased significantly in 
the 1970s due to the spike in oil prices. However, later, in 1979, the economic and 
political system of Iran changed dramatically due to the Iranian revolution and 
subsequent eight-year war with her neighbour Iraq. In the 1980s, output per se 
decreased quite sharply, not only because of the economic consequences of the war 
and the revolution but also because of the government’s policies focusing on 
encouraging higher population. After 1994, output per capita started increasing 
slowly, and it continued to increase until 2012, when following new rounds of 
sanctions imposed on Iran targeting the oil and gas sector output per capita 
decreased. Figure (5.1) depicts Iran’s output per capita in the period 1955-2014. All 
the fluctuations that were mentioned above can be seen in the figure.  
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Figure (5.1) Real Output per Capita for Iran (1955-2014).  
Source: Penn World tables, version 9, and author’s calculation  
 
5.3.2         Inflation  
An unstable inflation rate is a signal from prices that indicates the need for 
stabilization. In other words, stabilization of prices is possible through optimal 
allocation of resources, which engenders efficiency in the economy. The economic 
history of Iran shows a relatively high inflation rate of nearly 17 per cent since the 
revolution. However, this rate of inflation has been officially announced by the Iranian 
government as being lower than the “real” inflation. Inflation in Iran, like any other 
key macroeconomic variables, has corresponded to important events such as 
revolution, war, the 1993 balance-of-payments crisis and sanctions.  
Inflation is included in the study to take into account the effects of interest rates as 
well. Since the interest rate in Iran is not market determined and the credit markets 
are controlled strictly, inflation is a good proxy for interest rate assuming the Fisher 
equation holds in the long run (Esfahani et al. 2013). The inflation rate has been 
calculated by the author through the data collected from the World Bank website on 
the Consumer Price Index and the Iranian Central Bank. As can be seen from Figure 
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(5.2b), the rate of inflation in the country is not stable and has fluctuated quite often; 
furthermore, the alterations in the rate of inflation have been very sharp. Inflation can 
have significant and wide-ranging impacts on the economy; one of its important 
impacts is on the exchange rate of the country, which is the next variable.  
 
Figure (5.2a) CPI of Iran (1955-2014).  
Source: The World Bank and the Iranian central Bank 
 
Figure (5.2b) Inflation Rate in Iran (1955-2014). 
Source: The World Bank, the Iranian Central Bank and the author’s calculation 
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5.3.3         Exchange Rate  
Referring to the exchange rate in Iran is not easy since apart from the official market 
there is also a free market for foreign currencies. In the pre-revolution era, there was 
no free market for an exchange rate. The government provided foreign exchange at 
the official rate for everyone. By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had twelve different 
exchange rates to the US dollar. The endeavour of the government to fight corruption 
and rent-seeking activities reduced it to four. In the 1990s, it was possible for an 
importer to benefit from a subsidized official exchange rate 22 times lower than the 
market rate. This kind of policy created rent-seeking activities such as over-invoice 
imports or under-invoice exports to engender profits. In March 2002, the reformist 
government unified the exchange rate; however, the free market rate was different 
from the official rate. 
In 2011, the rial (the Iranian currency) suddenly crashed in the free market. The 
government’s policy was to remove the differences and to have a unified rate in the 
country, which was not successful and introduced the third exchange rate for 
travellers between the official and free market. Unsuccessful policies of the Iranian 
Central Bank and different rounds of sanctions made the situation even worse. The 
last round of sanctions in December 2011, which involved Iran’s Central Bank, burst 
the exchange rate overnight. As can be seen in Figure (5.3), the rate of exchange 
started increasing slowly from 1994, but since 2012 and the last round of economic 
sanctions by the United States and the European Union targeting the oil industry in 
Iran the country has faced an unprecedented rise in the exchange rate, which is 
translated into a weaker currency.  
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It is worth mentioning that the absence of suitable responses to volatility in oil 
revenues conveys massive volatility in the exchange rate. This has happened in Iran 
particularly since 1979. Ever since the revolution, the Iranian Rial has been on a 
downward trend. The data for the exchange rate in this research is obtained from 
the World Bank. 
 
 Figure (5.3) Exchange Rate (Market + Estimated) of Iran (1955-2014). 
Source: The World Bank 
 
5.3.4         Oil Prices 
Figure (4.5) illustrates Iran’s crude oil prices from 1955 to 2014. As is obvious in the 
figure, oil prices were stable as long as they used to be determined by the Seven 
Sisters Company in the international market and the host countries did not play any 
role in defining prices. In 1973, the first oil shock happened and this was only the 
beginning of an unstable market. Most importantly, these ups and downs in oil prices 
were not predictable. The fact that oil prices are volatile is detrimental to the Iranian 
economy since the government budget is dependent on oil income enormously. Due 
to the detrimental effects of volatile oil revenue, some oil exporting countries got 
together and established a cartel called the ‘Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
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Countries’ (OPEC). The main incentive behind establishing OPEC in the 1960s was 
to stop the reduction of oil incomes for OPEC’s members. From 1965 to 1973, the 
global demand for oil increased. OPEC’s members met the main portion of this 
increase by expanding their productions. In 1973, OAPEC announced an embargo 
on the US and the Netherland; this action raised oil prices, which was followed by 
substantial reductions in OPEC’s production. The Iranian revolution in 1979 led to 
another round of oil price spike. Iran was facing so many strikes in its oil sector that 
the production cutbacks from Iran were about 2 to 2.5 million b/d, and at some point 
it was almost halted.  
Over three decades, after the war, Iran’s production was only two-thirds of the level 
that had been reached under the government of Reza Pahlavi. After higher oil prices, 
new discoveries started coming online. Oil price experienced some ups and downs 
but they were not significant enough to influence the world economy significantly 
until 2008. Another spike in prices occurred in 2008 when the oil market faced high 
demand due to the global economic growth. This time higher oil prices were not 
associated with any geopolitical the fact that some oil fields reached maturity quite 
quickly was part of the reason, but it cannot be the only reason. For instance, oil 
production from the North Sea was 8 per cent of the global production in 2001, but 
by the end of 2007 it had decreased to almost 2 million b/d (Hamilton 2011). The 
unprecedented increase in oil prices in 2008 did not last forever and prices started 
decreasing by 2009, with prices dropping by almost 48%. After that, prices stayed 
low and did not undergo a huge increase.  
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In recent decades, the oil market faced volatility in prices and the era of stability was 
halted. Despite the fact that 2008 suggests an exceptionally large price fluctuation, 
volatility in oil prices is normally higher than any other commodity since supply and 
demand curves are inelastic. Demand is inelastic because there is no substitute for 
oil in fuel-consuming equipment. The time series highlights prominent volatility 
during the course of the study with some episodes being very volatile, mainly 
throughout the Gulf War and financial turbulence. Figure (4.5) demonstrates all the 
fluctuations in oil prices and illustrates how volatility has developed over time in the 
oil market. Data on oil prices were collected from the OPEC annual statistical 
bulletin. 
 
Figure (5.4) Iran’s Oil Prices (1955-2014). 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 
 
5.3.5         Oil Production  
Figure (5.5) shows Iran’s oil production. As is clear from the chart, after the revolution 
Iran was never successful in reaching the same point of production that she used to 
produce before the revolution. In 2012, Iran’s oil production dropped to one of its 
lowest levels after the war when the United States and European Union made 
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sanctions tighter, targeting Iran’s oil sector. Iran’s oil export declined to almost 2.5 
million b/d in 2012. Although the world’s supply of oil increased in 2012, the oil 
production in Iran dropped by almost 700,000 b/d. For the first time since 1986, Iraq 
exceeded Iran’s production and Iran was no longer the second-largest oil producing 
country in OPEC. Data on oil production were collected from OPEC’s annual 
statistical bulletin.  
 
Figure (5.5) Iran’s Oil Production (1955-2014). 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin  
5.3.6         Oil Revenue  
Figure (5.6) demonstrates Iran’s oil revenue from 1955 to 2014. Oil revenues are 
likely to have high fluctuations in comparison to other fiscal incomes. There are 
different reasons for this volatility, such as oil prices, exhaustible resources, the 
discovery of new oil fields, and changes in demand and other substitutions. Apart 
from these reasons, oil income originates from abroad and any policies by countries 
that import oil can have a significant impact on oil revenues. Furthermore, incomes 
from export have a considerable influence on the real exchange rate contingent on 
how the inflows of foreign currency are spent.  
As can be seen from Figure (5.6), Iran faced fluctuations in her oil income during the 
war and later a significant drop due to a decrease in oil prices and sanctions imposed 
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on the country because of the nuclear programme. It is important to mention that 
data on oil revenue in Iran are the data published officially; however, due to the 
corruption in the system, especially with sanctions, there were a number of 
embezzlements in the country. Furthermore, no data are available from the oil 
exported and its income, which have not been recorded officially.  
The Iranian economy is highly vulnerable to oil revenue oscillations. Volatility in oil 
revenue reduces planning horizons since petrodollars are the main source of income 
for the country. The result is volatile revenues and budget constraints for the 
government. The government heavily subsidizes energy, and fluctuations in oil 
revenue make the government budget very tight. Iran only retains a balanced budget 
with oil prices of between $90 and $95 per barrel (Shaffer et al. 2012). However, the 
Iranian government spends over a quarter of economic output on subsidies for 
energy. The data on oil income have been calculated by the author according to the 
following formula.   
𝑂𝑖𝑡 =
𝐸𝑋𝑡 𝑂𝑜𝑡 𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓
 
where 𝐸𝑋 is the exchange rate, 𝑂𝑜𝑡 is the number of barrels that the country sells, 
𝑃𝑡 is the price of oil in domestic currency and 𝑖𝑛𝑓 is inflation. Figure (5.6) depicts the 
history of oil revenue in Iran, which is calculated by the author according to the data 
collected from OPEC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin. 
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Figure (5.6) Iran’s Oil Revenue (1955-2014). 
Source: OPEC. Annual Statistical Bulletin and author’s calculation 
 
5.3.7         Volatility  
In the literature, most of the time oil endowments are blamed for slow economic 
growth in oil-rich countries. If we put aside differences in the oil producing countries 
and look at what they all have in common, it is necessary to analyse the oil market. 
The oil market has changed enormously in the new century, and this alteration 
affected oil prices significantly. Looking at the last two centuries, two different periods 
in oil prices can be observed. The first one is oil’s “golden era” from 1874 to 1974 
when the oil market was stable, although it did not stay stable forever. Ever since 
the first oil shock, the world has experienced unstable oil prices and the oil market 
has faced volatility. Consequently, around the same time oil started to play a 
substantial role in the Iranian economy. Although the price of oil did not stay high 
forever, its significant role in the Iranian economy did not diminish. 
As previously mentioned, from the 1970s onward oil remained an important factor of 
the Iranian economy and volatility was an inevitable part of it; therefore, this research 
uses methods employed in finance to take into account the effects of volatility. 
Nevertheless, the volatility of oil revenue in Iran is not just because of the alteration 
in oil prices but also because the Iranian revolution, the eight-year war with Iraq and 
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sanctions together generated more uncertainty in the oil revenue of the country. The 
most recent empirical analysis of the impact of oil revenue on economic growth 
strongly indicates that in general, oil revenue has a positive role in the development 
and growth of the Iranian economy (Esfahani et al. (2014); Mohaddes and Pesaran 
(2013). However, this positive influence has sometimes been exhausted by the 
negative effects of volatility. 
To explore the effects of oil price volatility on the Iranian economy, this research 
follows the finance literature of Mohaddes and Pesaran (2013) and Andersen et al. 
(2001) in using realized volatility. Nevertheless, this study uses monthly data on oil 
prices to calculate annual volatility. The realized oil price volatility is calculated as 
follows: 
First the log returns have been calculated: 
𝑟𝑡 = log(𝑃𝑡) − log (𝑃𝑡−1)                                                                                (5.20)   
The next step is the sum over the past N squared return   
𝑅𝑉𝑡 = ∑ 𝑟𝑡
2𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                                 (5.21)   
The square root of the realized variance gives us the realized volatility. 
𝑅𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡 = √𝑅𝑉𝑡                  (5.22)   
Figure (7.5) illustrates the realized volatility of oil prices. The figure indicates that the 
oil price fluctuation was very small before 1970, which is not surprising at all since 
before the 1970s oil prices were structured by the key international oil companies. 
Considerable volatility was first experienced in the first oil shock and then the second 
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oil shock. Ever since the first oil shock, volatility has remained a key feature of the 
international oil market.    
 
Figure (5.7) Volatility of Iranian Oil Prices (1955-2014). 
Source: OPEC. Annual Statistical Bulletin and author’s calculation  
5.3.8         Financial Development  
It is believed that a good financial system and high-quality institutions are essential 
for using petrodollars for development and economic growth. For instance, Hicks 
(1969) states  that financial development played a key role in igniting industrialization 
in England by easing the mobilization of capital. Schumpeter (1934) indicates that a 
financial system assists technological innovation by collecting money (savings), 
assessing investment projects, observing and making transactions. Since financial 
systems can obtain detailed information about agents they are authorised means of 
the country allocating money to entrepreneurs. In other words, the Schumpeterian 
point of view indicates that the development and improvement of financial 
intermediaries have a direct effect on productivity and economic growth. Goldsmith 
(1969) associates economic growth with a financial system and indicates that 
improvement and development in financial intermediation speeds up economic 
growth. According to him, the commercial banks were the very first financial 
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intermediaries in the early stages of economic growth. In the next stages other 
intermediaries, like insurance companies, and formal capital markets, are expanded 
to facilitate services to special classes of needs. Goldsmith (1969) investigates the 
link between the size of financial systems (the ratio of the value of intermediary 
assets to GNP) and economic growth for 35 countries during the period 1960-1963. 
His results demonstrated that there is a strong positive association between financial 
intensity and aggregate output, particularly during the times when a financial system 
is growing fast.  
The works by Goldsmith (1969), Diamond (1984), King and Levine (1993a), King 
and Levine (1993b), Bhattacharya and Sivasubramanian (2003), Gylfason and 
Zoega (2006) and Nili and Rastad (2007) demonstrate a positive relationship 
between financial development and economic growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) show in their studies that financial development can influence economic 
growth in a positive way by increasing saving and capital accumulation.  
Von Furstenberg and Fratianni (1996) indicate in their study that the ideal measure 
of financial development should be a variable that mirrors the alterations in the cost 
of financial intermediation, which is the outcome of an efficient financial system. One 
variable that can act as a proxy for the cost of providing financial services is possibly 
the real interest rate. Although, as previously mentioned, as the interest rate in Iran 
is not market determined and markets act under tight controls, the interest rate in 
Iran cannot be a good proxy.  
Several indicators can be used to measure the level of financial development for a 
country like Iran with oil endowments. It is necessary for financial institutions to have 
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the ability to direct the flow of credit to the private sector in resource-rich countries. 
To take into account the role of financial development here we use the following 
proxies: the flow of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(PRIVY); financial depth, which is money and quasi money, and has been used 
widely in the literature; and finally credit, which is domestic credit provided by the 
banking sector as a percentage of GDP. Since the data on financial development 
are highly correlated, in this research first we estimate models with each of the 
proxies and then we use principal component analysis to generate an index out of 
these three proxies. 
5.3.9         Principle Component Analysis  
In order to lessen the dimensionality and correlation of the data on financial 
development, the technique of principal component analysis was employed. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) involves a mathematical procedure that 
converts a number of correlated variables into a number of uncorrelated variables 
called “principal components”. The first principal component accounts for the biggest 
possible variability in the data set, and each subsequent component accounts for the 
remaining variability of data. 
The key objective of principal component analysis is to reduce the dimensionality in 
data. It is a method that tries to retain all the alteration in data even in a very large 
data set. It converts the variables into a new variable that can be called “the principal 
component” and they are not correlated. The maximum deviation of the original 
variables is included in the first and second principal components (Jolliffe 2002). 
Principal component analysis is usually applied as an approach to reduce variables 
in order to detect the structure of the relationship between them. Basically each 
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principal is the weighted average of the underlying variable. The first principal 
component contains the maximum variance for any of the combinations. Even if 
more than one principal component is created, they are uncorrelated. 
 The main strength in generating a financial development index by principal 
component analysis is that the weight of the index is based on the inner correlation 
of all the measures. Jackson (2005) stated that principal component analysis is a 
data analysis approach that obtains linear transformation of a group of correlated 
variables to achieve certain optimal conditions, the most important of which here is 
obtaining uncorrelated transformed variables. As mentioned before, in this research 
principal component analysis was used to generate a single measure of financial 
development, which is called “FD” in this study. The new index FD index is achieved 
by computing the eigenvalue of the variance matrix.  
5.3.10       Revolution and War 
During the time span of this research two main events influenced the Iranian 
economy and especially the oil revenue of the country. Since these two events had 
a significant impact on the Iranian economy, they need to be considered in the 
econometric model; to this end, the econometric framework has a dummy variable. 
In 1979, the country faced a revolution that dramatically changed both the economic 
situation and the oil income of the country due to the new policies of the Islamic 
government. One year after the Iranian revolution, the country went through a war 
with her neighbour Iraq, which lasted for eight years; since both countries are major 
oil exporters and they set each other’s oil field on fire, oil prices went up significantly. 
Therefore, both the Iranian economy and the international oil market were affected 
by this event.  
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5.3.11       Population Growth Rate  
During the past five decades, Iran has witnessed four fundamental reversal in the 
state’s fertility policies. In 1967, the first family plan was set out in order to encourage 
lower fertility. However, this plan was ended after the Islamic revolution in 1979. 
Then, for the next 10 years the new government adopted pronatalist policies. 
Following this in 1989 the government launched another plan in order to control 
population growth and to lower fertility. In 2010, the country faced low fertility and an 
aging population, therefore; the chance of fallen population,implying higher chances 
for a long-term population decrease. As a result the Iranian government again adopt 
a pronatalist policy in order to encourage a higher population increase. 
A sound understanding of Iran’s population dynamics is important since the focus of 
this research is on per-capita output. According to the 2016 census, Iran’s population 
was about 80 million whereas its growth rate fell to 1.2 % annually. This rate is similar 
to today’s world average, however; significantly lower than its peak ever since the 
revolution. Iran’s population increased from 34 million to almost 50 million, 
corresponding to the growth rate of 3.9% from 1976 to 1986. However, the outcome 
of the 1996 census demonstrated a significant drop in the population growth rate. 
The peak of population growth rate in Iran was in 1980 to 1985, which was about 4% 
per year.  
According to Iran’s birth registry, the yearly number of births raised from 0.9 million 
in 1960 to 1.4 million in 1978, however; then abruptly increased to almost 2.5 million 
in the years after the Islamic revolution. Yet, this was followed by a reverse trend 
which continued till 2000, when the yearly rate of growth was almost 1.1 million. 
Following 2000, the number of births has increased. Over the last five years the 
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number of birth is changing around 1.5 million annually and the population has been 
on an increasing trend.  
As seen in equation (5.19), the population growth rate has a negative impact on 
growth rate. Data on the rate of saving have been collected from the Iranian Central 
Bank and the World Bank since data are not available on all the years of study on 
the World Bank website. Also, in the estimation process, the study assumes that 𝛿 
is equal to 5 per cent per annum. This assumption is very common in the growth 
literature (Mankiw et al. 1992; Islam 1995; Caselli et al. 1996). In addition, the data 
on population growth (𝑛) have been collected from the World Bank. 
5.4            Quality and Reliability of Data  
With any decisions on the course of time and data collection there are strengths and 
weaknesses. The strength in the data selection is that the data come from official 
websites: OPEC, the World Bank, the Iranian Central Bank and the Penn World 
tables. The period of study takes into account major events in the international oil 
market and the history of Iran, including the Iranian revolution and eight-year war 
with Iraq. On the other hand, official data in Iran are not a very accurate indicator of 
the reality: for instance, there is a free market for foreign currency with a very 
different exchange rate, but there are no reliable data available on that market. In 
addition, usually the government announces a lower inflation rate to suggest that the 
economic situation is better than in reality. 
Data selected for this study were compared with those from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and the Iranian Central Bank. The results indicated that the figures 
from different sources are broadly consistent. To achieve the main objective of the 
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study, which is to determine the effect of oil income on economic growth in Iran, it is 
essential to collect data over a long period as well as seasonal data. However, 
seasonal data are not available for macroeconomic variables in Iran. This restricted 
the data of the study.      
All the analysis of the data in this research is carried out using EViews software, 
version 9, and Microsoft Excel software for data management and some basic 
analysis. Before processing the model estimation, it is essential to recall the 
significance of choosing the right proxy for studying the role of natural resources and 
financial development in economic performance. In addition, following the literature, 
as explained earlier in this chapter, other explanatory variables are also included in 
the model. For instance, inflation and the exchange rate are used to calculate the 
real oil income. As a measure of financial development, three different indicators are 
used: money and quasi money as percentage of GDP; domestic credit provided by 
the financial sector; and domestic credit to the private sector. The inclusion of 
volatility captures the fluctuations in the international oil market, which turns out to 
be important and to have significant effects. Finally, dummy variable captures the 
impact of important events in the period of study, i.e. the Islamic revolution and eight-
year war with Iraq.  
Some of the recent literature on natural resource endowments concentrates on 
political economy considerations, and believes that income from resources creates 
motivations for rent-seeking activities that generate corruption, voracity and even 
civil conflicts (see (Mauro 1995; Lane and Tornell 1996; Leite and Weidmann 1999; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004)). The model here concentrates on the significance of the 
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effects of variables on the level of real output per capita. In this process political 
economy and rent-seeking activities are still important and influential. Nevertheless, 
this study will not address such political economy considerations directly and 
believes they tend to show themselves in the equilibrium level of capital and steady-
state growth of the economy. While this chapter focuses on the significance of the 
impact of oil income and explanatory variables on the growth, which is subjected to 
the techniques being utilized, it is difficult to point comfortably  to the most 
appropriate one. Here we quote Kiviet (1995: 72) 
 “As yet, no technique is available that has shown uniform superiority in finite 
samples over a wide range of relevant situations as far as the true parameter 
values and the further properties of the data generating mechanism are 
concerned. Perhaps such a technique is just impossible.” 
Furthermore, the quality of data is not optimal for Iran as a developing country as 
considered in this research. As a result, it is possible to bring about an unreliable 
outcome from quantitative estimations. For instance, in regard to the quality of data 
on developing countries: 
“Once we go beyond developed nations, the data are of very poor quality (and 
in many cases non-existent). As discussed in Srinivasan (1994, 1995), most of 
the data are constructed by interpolation and extrapolation. Summers (Leite 
and Weidmann 1999) and Heston extrapolated from benchmark countries 
(which varied from 16 in 1970 to 56 in 1985) to other countries and also from 
benchmark years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985)” 
                                                                 (Maddala and Wu 2000: 641) 
 
Saunders (2011) indicated in his research that there are two main threats to the 
credibility of research: the validity and reliability of data. In the context of this 
research there are two main reliability issues. The first issue arises when data 
are obtained from an untrustworthy source. The second arises if the data 
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released by the national official institutions are the real data. To control the 
incidence of the first, the data used in this analysis are all obtained from the 
World Bank Indicators, the Iranian Central Bank, the OPEC website, the Penn 
World tables and OPEC’s annual bulletin. All of these organizations receive 
data from the primary institutions that generate the data required in this study.  
The second problem is unofficial rates and trades that happen in the Iranian 
economy and these are almost impossible to capture. The researcher is aware 
that, as in most developing countries, Iranian data are still subject to errors, 
which, exist to some degree in any data collected. As discussed before, the 
reliability and validity of data are the key bases of the credibility of a study. 
Threats to validity in this study may include the accuracy of the specifications 
of the frameworks and methods, along with the nature of the data employed in 
the research. Some of the problems could be tackled to some extent by 
undertaking diagnostic tests and ensuring that the appropriate framework and 
method are employed to fit the nature of data and to avoid potential threats to 
the validity of the research outcome. This has been indicated both in the review 
of literature and in the discussion of the research method and theoretical 
framework.    
In this regard, it is essential to note that some checks on the consistency and 
reliability of the data were made. However, this study only relies on the official 
data announced by the Iranian government and is not able to take into account 
the oil trading that happens unofficially or the exchange rate in the free market. 
Moreover, the official exchange rate and inflation are different from the reality, 
but there are no data available for the exchange rate in the free market and the 
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real rate of inflation. In this study, the model nests relevant factors to investigate 
the role that oil revenue has played in Iran.  
It is evident that the empirical studies on natural resources and economic 
growth have not decisively proved the justification of the so-called resource 
curse. This calls for clarity on the relationship between oil endowments and 
economic growth. From an economist’s perspective, there are two approaches 
that are deeply different: the first one begins with a stochastic formulation of 
time series before decreasing the dynamic by imposing restrictions on the 
parameters; the second framework begins with a static formulation of a 
theoretical framework before developing the model with more stochastic 
components. However, the results of these two approaches vary significantly. 
To decide on the appropriate econometric estimation, the following section 
starts with some diagnostic tests on data.  
Table 5.1 Variables and Sources  
Symbol  Variable  Proxies  Source  
Y Level of per 
capita output 
Economic 
performance  
 WDI 
EX Exchange 
rate  
Exchange rate  WDI 
INF Inflation Inflation  WDI 
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Credit Domestic 
credit 
provided by 
financial 
sector  
Financial 
development  
WDI 
DEPTH Money and 
quasi money 
as % GDP  
Financial 
development 
WDI 
PRIVY Domestic 
credit to the 
private sector  
Financial 
development 
WDI 
O Oil income  Oil  OPEC 
V Volatility  Fluctuations in the oil 
market  
OPEC and 
author’s 
calculations  
WDI indicates World Development Index 
5.5 Data Transformation and Unit Root Tests 
In the last three decades, the approaches to estimate econometric models have 
changed drastically. The standard regression model approach, ordinary least 
squares (OLS), is based on the assumption of stationary variables. In other words, 
in order to use OLS the mean and variance of each variable in the model should be 
constant over time. Yet, most macroeconomic time series variables are non-
stationary and show stochastic trend behaviour; therefore, the mean and variance of 
the series of the variables are non-constant over time. Thus, incorporating non-
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stationary variables in the OLS method generates misleading outcomes and 
spurious regression. Even high 𝑅2, DW and significant coefficients can be found 
where no meaningful association exists among variables.  
As was emphasized by Phillips and Perron (1988), estimating regressions with non-
stationary variables could have misleading outcomes, illustrating significant 
associations even where the variables are produced independently. These 
regressions are known as “spurious regressions” (Patterson 2000), which can 
happen in models dealing with time series data. The importance of the stationary 
data in time series lies in the fact that conditions of constant variance, covariance 
and mean should be satisfied to be able to estimate an accurate model. In order to 
avoid spurious regression, each individual series needs a careful investigation of the 
properties of individual series prior to estimation. Graphical inspection can create a 
general picture of the trend behaviour of the time series, and its difference. Hence, 
time series plots alone cannot indicate whether a series is stationary or not. 
Autocorrelation tests can give indications of the integration order of the data; 
however, they are only correlations. More sophisticated models are pivotal to show 
the association amongst variables and their lags through regression frameworks.  
To achieve this relationship, unit root tests can be used. A unit root test can be 
applied to decide whether the variables of interest are stationary or not. In order to 
decide on the order of integration amongst variables in the following section, first we 
look at the graph of variables and the first difference. Then unit root tests such as 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Peron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests will be applied.  
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It is important to mention that all the variables in econometric models apart from 
volatility and inflation are transformed to log form for a number of reasons. First of 
all, the natural logarithm transformation is helpful in finding the normal distribution of 
the data. Moreover, the estimated coefficients in a logarithm-transformed model are 
the elasticities of the variables in logs; therefore, the findings are easy to interpret 
since elasticity is unit free. In addition, it reduces the outlier effect. This illustrates the 
impact of 1 per cent change in a variable on the dependent variable irrespective of 
the units of each variable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998).  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron and KPSS tests, the last of which was 
developed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), will be applied in this study and a summary 
of the results is outlined in Tables (5.2) and (5.3) below. The null hypothesis in the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller is if the natural logarithm of the variable of the interest has 
a unit root. The constraint of standard and well-known tests for unit roots like Dickey 
and Fuller (1979) or Phillips and Perron (1988) is that they do not provide essential 
information on the nature of the persistence of the time series in the study (Garratt 
et al. 2012). The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) 
and KPSS tests calculated for the period 1955-2014 for both the levels and first 
differences of the core variables are shown in Tables (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4). 
5.5.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
 
The ADF test begins with an autoregressive (AR) (K) framework, where the 
explanatory variables are dependent lagged k periods. The ADF test corrects 
for higher-order correlation by presenting lags of first differences of the 
dependent variables as demonstrated in equation (5.25). 
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∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜌𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡                                                           (5.25) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is the time series variable at time t, t represents the deterministic time 
trend, ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑖 are the lagged first differences, and 𝛼 and 𝛿 are the parameters 
that need to be estimated. Equation (5.25) tests to check whether the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0; 𝜌 = 0 of the existence of a unit root is accepted against the 
alternative of  𝐻1: 𝜌 < 0. The test is performed consecutively. The calculated 
ADF test results are compared to the critical values from the non-standard 
Dickey-Fuller distribution at the different levels of significance. If the estimated 
t-statistic of 𝜌 is greater than the critical value in an absolute value, the null 
hypothesis will be rejected, specifying that the variable is non-stationary in its 
level. The first difference of the series will be tested following the same 
procedure. This process will be repeated until a stationary time series is 
achieved, which determines the order of integration of the data (Lim and 
McAleer 2001). 
5.5.2 Phillips-Perron Test  
The Phillips-Perron test builds on the Dickey-Fuller test with the same null 
hypothesis, which is the existence of the unit root 𝐻0; 𝛼 = 0. However, it 
suggests a non-parametric approach. As a result, it is applicable to broader 
categories of time series, including ARMA and moving average models (Phillips 
and Perron 1988). 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                          (5.26) 
where 𝑌𝑡 is a time series and 𝑢𝑡 is the error term. Whereas the ADF test 
addresses the issue of a higher order of autocorrelation by adding lag 
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difference terms of the variable, the PP test changes the test statistic of the 𝛼 
parameter; therefore, serial correlation cannot affect the asymptotic distribution 
of the statistic (Waheed et al. 2006). The drawback of using a unit root test is 
that these tests have low power in regard to available sample sizes and time 
spans.  
5.5.3 KPSS Test  
In the ADF and PP unit root test the null hypothesis of the time series is I(1). 
On the other hand, the null hypothesis of the time series is I(0) in stationary 
tests. The most popular stationary test is the KPSS test, which was proposed 
by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). The test was derived from the following model: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝐷𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                    (5.27) 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡              𝜀𝑡~𝑊𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2)    
where 𝐷𝑡 encompasses deterministic components and 𝑢𝑡 is I(0) which may be 
heteroscedastic. In this test the null hypothesis is  𝑦𝑡 is I(0); in other words, 
𝐻0: 𝜎𝜀
2 = 0, which indicates that 𝜇𝑡 is a constant. The KPSS test statistic is the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) or testing for 𝜎𝜀
2 = 0 against 𝜎𝜀
2 > 0. In contrast to the 
two previous tests, here the estimated value should be smaller than the critical 
value.  
5.5.4 Graphical Investigation  
 
Graphical investigation of all the variables, in levels and first differences, is 
demonstrated in Figure (5.8) in order to determine whether the data are 
stationary or non-stationary.  
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  Figure (5.8): Natural Logarithm of the Variables of the Study and their 
first differences.  
As has been demonstrated by the graphs in Figure (5.8), all the variables apart from 
volatility and inflation have either a deterministic or stochastic trend over time. In the 
first difference of variables trend behaviour has vanished over time. The figures 
suggest that all variables apart from volatility and inflation are non-stationary their 
first difference; however, is stationary. 
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5.6 Unit Root Test Results  
Following the graphical investigation, the time series unit root tests ADF, PP and 
KPSS were applied on all the variables of the model. Tables (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) 
demonstrate that the results of unit root tests for all the variables of interest are less 
than critical values at 1% and 5% levels apart from volatility and inflation. In other 
words, the results demonstrate that the variables are stationary at first difference. 
Because in the results of the ADF, PP and KPSS tests the variables are non-
stationary, it is necessary to transform them by taking their first differences in order 
to achieve stationary data. 
Table (5.2) Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test Applied to Variables in the 
Core Model 
 
 
Variables  
                           Level               First Difference  
 
Intercept  
 
Intercept and 
trend  
 
Intercept 
 
Intercept 
and trend 
Real output -2.045777 
 
 
-2.199514 
 
 
-6.321605 
 
-6.285890 
 
 
 
Exchange 
rate  
0.884924 -1.120934 -4.875181 -5.115546 
 
Inflation  
 
-3.433975 
 
-4.2647722 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil income  
 
-2.315146 
 
-1.741442 
 
-6.708308 
 
-6.834727 
 
Credit  
 
-1.961882 
 
-2.081161 
 
-6.716695 
 
-6.716019 
 
Depth 
 
-2.177651 
 
-2.116098 
 
-4.798964 
 
-2.600563 
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Note: When applied to the levels, ADF statistics are calculated using ADF regression 
with an intercept ADF(0), a linear time trend and intercept ADF(1) and 𝜌 lagged.  
Table (5.3) Phillips and Perron Unit Root Test Applied to Variables in the Core 
Model 
 
Variables  
Level  First Difference 
 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
trend 
 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
trend 
 
Real 
output 
 
-2.307279 
 
-2.808860 
 
-6.199946 
 
-6.191905 
 
Exchange 
rate 
 
1.009005 
 
-1.156560 
 
-4.928418 
 
-5.117386 
 
Inflation 
 
-3.282387 
 
-4.225100 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil income 
 
-2.261460 
 
-1.892369 
 
-6.699496 
 
-6.828909 
 
Credit 
 
-1.996714 
 
-2.162378 
 
-6.716695 
 
-6.716019 
Depth  
-2.382729 
 
-2.081868 
 
-5.146104 
 
-5.297989 
 
Privy 
 
-0.683934 
 
-1.691444 
 
-6.722829 
 
-6.694202 
 
Volatility 
 
-6.193432 
 
-7.369931 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Privy  
 
-0.531755 
 
-1.559439 
 
-6.721260 
 
-6.722793 
 
Volatility  
 
-6.138291 
 
-7.369931 
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Table (5.4) Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Unit Root Test Applied to 
Variables in the Core Model 
 
 
Variables  
Level  First Difference 
 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
trend 
 
Intercept 
Intercept and 
trend 
 
Real 
output 
 
0.168843 
 
 
 
0.137975 
 
 
0.219593 
 
0.196552 
 
 
 
Exchange 
rate 
 
 
0.882294 
 
 
0.2051257 
 
 
 
0.358985 
 
 
 
0.107759 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
0.717751 
 
 
 
0.141626 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Oil income 
 
0.707861 
 
 0.160105 
 
0.249938 
 
0.069300 
 
Credit 
 
0.661640 
 
0.136941 
 
0.095729 
 
0.083883 
Depth  
0.224520 
 
0.089441 
 
0.025944 
 
0.023844 
 
Privy 
 
0.107517 
 
0.082314 
 
0.022835 
 
0.017699 
Volatility 0.778853 0.137426   
 
It has been proved in the literature that the data on natural resources, GDP and most 
macroeconomic variables are non-stationary. Thus, the mean and variance are not 
constant; therefore, the assumption of the OLS estimator is violated and the results 
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of regression are likely to be spurious. To solve this problem, researchers employ 
different variables in order to obtain stationary variables; however, in such a scenario 
important information in regard to long-term analysis is lost. 
It is important to mention that the existence of structural breaks in time series can 
make the result of the Dickey-Fuller test for integration unreliable. Perron (1989) and 
Perron and Vogelsang (1992) have indicated that a structural break in the mean of 
a stationary variable would bias the standard Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dicky-
Fuller tests toward non-rejection of the hypothesis of a unit root. If any structural 
break exists it could be concluded that the process is I(1) whereas it is I(0). In order 
to test stationarity despite the structural break the ‘two-stage’ procedure suggested 
by Perron (1990) was adopted. Initially regression of each series was built on the 
residuals of single-lag values of variables. The t-ratios were compared with the 
Perron critical values based on the number of observations and the level of 
significance. The results indicated that t-values for both time series were higher than 
the Perron critical values. Therefore it is concluded that all the variables apart from 
inflation and volatility are non-stationary.  
A number of econometric time series methods have been employed in the analysis 
of natural resource abundance and economic growth. Methods include panel data 
models (Cavalcanti et al. 2011b), autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) tests 
(Jahan-Parvar and Mohammadi 2011), vector autoregressive ordinary least 
squares, co-integration and the VECM test (Esfahani et al. 2013). Each of these 
approaches has its own weaknesses that affect the choice of methods; therefore, 
based on the available data and for how and what the results are intended to be 
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used, approaches are determined and chosen. Nonetheless, some approaches are 
recognized as being more reliable and less likely to produce spurious outcomes.  
Since the model has six variables, there is a chance of having a co-integrating vector 
among variables. Based on the results of unit root tests, the co-integration 
relationship between output per capita as a dependent variable and independent 
variables can be tested. In addition, this method treats all the variables in the system 
as endogenous; therefore, there is no endogeneity bias if endogenous regressors 
are included. Moreover, the problem of multicollinearity is minimized in the VECM 
approach as regressors in the VECM are almost orthogonal. Furthermore, all figures 
about the long-term effects are present in brief in the levels matrix, which can be 
used with special attention when the co-integration problem is solved. Finally, the 
interpretation of the coefficients is more intuitive, since they can be easily 
categorized into short-term and long-term effects. In addition, because the co-
integration method is used in this research the problem of endogeneity is minimized. 
The co-integration approach would retain the long-term associations and obtains 
consistent parameters in the long-term (Stock and Watson 1988). In addition, the 
associated ECM estimates the short-term dynamics associations and the speed of 
adjustment to the long-term equilibrium is specified. However, there are a number of 
restrictions such as order of integration and co-integration tests that need to be 
satisfied before the estimation. Because of the results of unit root tests, this study is 
going to use co-integration analysis. This model will take into consideration the time 
dimension of the study. In addition, the fact that the omitted variables are either 
constant or change evenly will be captured through the deterministic trend. 
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It might be asked why, if the study is going to use a co-integration model, we need 
to include a theoretical part? The answer to this is that not having any background 
analysis and beginning immediately with the co-integration analysis would raise 
questions about components included in the model and the rationale behind 
choosing them. Therefore, this research explained a theoretical framework to clarify 
the choice of variables. It is worth adding that in this research we are going to apply 
two methods: first we start with a co-integration approach using ARDL, then we 
continue with the VECM model.  
Some literature assessing the effects of natural resource abundance on economic 
performance was discussed in Chapter Three. A number of researches focus on the 
negative short-run impact of a new natural resource discovery on economic growth, 
while others concentrate on the positive long-term influence of resources. Following 
the latter, here we continue to estimate the econometrics model given by equation 
(5.19). The level of financial development and volatility and the interaction between 
financial development and oil income are included in the model. In order to evaluate 
the role of the mentioned variables in explaining economic performance we use 
equation (5.19). From a theoretical point of view, to determine the impact of oil 
revenue on economic growth, there are many factors that need to be considered. 
However, it is impossible to take into account all variables simultaneously.  
5.7            Conclusion  
This chapter presented a theoretical model that is basically a variation of the 
neoclassical growth model, which includes oil income in the capital accumulation 
process. The variables were specified for the model for the period 1955-2014. Real 
output per capita was specified as a dependent variable whereas real oil income per 
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capita, inflation, the exchange rate, volatility, financial development, and the 
interaction between financial development and oil income were specified as the 
determinants of output per capita. The definition of the aforementioned variables, the 
adopted proxies and sources of data were explained in detail.  
The properties and the stationary status of the data were examined through 
graphical inspection and three unit root tests: ADF, PP and KSSP. Consequently, 
the results for all unit root tests were in line with the literature, which gave us more 
confidence in the results. All variables are integrated to the order of one except 
volatility and inflation, which are found to be I(0). Consequently co-integration 
analysis can be performed.  
The best solution to understand growth and investigate the impact of different 
variables is to examine time series data for each country individually, since countries 
experience different events, policies, political systems and so many other issues that 
contribute to economic growth and variations of it. Application of an instrumental 
variable that fails to address the validity of instruments would undermine the results 
of regression and the estimated results would be inconsistent. The econometric 
model would be in line with the theoretical model and would allow us to achieve the 
main objective of the study, which is to determine the impact of oil revenue on the 
Iranian economy over the period 1955-2014.  
With respect to the estimation process, it is essential to note that there are a few 
econometric problems in growth literature that need to be dealt with, namely the 
omitted variables, ignorance of the time dimension and how this study measures 
economic growth. Co-integration models have outstanding advantages for studying 
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economic growth in comparison to cross-sectional regressions and panel data 
models. For instance, despite the fact that cross-sectional regressions and panel 
data are likely to suffer from omitted variables, by using the VAR technique it is 
possible to control for them. In addition, the use of time series allows one to take into 
account the time dimension of the study. Moreover, the VAR approach can control 
the possible problems of endogeneity.  
The next chapter estimates co-integration models for this study to obtain the 
empirical results. The present study attempts to address the resource curse in regard 
to oil in the Iranian economy by employing the proposed framework. To this end, 
autoregressive distributed lags and vector error correction techniques based on time 
series will be used in order to improve the estimated parameters of the role of growth 
in Iran and produce more accurate results. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Table (5.5) Annual GDP (billion USD) Data and Population  
year Annual GDP population 
1955 49094.15 18.49558 
1956 53554.2 19.00651 
1957 62288.37 19.54 
1958 70728.28 20.1 
1959 79804.8 20.68551 
1960 82565.14 21.29356 
1961 88173.72 21.9192 
1962 95176.59 22.56736 
1963 99726.71 23.23508 
1964 103487.6 23.9322 
1965 119009.8 24.65477 
1966 129606.3 25.40476 
1967 145270.4 26.1644 
1968 160112.4 26.9327 
1969 175250.7 27.71558 
1970 203657.1 28.51401 
1971 230380.6 29.28113 
1972 260586.7 30.07385 
1973 281535.5 30.90357 
1974 284100.3 31.7849 
1975 268502.6 32.73056 
1976 294777.9 33.73923 
1977 264616.9 34.81423 
1978 232114.4 35.97759 
1979 204493.3 37.25677 
1980 118836 38.66822 
1981 107412.5 40.20908 
1982 146629.1 41.86237 
1983 144257.3 43.61051 
1984 140961.3 45.42902 
1985 144213.4 47.29079 
1986 130345.6 49.20558 
1987 143338.9 51.15212 
1988 127438.4 53.03594 
1989 142444.6 54.73524 
1990 175121.9 56.1692 
1991 205060 57.28804 
1992 221581 58.1301 
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1993 280478 58.81186 
1994 293629 59.50129 
1995 305672.4 60.31863 
1996 366441.9 61.30663 
1997 383228.1 62.42609 
1998 395292.3 63.61607 
1999 433352.3 64.78036 
2000 492996.7 65.85006 
2001 564511.4 66.81274 
2002 659469.4 67.69668 
2003 748614.8 68.52207 
2004 834729.8 69.32195 
2005 976026.1 70.12212 
2006 1045916 70.92316 
2007 1170065 71.72086 
2008 1194807 72.53069 
2009 1207749 73.37098 
2010 1275174 74.25337 
2011 1355094 75.18432 
2012 1203364 76.15698 
2013 1232942 77.15245 
2014 1218374 78.14364 
Source: The World Bank  
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                                           Chapter Six  
     CO-INTEGRATION AND ERROR CORRECTION ESTIMATION  
6.1            Introduction 
Chapter Five discussed the theoretical framework of the study by introducing an 
augmented neoclassical model. On the basis of such a framework, the current 
chapter aims to estimate an empirical version of the model for the Iranian economy. 
In other words, it examines empirically the link between oil income and economic 
growth. The estimated model considers both the long-term equilibrium and the 
short-term dynamics simultaneously. While the long-term role of oil income is of 
major importance for policymakers and planners, the short-term dynamics are 
central for forecasting.  
The results of unit root tests in the previous chapter indicate that two variables are 
integrated of order zero and the rest are integrated of order one, suggesting that 
the results of OLS estimation could be spurious. Therefore, the study will use co-
integration analysis to address different orders of integration in data. In addition, an 
alternative econometric co-integration approach, Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL), is utilized in this research as well. Following Esfahani et al. (2014), who 
tested the theory that they developed for major oil exporting countries using VARX 
and VECM, we test the theory in Chapter Five using ARDL and VECM models. A 
detailed report on the results from the analysis of the association between oil 
endowments and economic growth in both models will be carried out for the Iranian 
economy. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 justifies the econometric 
method chosen to model the role of oil revenue in the Iranian economy. Section 6.3 
discusses the ARDL approach and Section 6.4 the ARDL procedures. Section 6.5 
discusses the empirical results of ARDL for the course of the study in the Iranian 
economy. Following that, Sections 6.6 and 6.7 discuss the vector autoregressive 
model approach and the procedure of the model before the focus moves on to the 
empirical results of VECM models in Section 6.8. Finally, a summary of the chapter 
and concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.9.  
6.2            Justifying the Selected Co-integration Approach  
Nelson and Plosser (1982) indicate in their work that a significant number of 
macroeconomic time series have a unit root; therefore, the null hypothesis of no unit 
root cannot be rejected for the majority of macroeconomic time series.  
As Engel and Granger indicate:  
“If each element of a vector of time series 𝑥𝑡 first achieves stationarity 
after differencing, but a linear combination 𝛼′𝑥𝑡 is already stationary, the 
time series 𝑥𝑡  are said to be co-integrated with co-integrating vector 𝛼. 
There may be several such co-integrating vectors so that 𝛼 becomes a 
matrix. Interpreting 𝛼′𝑥𝑡 = 0 as a long-run equilibrium, co-integration 
implies that deviations from equilibrium are stationary, with finite variance, 
even though the series themselves are non-stationary and have infinite 
variance.”       
                                                              (Engle and Granger 1987: 251) 
In other words, this definition indicates that for some non-stationary variables that fit 
into the same economic system, there might be an attractor that stops them from 
going away from each other. Therefore, in the equilibrium there is a power forcing 
variables to move together in the long-term, which is called a “co-integration 
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relationship”. Co-integration was introduced in a series of papers by Granger (1983), 
Granger and Weiss (1983) and Engle and Granger (1987). According to these 
studies, for the existence of a co-integration relationship, variables should be 
integrated of order one but the residuals of the linear combination of those variables 
should be co-integrated of order zero.  However, in regard to the order of integration 
in variables, Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001) suggested the 
ARDL method of co-integrating analysis. They believed the system of variables can 
also be a combination of I(0) and I(1) or only I(0) or I(1) for ARDL estimation. 
Therefore, according to Pesaran et al. (2001), as long as there is no I(2) variable, a 
co-integration relationship can exist. Moreover, if there are 𝑛 variables in the model, 
up to (𝑛 − 1) co-integrating relations can exist.  
Different co-integration modelling approaches are used for time series analysis, with 
the most common techniques being the two-step approach originated by Engle and 
Granger (1987) and the maximum likelihood approach suggested by Johansen 
(1988). Johansen’s method has a number of advantages over the Engle-Granger 
method. For instance, Johansen offers a greater clarity on the statistical significance 
tests on the speed of adjustment and also it can identify multiple co-integration 
relationships. It is worth mentioning that although all the variables are considered 
endogenous in the VAR model, which can be estimated as a co-integrated VECM, 
the model still allows for weakly exogenous variables.  
According to Johansen’s approach, all the variables should have the same lag 
lengths. However, the proposed ARDL model for co-integration by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) can override this issue for models whose regressors have different lag 
lengths. Moreover, the ARDL bound test method has established a strong ability to 
211 
 
handle fairly small samples. In addition, endogenous variables would not hamper the 
model’s ability to produce unbiased estimates of the long-term parameters.  
This chapter uses the single-equation, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
bound test approach to co-integration according to Pesaran et al. (2001) Model to 
evaluate the long-term equilibrium and the short-term dynamic associations within 
the output per capita oil income nexus. There is limited evidence in the literature on 
growth and natural resources of comprehensive use of the ARDL bound test 
approach to co-integration. Thus this research fills this gap by introducing an 
important contribution to the empirical literature that concerns both the short-term 
and long-term associations between oil income and economic performance, 
represented by output per capita.   
In addition, this chapter applies the unrestricted error correction form of the ARDL 
framework to evaluate the long-term elasticities of variables before using a restricted 
error correction model (ECM) to estimate the short-term elasticities. This approach 
to co-integration analysis is suitable for handling variables that exhibit various 
statistical profiles, such as variables that do not have the same order of integration 
or variables that have endogenous properties.  
Therefore, the ARDL model will be used to test the long-term relationship between 
output per capita, oil income, financial development and a dummy variable. In 
general, four ARDL models will be estimated using different indexes for financial 
development. The first model uses depth as an index of financial development, the 
second model uses credit as an index, the third one uses PRIVY and the last ARDL 
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model uses principal component analysis to provide a new index using credit, depth 
and PRIVY1.  
In order to check whether the same result is held by applying another co-integration 
technique we use a vector error correction model. Four different VECMs will be 
estimated for testing the co-integration relationship between output, oil income, 
financial development and the interaction between financial development and oil 
income, as was explained in the theoretical framework. In addition, the VECM model 
includes volatility in oil prices as a weakly exogenous variable to check the impact 
of volatility. In line with the ARDL model, the effects of the eight-year war with Iraq 
and the Iranian revolution will be taken into account as a political crisis in a dummy 
variable.  
6.3           The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Approach  
Here we follow Pesaran et al. (2001) approach to the ARDL model in order to 
estimate the long-term relationship between variables of the study. As discussed 
earlier, the variables can be I (0) or I (1) or even a combination of I (0) and I (1). 
Although regression models of this type have been used for a long time, more 
recently they have been shown to generate a valuable tool for testing the existence 
of the long-term associations amongst economic variables. Considering the low 
power of a unit root test for time series, particularly in small samples, ARDL seems 
a suitable approach since it does not need a prior unit root test. Moreover, another 
advantage of the ARDL model, as mentioned earlier, is the fact that it allows a 
different number of lags for any regressor (Feridun 2010). It is worth mentioning that 
                                                          
1 As explained in Chapter Five. 
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the Monte Carlo findings specify that the ARDL method also works accurately when 
the model has endogenous regressors.  
6.4            The ARDL Approach’s Procedures   
To start the ARDL we go back to a general autoregressive distributed lag model, 
which is written as: 
𝛽(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜃(𝐿)𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡               (6.1) 
where 𝛽(𝐿) is an order-p that has roots lying outside the unit circle; in other words, 
they have unit roots and 𝜃(𝐿) is an order-q polynomial. A basic form of ARDL can 
be written as:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛼0𝑥𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑞𝑥𝑡−𝑞 + 𝜀𝑡    (6.2) 
Model (6.2) is autoregressive in the sense that 𝑦𝑡 is explained by lagged values of 
itself. In addition, it has a distributed lag component in the form of explanatory 
variables 𝑥.  
There are a number of steps in the ARDL approach to co-integration. First, according 
to Pesaran et al. (2001), all the variables in the model should be either I(0) or I(1). 
Therefore, there should not be any I(2) variables since such data will invalidate this 
methodology. Second, an unrestricted error correction model (ECM) needs to be 
formulated and the appropriate lag structure for the model needs to be determined. 
In the following step, the error terms of the model should be checked to make sure 
they are serially independent and the model is dynamically stable. The next step is 
performing the bound test to check for the long-term associations between the 
variables. Then, if the bound test confirms the existence of a long-term relationship, 
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both the long-term model and a restricted ECM can be estimated. Finally, the short-
term dynamic effects and the long-term relationships among variables can be 
measured.  
It can be concluded that the ARDL approach is an OLS regression that contains lags 
that are distributed amongst both dependent and independent variables. The model 
is presented in the (p, q) set-up. In the model p expresses the maximum number of 
lags for the dependent variable and 𝑞 = 𝑞1, … , 𝑞𝑘  exhibits the maximum number of 
lags of k independent variables. According to Patterson (2000:349) representation, 
the overall formula of a multivariate ARDL model is: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐿
𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=0 𝐿
𝑖𝑗𝑋′𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡           (6.3) 
where 𝐿 is the lag operator and 𝑋′ is a vector of independent variables. A vector of 
𝑋′ could include variables that have lag of zero.  
The first step of ARDL was described in Chapter Five; the result indicates that none 
of the variable is I(2), which is in line with the first assumption of the ARDL approach. 
Following that, the appropriate values for the maximum lags need to be selected. 
The optimal lags are determined according to AIC and SC information. Then, before 
moving to the bound test, it is important to check whether the errors are independent 
since one of the important assumptions in the bound test proposed by Pesaran et 
al. (2001) is that the errors of the estimation must be serially independent. 
The relationship between variables in equation (5.19) follows a time path before 
reaching the long-term relationship. Therefore, equation (5.19) can be written in the 
following unrestricted error correction form of the ARDL model (taking out volatility 
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and the interaction between oil income and financial development, which are taken 
into account through total factor productivity):  
∆ln 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆ ln 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑒/𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 +
𝑞
𝑖=0 ∑ 𝛽4𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝑓𝑑𝑡−𝑖 +
𝛾1 ln 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑛
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡−1
+ 𝛾4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑒1𝑡                                                             (6.4)                       
where 𝑒1𝑡 is the error term. The left-hand side of the equation (6.4) is the real output 
per capita in Iran. The right-hand side of the equation denotes other variables in lags, 
and in differences. The F-statistic is employed to test the joint significance of the lag 
levels of the variables in the unrestricted error correction model and specifies the 
presence of long-term equilibrium under the null hypothesis of no co-integration 
(𝐻0 = 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 = 0) against the alternative of (𝐻1 = 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 ≠ 0) in 
equation (6.4). However, as argued by Pesaran et al. (2001), none of the statistics 
has standard distribution, regardless of whether the regressors are all I(0) or I(1) or 
mutually co-integrated. Hence, Pesaran et al. (2001) calculated two forms of 
asymptotic critical values for a given significant level in cases with and without trend.  
The first considers all the variables as I(1) while the other one considers all the 
variables as I(0). If the calculated F-statistics are greater than the upper critical value, 
the null is rejected, which means the variables are co-integrated. On the other hand, 
if the F-statistics are smaller than the lower critical value, the null cannot be rejected; 
therefore, the variables are not co-integrated. The last scenario is if the F-statistic 
value lies between the two bounds, the test is indecisive and needs further 
investigation. It is important to mention that these critical values are determined by 
the number of regressors and whether the ARDL framework has intercept, or trend 
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and intercept together. Following the long-term relationship estimation using the 
bound test, the long-term and short-term associations can be estimated.  
After establishing the long-term association in the initial step using the bound test, 
the long-term coefficients of the co-integrating model will be estimated in equation 
(6.4). The final stage includes estimating the short-term coefficients from the 
restricted error correction in equation (6. 5). In order to do so, the optimal number of 
lags for all variables in the ARDL model will be selected according to the appropriate 
information criteria. Following that, the ARDL (p, q, m, n) as in equation (6. 5) will be 
estimated as: 
∆ln 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆ln 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑖∆ ln 𝑜𝑖𝑡−𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0 ∆ln 
𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽4𝑖∆ln 𝑓𝑑𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝜑𝜀𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝜐𝑡       (6. 5) 
 
where 𝜀𝑐𝑡−1 is the lagged error correction term achieved from the residuals of the 
prior ARDL model, and 𝜑 is the speed of adjustment parameter that congregates the 
ECM to its long-term equilibrium.   
6.5            Empirical Results of the ARDL Models 
Annual data over the course of 1955-2014 are used to estimate the long-term 
relationship between oil income and economic growth in Iran using Pesaran et al. 
(2001) ARDL approach. We apply ARDL co-integration regardless of the order of 
integration. For the optimal lag length, AIC criteria will be used since SC tends to 
choose a simpler model specification than that of AIC. Although there is a risk of 
overfitting the model, we do not want to underfit it; therefore, AIC seems a better 
choice. A dummy variable is added due to the political crisis in Iran from 1979 to 
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1988, which had significant effects both on oil income and the level of output per 
capita. The political crisis started with the Iranian revolution in 1979, and this was 
followed by a war with Iraq that lasted for eight years. Since the war and revolution 
had similar effects on oil production, and also as they were consecutive events, we 
take their impact into account in one dummy variable. Before checking the bound 
test it is important to check that the errors of the model are serially independent, 
otherwise the parameter estimates will not be consistent. To this end, we check the 
Q-statistics. The P-values strongly suggest that there is no evidence of 
autocorrelation in the model’s residual (results in Appendix 6). 
Four different cases were estimated for the ARDL model since we have different 
indexes for financial development. Case 1 (1, 0, 0, 4) includes output per capita, real 
oil income, and depth as an index for financial development. Case 2 (1, 0, 0, 1) 
includes output per capita, real oil income, and credit as an index for financial 
development. In the third case (1, 4, 4, 0) we used PRIVY as an index for financial 
development and the rest of the variables were similar to the previous model. The 
final case (1, 4, 4, 1) includes output per capita, real oil income, and an index for 
financial development calculated using the principal component analysis method 
using credit, depth and PRIVY for financial development.  
6.5.1         Bound Test  
The results of the bound test for the first model indicate that there is a long-term 
relationship amongst the variables of the study at 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
significance. Accordingly, we reject the null hypothesis of “no long-term relationship”. 
In line with the first model, the results of the bound test for the second model show 
there is a co-integration relationship at 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance. In 
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the third case, the relationship only exists at 10 per cent significance. In addition, for 
the final model the long-term relationship exists only at 10 per cent significance. This 
means that we reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration, at 5 per cent and 10 
per cent for the first and second model and at 10 per cent for the third and last model. 
Cases 1 and 2 demonstrate the strongest proof of co-integration. In general, the 
outcome confirms that there is evidence of a long-term co-integration association 
amongst the variables for all cases, as is depicted in Table (6.1). 
               Table (6.1) Results of Bounds Test for ARDL Model 
Model 10%        5%            1% F-Stat                   Result 
Case 1 ARDL (1, 0, 0, 4) 
 
Lny, lnoi, lne/inf, lndepth 
I(0)  2.01      2.45         3.42 
 
I(1) 3.1         3.63  4.84  
3.8006         Co-integrated 
                      at 5% and 10% 
Case 2 ARDL (1, 0, 0, 1) 
 
Lny, lnoi, lne/inf, lncredit 
I(0)  2.01       2.45        3.42 
 
I(1) 3.1        3.63          4.84 
4.1407           Co-integrated 
                        at 5% and 10% 
Case 3 ARDL (1, 4, 4, 0) 
 
Lny, lnoi, lne/inf, lPRIVY 
I(0)  2.97         3.38        4.3 
 
I(1) 3.74         4.23       5.23 
4.1402            Co-integrated 
                         at 10% 
Case 4 ARDL (1, 4, 4, 1) 
 
Lny, lnoi, lne/inf, lnfd 
I(0)  2.97        3.38         4.3 
 
I(1) 3.74         4.23       5.23 
3.79302         Co-integrated 
                        at 10% 
 
6.5.2         The Long-term Relationships  
Table (6.2) demonstrated the long-run relationship amongst the variables of the 
study. It can be concluded that in the first model, oil income has a significant and 
positive impact on the level of output per capita. In addition, two important political 
events (war and revolution), which were captured by a dummy variable, have a 
significant negative impact on output per capita of the country. According to the 
results, the depth index, which is money and quasi money as a percentage of GDP, 
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does not have a significant impact on the output of Iran. It can be concluded that the 
reason for this insignificant impact of depth is the underdeveloped financial system 
in Iran, which has not been successful. It could be concluded that the Iranian banking 
system is not capable of attracting savings, which means the country does not have 
the ability to provide funding for long-run investment.    
In the second case, where credit is an index of financial development as 
demonstrated in Table (6.2), oil income has a positive and very significant impact on 
output per capita. As expected, the dummy variable has a negative impact on the 
economy. In addition, credit that is domestic credit provided by the financial sector 
does not have a significant impact, which can be explained like the result of depth 
on output per capita. In other words, local banks are not successful in providing loans 
to the private sector since it does not contribute to economic growth positively.  
According to the third model, there is not really a significant relationship among 
variables. This can be explained by the inefficient financial system (PRIVY) of the 
country, particularly in terms of domestic credit to the private sector. PRIVY 
demonstrates the process of allocating loans among the public and private sectors 
in Iran. Moreover, the dummy variable again shows a significant negative impact on 
our dependent variable. However, financial development does not seem to have a 
significant impact, which is in contrast to the growth literature.  
The final model considers a new index for financial development that takes into 
account depth, credit and PRIVY. This new index has been calculated using a 
principal component analysis approach. The results indicate that in general oil has 
a positive impact on output per capita, although it could be concluded that the poor 
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domestic credit given to the private sector is a trade-off against the positive impact 
of oil income.  
Overall, it can be said that oil revenue has a positive impact on the level of output 
per capita in the economy. However, including PRIVY in the model makes the 
positive impact of oil revenue vanish. Therefore, it could be concluded that in the 
Iranian economy, in contrast to the common literature, the financial system does not 
contribute positively to economic growth. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the 
reason for the insignificant financial development is underdevelopment and the 
isolation of the financial system from the rest of the world. 
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Table (6.2) Results of Long-run Relationship for ARDL Model 
variable Case 1 P-Values Case 2 P-Values Case3 P-Values Case 4 P-Values 
Lnoi 0.67227 0.0000*** 0.17628 0.0000*** -0.2381 0.1299 0.2565 0.0297 
Lne/inf 1.45247 0.0000*** 0.95999 0.0000*** 0.10757 0.7138 0.0038 0.9895 
dummy -1.7055 0.0043*** -0.7149 0.0331*** -0.6967 0.0139** -0.7000 0.0247** 
ldepth -0.9250 0.6947       
lcredit   0.54550 0.1141     
lPRIVY     -0.71897 0.2313   
lnfd       0.2074 0.5757 
Author’s own calculations using Eviews. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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6.5.3 Co-integration  
The results of co-integration are demonstrated in Table (6.3). The outcome indicates 
that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between output per capita and oil 
income. As the results indicate, for the first model a 10 per cent change in oil income 
will result in a long-term change of 7 per cent in output per capita, which is significant. 
Moreover, in the long term the error correction coefficient for the first model is 
negative (-0.1082), as required, and is very significant (3.597). The speed of 
adjustment indicates that the half lifetime of the deviation from the equilibrium would 
be one year and six months. Equation (6.6) demonstrates the long-term relationship 
between the variables for the first case.  
𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 0.672𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑖 + 1.4525 𝑙𝑛𝑒/𝑖𝑛𝑓 + 0.925𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ − 1.705𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦                (6.6) 
As expected, the error correction term in the second model is negative (-0.099), and 
the T-statistic is fairly significant (3.542), confirming that there is a co-integration 
relationship among the variables. The speed of adjustment indicates that the half 
lifetime of the deviation from the equilibrium would be one year and seven months. 
As the outcome shows, a 10 per cent change in oil income will result in a long-term 
change of 5 per cent in output per capita.  
The co-integration equation will be as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 0.4972𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑖 + 1.392𝑙𝑛𝑒/𝑖𝑛𝑓 + 0.545 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 1.372𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦        (6.7) 
In the third model, as we expected, the error correction term is negative (-0.2364) 
and the T-statistic is (5.3188), which is very significant, confirming the long-term 
relationship. The speed of adjustment shows that the half lifetime of the deviation 
223 
 
from the equilibrium would be seven months, which is a fairly quick adjustment. As 
the outcome shows, a 10 per cent change in oil income will result in a long-term 
change of 2 per cent in output per capita. The co-integration equation will be as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 0.2381𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑖 + 1.076 𝑙𝑛𝑒/𝑖𝑛𝑓 + 0.719 𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝑌 − 0.6968 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦            (6.8) 
Finally, in the last model, as expected, the error correction is negative (-0.256), and 
the T-statistic is very significant (5.396). In other words, the outcome indicates that 
there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between output per capita and oil 
income. As the results indicate, a 10 per cent change in oil income will result in a 
long-term change of 3 per cent in output per capita. The speed of adjustment 
indicates that the half lifetime of the deviation from the equilibrium would be seven 
months.  
𝑙𝑛𝑦 = 0.2566𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑖 + 0.0039 𝑙𝑛𝑒/𝑖𝑛𝑓 − 0.2074 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑 − 0.7001𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦          (6.9) 
It is worth mentioning that in general the Iranian economy adjusts quite fast to 
changes, which can be explained by the restrictions in Iran’s financial system.
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                  Table (6.3) Co-integration Relationships  
Variables Case 1  P-value Case 2 P-value Case 3 P-value Case 4 P-value 
dloi 0.08224 0.0453** 0.0874 0.0239** 0.08422 0.0187** 0.1096 0.0021*** 
dlne/inf 0.1676 0.051** 0.15238 0.0458** -0.0179 0.8123 -0.0857 0.0013*** 
dummy -0.1879 0.0000*** -0.1420 0.0000*** -0.1642 0.000*** -0.1683 0.0000**** 
CointEq(-1) -0.1082 0.0009*** -0.0993 0.0009*** -0.2364 0.0000*** -0.2506 0.0000**** 
dldepth -0.4719 0.0080***       
dldepth(-1) -0.5509 0.0047***       
dldepth(-2) -0.3547 0.0391***       
Dldepth(-3) -0.5953 0.0093***       
dlcredit   -0.2135 0.0223**     
dlprivy     -0.2484 0.0079***   
dloi(-1)     0.13323 0.0015*** 0.1236 0.0017*** 
dloi(-2)     0.05903 0.1050* 0.07847 0.0299** 
dloi(-3)     0.10400 0.0083** 0.1195 0.0043** 
dle/inf (-1)     -0.0444 0.5795 -0.0721 0.0574** 
dle/inf (-2)     -1.1150 0.1333 -0.1154 0.0136** 
dle/inf (-3)     -0.2378 0.0044** -0.2120 0.0085** 
dlnfd        -0.0115 0.7814 
                  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table (6.4) summarizes the goodness of fit and diagnosis of four ARDL models. 
According to the outcome, the  𝑅2 and 𝐴𝑑𝑗 𝑅2  are reasonably high and 𝐷𝑊 is close 
to 2 for all the models, which is preferable.  
        Table (6.4) Goodness of Fit & Diagnosis of ARDL Models 
 Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
𝑅2 0.9306 0.94547 0.93642 0.9370 
𝐴𝑑𝑗 𝑅2 0.9519 0.93979 0.91360 0.91217 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑  53.1797 58.1134 68.6931 68.9511 
𝐷𝑊 1.9549 1.7056 2.12873 2.2539 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 -1.8799 -1.9301 -1.98863 -1.9611 
𝑆𝐶 -1.52507 -1.7091 -1.43613 -1.3718 
 
6.5.4 Diagnostic and Stability Test  
The CUSUM test was performed on the residuals of the ARDL models to test the 
robustness of the models and the reliability of their estimates. This is essential since 
the presence of irrelevant variables or the exclusion of main variables or data could 
create estimation issues such as inefficient estimates coupled with high parameter 
variability and incorrect standard errors of coefficients and T-statistics. These 
challenges could exist with a high 𝑅2 and even strong statistical significance within 
a model. The results for the stability test (CUSUM) indicate that all models are stable 
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since the blue line is inside the red line. (Results for serially independent errors and 
optimal lags can be found in Appendix 6.) 
                                  
              
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
CUSUM 5% Significance  
                                               Figure (6.1) Plot of CUSUM Case 1 
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                                     Figure (6.3) Plot of CUSUM Case 3 
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                                      Figure (6.4) Plot of CUSUM Case 4 
Overall, it can be concluded that all ARDL models that have been estimated indicate 
that there is a long-run and positive impact between oil income and output per capita 
in Iran apart from in model 3. However, in all models financial development seems 
to have no role in economic growth, which is in contrast to the growth literature, 
although this may be a symptom of the underdeveloped and inefficient financial 
system in Iran. Needless to say, ever since the revolution Iran has been under 
sanctions from the US, and since 2002 more sanctions have been imposed on the 
country. One consequence of economic sanctions is the isolation of the country and 
a financial system that does not contribute to economic growth.  
6.6            Vector Autoregressive Models   
The connection between empirical results and economic theory is at the heart of 
econometric modelling. Econometric modelling is performed using a variety of 
techniques, which vary from large frameworks with plenty of equations to a single-
equation framework that concentrates on the influence of a handful of variables. 
Christopher Sims (1980) introduced the vector autoregressive (VAR) approach in 
macroeconomic modelling; he criticized econometric approaches due to unjustified 
restrictions imposed on the short-term dynamics, and he suggested an alternative, 
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which is usually termed “a-theoretical” vector autoregression. The VAR model, built 
on Gaussian (normally distributed) errors, has been a common choice as an 
explanation of macroeconomic time series data. The statistical foundation of the 
VAR framework is the Wold decomposition theorem. Sims argued that all variables 
in the model could be considered endogenous. As he explains, a VAR approach 
treats all variables simultaneously equal. Furthermore, in a VAR model each variable 
will be regressed on both its own lags and the lags of the other variables in a finite 
order system. The aim of this approach is to investigate the dynamic reaction of the 
system without relying on the “incredible identification restriction” existing in a 
structural framework. 
In general, according to Sims, an unrestricted vector autoregression of order 𝑝  
(𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑝)) is:  
𝑧𝑡 = 𝐶 + ∑ A𝑖𝑧𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑝
𝑖=1   (6.10) 
where a polynomial matrix A(L)=𝐵(𝐿)−1 is the lag operator, 𝑧𝑡 = [𝑧1𝑡, 𝑧2𝑡, … , 𝑧𝑛𝑡]′ is 
𝐼(0), and 𝐶 is an 𝑛𝜓 × 1 deterministic vector that encompasses a constant, a linear 
term, dummies or any other variables that are non-stochastic. Although a VAR model 
does not need strong restrictions and identification assumptions, useful applications 
of the estimates, such as impulse response functions or variance decompositions, 
do need their restrictions to be identified. Needless to say, the VAR process has 
many advantages, such as being flexible and easy to estimate, and most of the time 
it gives a good fit of data.  
According to the traditional VAR framework, variables would not be classified as 
endogenous or exogenous. Usually it is assumed that all variables are treated as 
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endogenous, but this is not always the case. In macroeconomic models, sometimes 
the variables of the study are best thought of as exogenous, and that could determine 
how the VAR model can be articulated. One example of this is in a small open 
economy where there are foreign variables that influence the domestic variables, but 
foreign variables are not affected by the domestic ones: for instance, a foreign 
variable that is determined by its own lag values and not the lag values of the 
domestic one. Therefore, zero restrictions will be imposed on the 𝐵 in a VAR model. 
This structure leads to the VARX framework, where X indicates there is a VAR with 
weakly exogenous variables. This kind of VAR allows either one or more variables 
to be treated as exogenous compared to other sets of variables.  
The first assumption of VAR models is that all the variables in the model are 
stationary 𝐼(0). In other words, all roots of variables lie inside the unit circle. 
However, most of the macroeconomic data violate this assumption. The most 
popular solution for non-stationary variables is differencing. The problem with this 
solution is that in a VAR framework estimated with differences, some data will be 
lost by converting non-stationary to stationary data as a result of differencing and the 
co-integration is ignored. According to Hamilton (1994), one solution is to ignore the 
non-stationary data and estimate the VAR in levels, relying instead on 𝑇 standard 
and 𝐹 distribution for interpreting the results. The other alternative is to difference 
the non-stationary data before running the model. The differencing should improve 
the small sample if the true process is a VAR in differences (Hamilton 1994).  
Another solution in the case of VAR if all variables are I(1) individually and a linear 
combination of the variables is I(0) is that a restricted version of the model that is a 
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co-integration approach will be employed such as a vector error correction (VECM). 
In co-integration estimations the long-term relationship of variables is examined 
through co-integration analysis. Hamilton (1994) indicated that in this situation a VAR 
in difference form is misspecified. Therefore, it is recommended to use Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) test; the maximum eigenvalue and the trace are both utilized not 
only to check for co-integration, but also to decide on the number of co-integrations. 
In addition, the advantages of unrestricted VAR in analysing the impulse response 
function in co-integrated systems has been emphasized by Naka and Tufte (1997). 
They indicated that estimation of a co-integrated system is a better idea either as a 
VAR in levels or as VECM, which is a restricted version of VAR. If co-integration 
exists, imposing restrictions will result in a more efficient model. Although in the short 
run, co-integration models are less accurate than VAR models, their Monte Carlo 
examination demonstrates that the loss of efficiency from the VAR model is not 
significant in the short-term.  
Rewriting the VAR model as a VECM, we have:  
∆𝑧𝑡 = 𝐶 + Π𝑧𝑡−1 + ∑ Γ𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 ∆𝑧𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                      (6.11) 
where 
 Π = ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 − 𝐼  and   Γ = − ∑ 𝐴𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=𝑖+1                                                                   (6.12) 
where 𝐼𝐾 establishes an identity matrix of the order 𝐾 × 𝐾. If the 𝐾 vector of variables 
of 𝑧𝑡 is integrated of order one, then the long-term co-integration vector in coefficient 
matrix Π must be integrated of order zero in order for 𝜀𝑡 to be the error term. The 
assumption that 𝑧𝑡 is 𝐼(1) in (6.10) imposes a restriction on matrix Π. In other words, 
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the econometric model of a vector autoregression explains the representation 𝑧𝑡 as 
a function of its own lags and other variables’ lags included in the model. This method 
was criticized for being more theoretical than practical since it relies more on 
statistical properties than economic theory. Therefore, the restricted VAR (p) can be 
rewritten as co-integrating transformation, Johansen decomposition, ARDL and 
VECM. The co-integration approach combines the long-term behaviour of the data 
and their short-term interactions; hence it can better show the association between 
variables. 
Engle and Granger (1987) showed that if the vector 𝑧𝑡 in equation (6.10) is integrated 
of order one, the coefficient matrix Π rank should be between 0 and k (0 ≤ r ≤ k). In 
other words, the rank of matrix (r) is the number of co-integration vectors in the 
model. Π can be explained as Π = αβ′ where α is the speed of adjustment matrix 
and β can be defined as the parameters of co-integration vectors. For instance, if 𝑧𝑡 
consists of five variables and 𝑟 = 1, then vector α and β are 5 × 1. In other words, 
there are five adjustment parameters for any of the five equations, and in order to 
correspond to deviations from the long-term equilibrium associations they are 
multiplied by the co-integration vector.  
6.7            VECM Procedure  
There are a number of steps to be performed in order to estimate co-integrating 
relationships in a VECM approach. In addition, following the VARX models here we 
consider volatility as a weakly exogenous variable.  
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6.7.1 Selecting the Optimal Lag  
In order to select the appropriate lag order it is essential to obtain Gaussian error 
terms. To do so, the VAR model with maximum lag length needs to be estimated for 
non-normality, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In doing so, the lag length is 
decreased by one lag until zero lags has been reached. In addition, the VAR 
framework will be re-estimated and the errors will be checked. Then the lag with 
Gaussian error terms is the optimal lag (Asteriou and Hall 2007). In this research, 
AIC, SC, and HQ are calculated for each lag and the one with the lowest value is 
considered the optimal lag.   
6.7.2 Deterministic Components   
The next required step of the process is to specify whether the model has only an 
intercept, or trend and intercept or none in the VAR or in the co-integrating equation. 
The following equation shows the VECM model with different cases that can be 
considered in a co-integration relationship. The equation (6.13) can have five 
different scenarios, which are explained in I to V.  
∆𝑍𝑡 = Γ1∆Z𝑡−1 + Γ2∆Z𝑡−2 + ⋯ + Γ𝑘−1∆𝑍𝑡−𝑘−1 + 𝛼 (
𝛽
𝜇1
𝛿1
) (𝑍𝑡−1 1 𝑡) + 𝜇2 + 𝛿2𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 
(6.13) 
I) There is no intercept or trend in the long-term (CE) or in the short-term 
VAR; therefore, the model is the most restrictive. In other words: 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 =
𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 0. This model suggests that there is no deterministic component 
in data, which is unlikely to happen in reality.  
233 
 
II) There is an intercept in the long-term but no intercept or trend in the short 
term; therefore 𝜇2 = 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 0. This can be translated to no linear trend 
in data. 
III) Both the short-term and the long-term have an intercept but no trend. In 
other words, 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 0. This means there is a linear trend in the levels 
of data; therefore, it allows the non-stationary association in the model to 
drift.  
IV) Both the long-term and short-term have an intercept; in addition, there is 
a linear trend in the long-term, where  𝛿2 = 0. This happens when no 
quadratic trend exists in the levels of the data. Consequently, there is no 
trend in the short-term; however, there is some long-term linear growth, 
which the model cannot account for.  
V) Both the CE and VAR have an intercept and trend; however, the trend in 
the CE is quadratic and the trend in the VAR is linear. As a result, 
everything is unrestricted in this model. However, it is difficult to justify this 
model economically, particularly since the variables are in natural 
logarithm form (Asteriou and Hall 2011). 
It is not easy to specify which case is suitable for the data of this research. The 
graphs in the previous chapter can provide some helpful information on the trend 
components in our time series.  
6.7.3 Checking the Co-integration and Determining the Rank of 𝚷 
There are two methods through which the rank of Π can be determined: a trace test 
and the maximum eigenvalue test of Johansen and Juselius (1990).   
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I) Trace Test   
The null hypothesis in the Trace test is that the number of co-integrating vectors is 
less than or equal to 𝑟. It is considered that 𝑟 is an indicator of reduced rank in 
(𝑛 − 𝑟), where 𝑛 is the number of variables.  
II) Maximum Eigenvalue Test  
The null hypothesis here is that the rank Π = r, or in other words, there are up to 𝑟 
co-integrating vectors against the alternative, which is the rank of 𝑟 + 1. As a result, 
the null hypothesis of 𝑟 = 0 is tested against 𝑟 = 1, then 𝑟 = 1 against 𝑟 = 2 and so 
on.  
6.7.4 Imposing Restrictions on 𝜷𝒔 to Identify Co-integration Vector  
After selecting the optimal lag and determining the number of co-integrating vectors 
amongst the variables in the system, the unrestricted model can be estimated. 
However, these estimates are sometimes difficult to interpret economically since 
matrices 𝛼 and 𝛽 are not exclusively identified with restrictions; thus, an issue of 
identification arises (Zhou et al. 2007). Therefore, it is necessary to test for 
identification in order to formulate a unique co-integrating vector. In order to impose 
restrictions, prior economic information about the association amongst variables is 
needed. However, this is not easy as the number of variables that can enter the 
model should be limited to simplify the co-integration relationship, while according to 
theory there are many relevant variables.  
According to Pesaran et al. (2001), in order to identify a system with a co-integration 
rank, it is essential to either have 𝑟 restrictions for the whole system or 𝑟 number of 
restrictions for each co-integrating vector. A statistical method was suggested by 
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Johansen (1988) to impose identification restrictions; however, Pesaran and Shin 
(1998) state that this method overlooks the theoretical and empirical associations 
amongst variables and is a pure mathematical convenience. Therefore, they 
proposed applying economic theory and pertinent prior information to select the long-
term identifying restrictions, which is a theory-based approach (Zhou et al. 2007). 
However, if there is only one co-integration relationship, there is no need for further 
restriction.  
6.7.5 Weakly Exogenous Variable  
A variable is a weakly exogenous variable if it is a function of lagged variables and 
the parameters of the equation that generates that variable are not dependent on 
the parameters generating the rest of the variables in the system. Such a variable 
can be removed as an endogenous variable from the left-hand side of the model.  
The speed of adjustment to the long-term equilibrium is signified by matrix 𝛼 in Π =
𝛼𝛽′ , and 𝛽′ is the matrix of the long-term coefficients. In order to test for the weakly 
exogenous variable in the model, the null hypothesis of 𝐻0: 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 0 for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑟 
needs to be tested. If any of the variables are weakly exogenous when estimating 
the co-integration vector, the responding element 𝛼 should be very low. The 
likelihood ratio test can also be used for the validity of these restrictions. It is 
important to mention that a VECM model with weakly exogenous variables confirms 
that the rest of the model has better stochastic properties in regard to having short-
term residuals without diagnostic problems.  
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6.7.6         Impulse Response Function  
By using the impulse response function a detailed analysis of the dynamic properties 
of the VAR framework will be provided. The impulse response function is a standard 
means of analysing the dynamics in a model. Impulse response analysis can trace 
the effects of an exogenous shock or innovation in one of the variables, in some or 
in all of the variables. There are two kinds of shocks to both observable and 
unobservable variables. The first step of any analysis should definitely be the impact 
of a shock on the variables. Shocks to observables are analysed by applying 
generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs). The calculation of GIRFs does not 
need any identifying assumptions; rather it uses error covariance to allow for the 
simultaneous linkages that have dominated among shocks historically.  
6.8 Empirical Results  
In this section, we derive an econometric formulation for our model based on 
economic theory. For empirical purposes, a log-linear approximation of long-run 
equilibrium relationships will be discussed. All variables are treated as endogenous, 
apart from volatility, which is a weakly exogenous variable. The VAR will be 
estimated as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝐵𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡              (6.14) 
where the dependent variable is output per capita, and explanatory variables are 
real oil income, financial development, and the interaction between financial 
development and oil income, and we have volatility as a weakly exogenous variable. 
Similarly to the ARDL model, the Iranian political crisis is taken into account through 
a dummy variable. Since the co-integration results could not reject the null 
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hypothesis of no co-integration, the VAR system will be transformed to a VEC model 
as follows: 
   ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶 + Π𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑝−1
𝑖=1 ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝐵𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                     (6.15) 
A vector of variables (real output per capita, real oil income, financial development, 
the interaction between financial development and oil income and volatility) was 
tested for the co-integration relationship. Following that a model was estimated that 
represented the economic performance of Iran over the period 1955-2014 using 
VECM. It is desirable that all variables are integrated of order one for applying this 
approach. Nevertheless, unit root tests usually suffer from low power; thus, in 
empirical work, it is common to test co-integration amongst variables even when 
some variables are not I(1). Furthermore, Enders (2004) proposed that Johansen’s 
co-integration can be tested for variables with different orders of integration. It has 
also been suggested that the result of co-integration is valid in the case of mixed 
integration order of variables (Foon Tang 2011).  
In this research, as was indicated in the previous chapter, all variables except 
volatility and inflation were integrated of order one. Four different VECMs will be 
estimated using real output, oil income, financial development (four different proxies 
similar to ARDL models), the interaction between oil income and financial 
development, and volatility as a weakly exogenous variable. It is important to 
mention that, similarly to the previous models, the political crisis of Iran will be taken 
into account via a dummy variable. The first VECM considers depth as a financial 
development proxy, the second one considers credit, the third one uses PRIVY and 
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the last one uses an index generated by principal component analysis using depth, 
credit and PRIVY.  
6.8.1 Selecting the Optimal Lag Order  
The first pre-estimation test for our model is the estimation of an unrestricted VAR 
to determine the optimal p lag order, signified as VAR (p). As Lütkepohl (2005) 
showed, the selection of an overfitted VAR would result in the mean square error 
forecast being inferior to forecasts from an accurate VAR (p), whereas an underfitted 
VAR would create autocorrelated residuals. Applying the optimal lag length criterion, 
both the AIC and SC suggest lag one as the optimal lag for all four models, as 
displayed in the Tables (6.5), (6.6), (6.7) and (6.8).  
            Table (6.5) Optimal Lag Length VECM 1   
 
      * indicates the optimal lag order. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lag length  AIC SC HQ 
1            -5.985807* -4.804862** -5.541409* 
2 -5.922001 -3.756935 -5.107272 
3 -5.469555 -2.320367 -4.284494 
4 -5.647003 -1.513694 -4.091611 
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          Table (6.6) Optimal Lag Length VECM 2 
 
         *indicates the optimal lag order. 
 
  
       Table (6.7) Optimal Lag Length VECM 3 
                
        *indicates the optimal lag order. 
             Table (6.8) Optimal Lag Length VECM 4 
 
         *indicates the optimal lag order. 
Following the selection of lags we need to test for co-integration relationship using 
Johansen. As was discussed earlier, the rank of the coefficient matrix Π depends on 
Lag length  AIC SC HQ 
1            -2.940443* -2.182864* -2.650949* 
2 -2.819706 -1.456064 -2.298618 
3 -2.556732 -0.587028 -1.804050 
4 -2.601290 -0.025522 -1.617013 
Lag length  AIC SC HQ 
1            -5.874662* -4.727448* -5.437796* 
2 -5.655264 -3.552039 -4.854344 
3 -5.569119 -2.509882 -4.404144 
4 -5.262795 -1.247547 -3.733766 
Lag length  AIC SC HQ 
1            -4.042984* -2.906616* -3.608744* 
2 -3.869324 -1.785982 -3.073217 
3 -3.368458 -0.338143 -2.210485 
4 -3.772146 0.205142 -2.252307 
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the number of eigenvalues within Π̂. The eigenvalues are classified in descending 
order. In other words, the null hypothesis of no co-integration is tested against at 
least one co-integration. In the case of the rejection of this hypothesis, the test goes 
to the next largest eigenvalue and continues until the null cannot be rejected 
anymore. Tables (6.9) – (6.16) provide brief results for Johansen’s test for both the 
trace and maximum eigenvalue at the first lag.  
The outcome indicates the presence of one co-integration vector for all models. In 
other words, there are dynamic long-term relationships, including the indicators of 
economic growth and other variables in the study. The maximum eigenvalue and 
statistical outcome results from the co-integration framework indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration at 5 per cent can be rejected and there is no rejection 
of the null hypothesis for the “at most 1” row. The max statistics demonstrate similar 
results to the trace statistic concerning the rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-
integration at the 5 per cent level and no rejection of the hypothesis at most 1. The 
trend specification for each co-integration test is selected in line with economic 
theory and graphical analysis. According to these criteria, the trend specification for 
our model is based on case 3, which is unrestricted intercept.  
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Table (6.9) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Trace 
Statistic) VECM 1 
𝐻0 𝐻1 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  0.05  
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 66.03389* 55.24578 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 34.25065 35.01090 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 12.90817 18.39771 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 6.453911 12.49467 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 2.311753 3.841466 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
 
 
 
Table (6.10) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) VECM1 
𝐻0 𝐻1 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  0.05  
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 31.78325* 30.81507 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 21.34247 24.25202 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 10.59642 17.14769 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 5.278832 10.49456 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 2.311753 3.841466 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
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Table (6.11) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Trace 
Statistic) VECM 2 
𝐻0 𝐻1 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  0.05   
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 69.60699* 60.06141 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 36.29569 40.17493 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 17.62899 24.27596 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 2.064739 12.32090 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 0.074351 4.129906 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
 
 
 
Table (6.12) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) VECM 2 
𝐻0 𝐻1 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  0.05   
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 33.31130* 30.43961 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 18.66669 24.15921 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 15.56425 17.79730 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 1.990388 11.22480 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 0.074351 4.129906 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
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Table (6.13) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Trace 
Statistic) VECM 3 
𝐻0 𝐻1 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  0.05   
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 94.18857* 76.97277 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 48.39903 54.07904 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 26.57386 35.19257 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 12.42239 20.26184 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 1.913236 9.164546 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
 
 
Table (6.14) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) VECM 3 
𝐻0   𝐻1 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛 𝐸𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  0.05   
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 45.78954* 34.80587 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 21.82517 28.58808 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 14.15147 22.29962 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 10.50916 15.89210 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 1.913236 9.164546 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
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Table (6.15) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Trace 
Statistic) VECM 4 
𝐻0 𝐻1 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  0.05  
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 71.16357* 60.06141 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 35.34581 40.17493 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 15.21184 24.27596 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 4.822174 12.32090 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 0.894095 4.129906 
Trace test indicates 1 co-integration eqn at the 0.05 level.  
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
 
 
 
Table (6.16) Co-integration Rank Test Statistic for the Core Model (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) VECM 4 
𝐻0 𝐻1 Max-Eigen  
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical value 
𝑟 = 0 𝑟 = 1 35.81776* 30.43961 
𝑟 ≤ 1 𝑟 = 2 20.13397 24.15921 
𝑟 ≤ 2 𝑟 = 3 10.38966 17.79730 
𝑟 ≤ 3 𝑟 = 4 3.928079 11.22480 
𝑟 ≤ 4 𝑟 = 5 0.894095 4.129906 
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 co-integration eqn at the 0.05  level. 
*denotes a rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding co-integration rank. 
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6.8.2 Identifying the Co-integration Vectors  
According to theory, it is expected for volatility to be a weakly exogenous variable. 
In order to test this for our models we impose the restriction of 𝛼 = 0. The result 
indicates significant p-value, confirming that volatility is a weakly exogenous 
variable. The findings confirm that the problem of identification does not hold in this 
model since volatility is found to be exogenous, considering economic growth as a 
dependent variable. Consequently, since volatility is considered to be exogenous, 
the estimation will be valid and overcome the problem of identification and 
simultaneity. Recalling (5.19), we will estimate the long-term and the co-integration 
relationship.  
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑 + 𝛽14𝑓𝑑 ∗ 𝑜𝑖 + 𝛽15𝑣 + 𝛽16𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦                     (6.16) 
6.8.3 Estimating the Long-run Equilibrium Relationship 
Having identified the co-integrating vector and imposing weakly exogenous 
restriction, the results indicate that there is a positive relationship between oil income 
and output per capita in Iran for all the estimated VECMs. In addition, they indicate 
that financial development has a negative impact on the economy, which is in 
contrast to the growth literature. Moreover, the interaction between financial 
development and oil income has a negative impact on the economy. It can be 
concluded from the results that whenever oil income is sufficient in Iran it relaxes the 
financial system and can provide enough money for the government to keep the 
interest rate artificially low and finance its budget. On the other hand, when the oil 
revenue is low the government faces difficulty in financing its expenditure, ending up 
with a very tight budget. It is worth mentioning that for the last 12 years (2003-2015), 
Iran has faced sanctions and had difficulty selling her oil; therefore, the government 
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revenue from oil has been quite low. It should be mentioned that the error correction 
terms are negative and significant for all models as required, thereby suggesting that 
the co-integration relationship is accurate, as reported in Table (6.17).  
Table (6.17) Results of Speed of Adjustment and Co-integration 
Models Speed of Adjustment T-Statistics  
VECM 1 -0.024228 1.95399** 
VECM 2 -0.033849 1.81718* 
VECM 3 -0.14747 0.147 
VECM 4  -0.121720 2.31705** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The result of co-integration is reported in Table (6.18). As can be seen from the table, 
oil income has a positive impact on output per capita in all models apart from the 
third model where PRIVY is a proxy for financial development similarly to the result 
of the ARDL model considering PRIVY as an index for financial development. This 
indicates the inefficiency of allocating credit to the private sector in Iran. Interestingly, 
financial development has a negative impact, and also when the interaction between 
financial development and oil income is considered, the effect is negative. This 
explains the fact that the financial system cannot successfully invest income from 
oil. In our model, we consider volatility to be a weakly exogenous variable that seems 
to have a negative impact on output per capita. Needless to say, the results indicate 
that political crises had a negative impact on the level of output per capita. The error-
correction relationship is as follows:
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 Table (6.18) Results of Long-run Relationship in VECM  
Variabl
es  
Case 1 T-Stat Case 2 T-Stat Case 3 T-Stat Case 4 T-Stat 
Loi(-1) 0.4136 4.179*** 0.22762 1.9821** 0.2190 7.393*** 0.1252 2.532** 
Inter -12.758 7.0135*** -0.44192 2.2657** -1.1774 7.872*** -0.638 3.5221** 
CointE
q 
-
0.02422 
2.5399** -0.03384 1.717** -0.0005 0.1474 -0.121 2.317** 
ldepth -1.1787 6.753***       
lcredit   -7.52013 2.9141**     
lPrivy     -1.7.741 7.866***   
lnfd       -5.1209 2.8307** 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% Levels, respectively. 
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The results of error correction estimation are reported in Table (6.19). As can be 
seen in the table, in three of the four models a co-integration relationship was 
confirmed. In addition, in all VECMs apart from the third one, oil has a positive impact 
on the level of output per capita, and financial development, the interaction between 
financial development and oil income, volatility and political crises have a negative 
impact on the level of output. It can be concluded from the results that the financial 
system is not efficient in Iran and the outcome is in line with the outcome of ARDL 
estimation. Not surprisingly, PRIVY, which is the domestic credit provided to the 
private sector, when considered as a proxy for financial development changes the 
results. This can be translated to the fact that the country does not have the ability 
to provide sufficient credit to its private sector, which can be considered a reason for 
the poor performance of the economy in general. 
 249 
 
            Table (6.19) Error Correction Results 
Variables  Case 1 T-Stat Case 2  T-Stat Case 3  T-Stat Case 4 T-Stat 
𝐷𝑜𝑖 
(−1) 
0.246 1.9531** 0.1756 1.864** 0.3234 1.7873** 0.1191 1.865** 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 -0.1255 2.6861** -0.1420 2.2709** 0.10884 1.7623** -0.134 2.898** 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.1477 2.1239** -0.1274 1.836** -0.0315 1.743** -0.046 0.5791 
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 
(−1) 
-0.3599 2.4771** 0.002827 0.4698 -0.0213 0.512 -0.123 1.705** 
𝐷𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 
(−1) 
3.49788 2.5225**       
𝐷𝑙𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
(−1) 
  -0.08762 2.0132**     
𝐷𝑙𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑦 
(−1) 
    -0.1811 0.4554   
𝐷𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑑 
(−1) 
      -0.8111 1.742** 
                              *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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6.8.4 Impulse Response Function  
Figure (6.5) indicates that a positive shock to oil income increases real output 
in Iran. It can be seen that the impacts of shock work themselves through the 
economy quite quickly. This may be because of the isolation of the financial 
system in Iran, which makes the economy move up and down rapidly through 
alterations in domestic or foreign conditions. The figures indicate that a rise in 
oil revenue increases real output, inflation and the real exchange rate 
significantly. The Dutch Disease hypothesis cannot be supported for Iran as 
the increase in the real exchange rate is coupled with a surge in real output. In 
line with the results of estimations, the interaction between financial 
development and oil income has a negative impact on output per capita. In 
addition, in contrast to the growth literature, indexes for financial development 
do not have a positive impact on output.  
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Figure (6.5) Generalized Impulse Response of a Positive One Standard 
Deviation. 
6.9 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter has provided simple models that links together the theoretical 
framework using an augmented neoclassical model and oil export income in 
order to investigate empirically the relationship between oil revenue and 
economic growth in Iran. In particular, it was examined whether oil income has 
a positive impact on the long-term economic growth of Iran. To test the 
hypothesis, two different co-integration models, ARDL and VECM, were 
estimated. The ARDL model indicated that there is a co-integration among 
variables, which means there is a long-term relationship between variables. 
The findings indicate that oil income had a positive impact on output per capita 
in Iran. However, the findings show that the interaction between oil income and 
the level of financial development in Iran had a negative impact on output per 
capita, but the financial system in Iran is not very developed and, due to the 
isolation of the country and tough sanctions, the situation got worse. Moreover, 
the war and revolution both had negative impacts on the level of output per 
capita.  
The evidence demonstrated from the Johansen co-integration test supports 
the view that both a long-term and short-term relationship exist between 
economic growth and oil income in Iran. The findings are in line with studies 
that support the positive impact of natural resources on economic growth. In 
addition, the study provides evidence to support the view that the level of 
financial development will direct the money from oil export to being invested 
and entering the long-run output equation.  
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These findings are not consistent with those supporting the so-called “resource 
curse hypothesis” and Dutch Disease. Overall, the findings in this chapter have 
significant policy implications for Iran and other major oil exporting countries. 
The evidence indicates that the level of financial development and oil revenue 
together play an important role in encouraging economic growth. Thus the 
development of a financial system can be beneficial for economic growth by 
improving the quality and quantity of investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6  
 
The errors of this model (1) are serially independent 
 
Date: 10/04/17   Time: 17:35    
Sample: 1955 2014      
Included observations: 47     
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 1 dynamic regressor 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
       
             . | .    |       . | .    | 1 0.027 0.027 0.0373 0.847 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 2 -0.012 -0.013 0.0449 0.978 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 3 -0.062 -0.061 0.2456 0.970 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 4 0.063 0.066 0.4556 0.978 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 5 -0.100 -0.106 1.0061 0.962 
      **| .    |       **| .    | 6 -0.278 -0.279 5.3505 0.500 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 7 0.114 0.146 6.1015 0.528 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 8 -0.060 -0.101 6.3171 0.612 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 9 0.097 0.087 6.8840 0.649 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 10 -0.142 -0.120 8.1311 0.616 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 11 0.057 -0.012 8.3406 0.683 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 12 -0.132 -0.191 9.4862 0.661 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 13 -0.091 -0.051 10.042 0.690 
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      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 14 0.120 0.115 11.040 0.683 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 15 0.022 0.028 11.073 0.747 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 16 -0.061 -0.175 11.346 0.788 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 17 -0.152 -0.112 13.130 0.727 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 18 0.156 0.024 15.059 0.658 
      . | .    |       . |*.    | 19 0.054 0.091 15.297 0.704 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.082 -0.060 15.865 0.725 
       
       
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification. 
 
Optimal lag selected according to Akaike model (1)  
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The errors of this model (2) are serially independent. 
 
Sample: 1955 2014      
Included observations: 54     
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 1 dynamic regressor 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
       
             . |*.    |       . |*.    | 1 0.145 0.145 1.1942 0.274 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 2 -0.074 -0.097 1.5155 0.469 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 3 0.002 0.028 1.5156 0.679 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 4 0.040 0.029 1.6142 0.806 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 5 -0.094 -0.107 2.1635 0.826 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 6 -0.105 -0.070 2.8621 0.826 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 7 0.191 0.211 5.2160 0.634 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 8 0.191 0.123 7.6210 0.471 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 9 0.139 0.141 8.9110 0.446 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 10 -0.083 -0.116 9.3880 0.496 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 11 -0.062 -0.062 9.6603 0.561 
      **| .    |       **| .    | 12 -0.292 -0.326 15.813 0.200 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 13 -0.120 0.005 16.880 0.205 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 14 0.099 0.130 17.627 0.224 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 15 0.066 0.045 17.963 0.265 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 16 0.033 -0.029 18.048 0.321 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 17 -0.051 -0.152 18.259 0.373 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 18 0.053 -0.010 18.495 0.423 
      . | .    |       . |*.    | 19 -0.042 0.116 18.645 0.480 
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      .*| .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.171 0.005 21.248 0.383 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 21 -0.076 0.042 21.777 0.412 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 22 0.024 -0.143 21.832 0.470 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 23 0.171 0.089 24.673 0.367 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 24 -0.023 -0.114 24.724 0.421 
       
       
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification. 
 
Optimal lag selected according to Akaike model (2)  
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The errors of this model (3) are serially independent. 
 
 
Sample: 1955 2014      
Included observations: 55     
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 3 dynamic regressors 
       
       Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
       
             . | .    |       . | .    | 1 -0.054 -0.054 0.1671 0.683 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 2 -0.089 -0.092 0.6375 0.727 
      .*| .    |       **| .    | 3 -0.203 -0.215 3.1102 0.375 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 4 0.007 -0.031 3.1134 0.539 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 5 -0.021 -0.067 3.1415 0.678 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 6 -0.063 -0.124 3.3959 0.758 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 7 0.078 0.051 3.7964 0.803 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 8 -0.044 -0.079 3.9268 0.864 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 9 0.006 -0.033 3.9292 0.916 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 10 0.132 0.156 5.1475 0.881 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 11 -0.053 -0.073 5.3458 0.913 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 12 -0.192 -0.197 8.0249 0.783 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 13 -0.174 -0.163 10.284 0.671 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 14 0.121 0.009 11.407 0.654 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 15 0.045 -0.058 11.567 0.711 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 16 0.093 0.051 12.262 0.726 
      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 17 0.083 0.090 12.825 0.748 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 18 0.011 0.017 12.834 0.801 
      .*| .    |       . | .    | 19 -0.076 -0.027 13.343 0.821 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 20 -0.039 -0.009 13.479 0.856 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 21 -0.107 -0.160 14.542 0.845 
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      . |*.    |       . |*.    | 22 0.104 0.136 15.568 0.837 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 23 0.017 0.043 15.595 0.872 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 24 -0.011 -0.150 15.607 0.902 
       
       
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification. 
 
Optimal lag selected according to Akaike model (3)  
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The errors of this model (4) are serially independent. 
 
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 1 dynamic regressor 
       
       
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
       
       
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 1 -0.136 -0.136 1.0592 0.303 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 2 -0.153 -0.175 2.4264 0.297 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 3 0.013 -0.037 2.4362 0.487 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 4 -0.026 -0.060 2.4775 0.649 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 5 -0.032 -0.052 2.5395 0.771 
      .*| .    |       **| .    | 6 -0.189 -0.230 4.8009 0.570 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 7 0.080 -0.008 5.2095 0.634 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 8 -0.072 -0.154 5.5502 0.697 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 9 0.079 0.045 5.9748 0.742 
      . | .    |       .*| .    | 10 -0.048 -0.109 6.1334 0.804 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 11 0.046 0.030 6.2794 0.854 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 12 -0.104 -0.204 7.0650 0.853 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 13 -0.113 -0.157 8.0123 0.843 
      . |**    |       . |*.    | 14 0.238 0.092 12.298 0.582 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 15 0.030 0.072 12.366 0.651 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 16 -0.034 -0.021 12.456 0.712 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 17 -0.038 -0.029 12.575 0.764 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 18 0.067 -0.020 12.952 0.794 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 19 0.056 0.072 13.222 0.827 
      .*| .    |       .*| .    | 20 -0.168 -0.101 15.720 0.734 
      .*| .    |       **| .    | 21 -0.191 -0.248 19.077 0.580 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 22 0.129 0.032 20.649 0.543 
      . |*.    |       . | .    | 23 0.077 -0.004 21.226 0.567 
      . | .    |       . | .    | 24 -0.027 0.011 21.300 0.621 
       
       
 
Optimal lag selected according to Akaike model (4)  
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Weak exogeneity 
 
   
   Co-integration Restrictions:  
      A(5,1)=0  
Convergence achieved after 137 iterations. 
Not all co-integrating vectors are identified. 
LR test for binding restrictions (rank = 1):  
Chi-square(1)  30.65224  
Probability  0.000000  
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                                                                  Chapter Seven 
                 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.1         Introduction  
The impact of oil revenue on economic growth is an issue that has captured 
researchers’ attention for a long period. Empirical studies most of the time use 
cross-sectional studies to find the impact of oil revenue on economic growth in 
a regression analysis. Although natural resources are not a factor of production 
in growth theories, it is important to say that including any natural resources, 
particularly oil, has a role in determining the long-term economic growth in 
either a neoclassical or endogenous growth framework. However, in a 
neoclassical growth model the rate of growth is determined by the exogenous 
population growth and technological improvements. On the other hand, 
endogenous growth theories explain growth in a framework where economic 
growth is determined within the economy itself and the rate of growth is 
determined by human capital, R&D, innovation etc.  
Yet the Solow model remains very much in use in empirical studies on growth. 
Scholars have used different augmented Solow models to explain other factors 
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that can have a substantial impact on economic growth. In the same line of 
research, this study has used an augmented neoclassical model to show how 
oil revenues can enter the long-term output. The study indicates that if oil does 
not provide a temporary income, it can enter the long-term output through the 
capital accumulation process. However, it should be mentioned that the role of 
financial development in the process of converting money from oil to efficient 
investment is very important. Therefore, this study took into account the impact 
of financial development on growth as well.  
This thesis has estimated two different co-integration models for the Iranian 
economy bearing in mind that there was a long run relationship between oil 
income and economic growth over the course of the period 1955-2014. The 
purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions on the theoretical and empirical 
results and related policy implications and recommendations. Moreover, the 
contributions of this research are explained. Finally, the limitations that the 
researcher faced and some suggestions for further research are presented. 
7.2         Summary of the Study 
  
From a theoretical point of view, natural resource endowments, like any other 
factor of production, should have a positive impact on economic growth and 
did have in the nineteenth century. However, the empirical studies in the 
twentieth century demonstrated an opposite view. Following studies indicating 
the negative impact of natural resources and economic growth, the resource 
curse hypothesis was born, indicating that countries endowed with natural 
resources grow more slowly than those without natural resources. There is a 
vast body of literature supporting the resource curse hypothesis. However, 
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Esfahani et al. (2014) developed a theoretical framework showing that oil 
income has a positive impact on economic growth in the major oil exporting 
countries. This study followed Esfahani et al. (2014) by including financial 
development, its interaction with oil income and volatility to investigate the 
impact of oil income on the Iranian economy.  
In order to apply a growth model and have a theoretical framework to test the 
data empirically, Chapter Two delivers an overview of growth theories from the 
Harrod-Domar model to the more recent theories such as endogenous and 
augmented Solow models. It can be concluded that natural resources have 
played an important role in the economic growth of many of today’s industrial 
countries. However, from a theoretical point of view, in none of the growth 
theories are natural resources a factor of economic growth. In the Solow 
model, capital accumulation and technology are the main factors of growth, 
and in endogenous models the key drivers of economic growth are innovation 
and R&D. However, some other factors have been added to the traditional 
theories as factors of growth, such as human capital. A number of studies in 
the literature have used empirical data without any theory. They mostly look at 
the temporary income and short-term impact of income from natural resources 
on the exchange rate and government expenditure. Nevertheless, the results 
are far from conclusive. It seems that the role that natural resources play 
depends on many aspects, including geographical position, institutional 
quality, method or techniques used and country.  
Studies focusing on the role that revenue from natural resources plays in the 
economy have mainly used the Solow or endogenous models. Esfahani et al. 
(2014) developed an empirical growth model for major oil exporting countries. 
Their model is based on the stochastic Solow model and indicates that in major 
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oil exporting countries, oil can have a positive impact on output production if 
the growth rate of oil income is greater than the natural growth rate, i.e. 
population growth and technology growth. Their results are in contrast to the 
traditional belief regarding the resource curse and the negative association 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth. In other words, 
they show that if a country has been producing oil for a long time, and 
according to reserve to extraction statistics can produce oil in the relative long-
term, oil revenues enhance growth. These results have generally been 
supported by studies such as (Cavalcanti et al. 2011a; Cavalcanti et al. 2011b; 
Mohaddes and Pesaran 2013).  
With regard to the empirical literature, it can be concluded that the majority of 
the studies have continued to employ neoclassical models with augmentation. 
Although there is a consensus that a theoretical model of economic growth 
should move in endogenous framework directions, it has been illustrated that 
many leading endogenous models, including (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988) are 
based on very strong assumptions that are not substantiated in applying these 
models (Solow 2000). Relaxing these strong assumptions would either lead to 
no endogenous model or infinite time. However, many empirical studies do not 
rely on any specific growth framework. All in all, the results of all these studies 
are far from conclusive. Chapter Two reviewed growth frameworks, from the 
very early ones to the most recent ones, in order to pick a suitable growth 
theory for developing an appropriate theoretical framework that fits the 
purpose of this study. This review on growth models helped to establish an 
analytical framework on how oil can enter the capital accumulation equation. 
Due to the flexibility of neoclassical growth models and aforementioned 
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reasons, this thesis used a neoclassical growth model to develop a theoretical 
framework.  
It seems the results of natural resource endowments on growth depend on a 
variety of factors, such as the econometric techniques used, assumptions, 
proxies of natural resource abundance, country or set of countries, social and 
political situations in countries and even the geographical situation of 
countries, among many others. Moreover, the results of analysing the growth 
effects of natural resources vary from country to country. A review of theories 
explaining the resource curse and channels through which the resource curse 
can be felt and some empirical studies were presented in Chapter Three. 
These studies contribute considerably to knowledge in the area of economic 
growth and the resource curse. They can be divided into two different groups: 
one group studying the political economy of the resource curse and the other 
one looking at the curse from an economic perspective. From the political point 
of view, resource endowments generate rent-seeking activities, corruption, 
civil war, poor-quality institutions etc., all of which dampen economic growth. 
From the economic point of view, the most common explanation of the so-
called “resource curse” is the Dutch Disease. Chapter Three explained the 
Dutch Disease, where, with a boom in natural resource prices, the inflow of 
foreign currency increases, which leads to currency appreciation. This 
phenomenon makes the country’s other products more expensive in the export 
sector. It is worth mentioning that Dutch Disease which could be translated to 
a stronger currency is not inherently a worsening factor. The important issue 
is that the economy can be adjusted by appropriate policies.  
The analysis of literature in Chapters Two and Three indicated that the majority 
of studies on growth and natural resources have focused on the short-term 
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impact of natural resources. In addition, they mainly used cross-sectional 
analysis. Therefore, there is a scarcity of literature based on the long-term 
relationship of resource endowments and growth and using different 
econometric approaches to cross-sectional analysis. As a result, there is a 
need to narrow the gap by analysing the long-term role that oil has played in a 
country that was the first oil producer in the Middle East. Furthermore, the 
review of empirical studies helped to decide on the applied econometric 
methods, and the main findings of the study.     
Following these reviews, Chapter Four included a brief summary of Iran’s 
economic history, with a focus on oil. This started with the time when oil was 
discovered and covered the evolution of the oil industry in Iran in order to look 
at the role of oil historically and compare it to econometric results. It was 
concluded that for all Development Plans (main economic targets of the 
country) in Iran both before and after the revolution, oil was almost the only 
source of finance. In other words, what made all the Development Plans in Iran 
possible were oil endowments. There were also important events in Iran, such 
as the Islamic revolution and eight-year war with Iraq, which had significant 
negative effects both on oil income and the development of the country.  
In general, it can be said that oil was always the mainstream of the Iranian 
economy and played a positive role in the country. Needless to say, the 
economic system of the country changed dramatically between the discovery 
of oil and 2014. The data presented in this study start from 1955; however, for 
a historical analysis we go back to the time that oil was discovered in Iran. Oil 
was discovered in 1908 in Iran but the country’s income from oil was 
insignificant until 1951 when oil was nationalized. Although after 
nationalization oil exports reached zero due to the embargo on Iranian oil by 
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Britain and America, after 1970 oil started to play a significant role in the Iranian 
economy and is still a cornerstone of the economy.   
Taking into account a number of theoretical and empirical issues that emerged 
from reviewing the literature, this research offered a conceptual framework 
built on the neoclassical model presented in Chapter Five. In the modified 
version, since the country is one of the major oil exporting ones, it is assumed 
that all the income from oil is saved, apart from a proportion that is devoted to 
financial intermediations. In addition, it is assumed the saving will be 
transformed to investment. Thus, in the capital accumulation function the 
investment part consists of two parts: investment from the non-oil output of the 
country and investment from the oil output of the country, which is petrodollars. 
Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of financial development in 
converting savings to productive investment and also using interaction terms 
for the impact of financial development and oil income. Chapter Five also 
introduces the variables in the study, which are decided based on the 
theoretical model. Some data analysis also took place to select an econometric 
approach that fits the nature of the data. The analysis of data suggested the 
co-integration models that fit the purpose of study and provided a suitable 
method regarding the unit root test results.   
In Chapter Six, based on the data analysis from the previous chapter, the co-
integration estimation was selected. This thesis employed co-integration 
analysis, particularly ARDL and VECM estimations as the preferred 
econometric approaches. For instance, while cross-country analysis is likely to 
suffer from omitted variables, the use of a co-integration technique is likely to 
control for them. In addition, using co-integration models allows endogeneity 
to be controlled for.  
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The findings in Chapter Six suggested that oil revenue plays a positive role in 
the level of output per capita in Iran. On the other hand, the results indicated 
that volatility, inappropriate government responses (monetary and fiscal 
policies) to oil income fluctuations and the level of financial development in 
interaction with oil income have negative impacts. While we believe that the 
benefits of natural resource endowments could be greater in oil-abundant 
countries if they adopted appropriate policies and developed good-quality 
institutions, the findings of this thesis challenge the common belief regarding 
the negative effects of oil abundance on economic growth. 
Both the ARDL and VECM models indicated that there is co-integration among 
variables in the system. In other words, there is a long-term relationship 
amongst variables. The variables in the ARDL models were output per capita, 
oil income and financial development. It is important to mention that oil income 
was divided into two variables to simplify the analysis. To take into account 
political events in the country, both the Islamic revolution and eight-year war 
with Iraq were included in the model as a dummy variable. Four different ARDL 
models were estimated, and the difference between them was the proxy that 
was used for financial development. According to ARDL models, oil income 
has a positive impact on output per capita. In addition, the financial system of 
Iran (all four indexes for financial development), in contrast to growth literature, 
does not contribute positively to the economic growth of the country.  
Following the estimation of ARDL models to check whether the same result 
would be obtained using a different technique, four VEC models were 
estimated. These models used the same variables as that of ARDL models. In 
addition, the role of volatility in oil prices as a weakly exogenous variable and 
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the interaction between the financial system and oil income were taken into 
account. The results were in line with the outcome of ARDL models.  While the 
findings indicated that oil income has a positive impact on per capita output 
the financial system does not contribute positively to the economic growth of 
the country. Moreover, the interaction between financial development and oil 
income does not have a positive impact and volatility has a negative impact on 
growth. Furthermore, the impulse response function indicates that the ups and 
downs of oil income show themselves in the economy quite fast. This can be 
explained through the financial system of the country. This is because of the 
restrictions of financial markets in Iran that curb expenditure-smoothing 
options; therefore, this causes quick adjustment to both internal and external 
shocks. 
In general, eight co-integration models were estimated. Interestingly, the 
results of estimations were in line with the historical analysis in Chapter Four. 
Both historically and econometrically, oil has a positive impact on the level of 
output per capita. In addition, in line with the historical analysis, econometric 
results indicate that war and revolution had a negative impact on the 
performance of the country. The main finding of this research is that oil, which 
has been produced in Iran for over a century, had a positive impact on the 
output per capita of the country. This finding is in contrast to the so-called 
“resource curse hypothesis”, which believes that natural resources have a 
negative impact on economic growth.  
To answer the research questions of the study, it can be said that oil, in the 
long-term, has a positive impact on the per capita output of a country. In 
addition, in the short-term, the economy adjusts itself to any alterations of oil 
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revenue quite fast due to the poor financial development and inefficient 
financial system. Since oil has been and will be produced for a fairly long 
period, it can be entered the production function of the country. It is worth 
mentioning that a well-developed financial system can have a positive impact 
on the output of the country. Governments need to establish a sovereign fund 
to be able to deal with the given natural resources’ income volatilities.  
7.3 Related Policy Implications and Recommendations  
From the policy perspective, this thesis suggests that income from oil should 
be invested in long-term investments; therefore, it has a long-term positive 
impact. In other words, when oil is produced for a relatively long period it will 
enter the long-term output equation. However, the government should ensure, 
by adopting suitable policies, that corruption, civil war and other political 
economy factors do not disturb this process. This is closely associated with 
the quality of institutions, the efficiency of the financial system and the 
infrastructure of the country. In addition, in order to use the revenue from oil 
effectively, an Oil Stabilization Fund is necessary, a policy that has been 
adopted by all successful oil producing countries. Appropriate policy 
implications from the government can act as a shock absorber to deal with 
volatility from revenues. The above-mentioned policies answer the research 
questions which were raised in the Introduction Chapter.  
Another recommendation that applies to resource-rich countries is to use the 
comparative advantage they have. For instance, when Norway discovered 
offshore oil, they simultaneously developed the technology needed to extract 
it. In other words, Norway not only exports its oil but it also exports the 
technology and the human capital needed for extracting offshore oil. 
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Therefore, countries rich in natural resources should develop the technology 
and human capital that they need for extracting their resources, otherwise they 
will not be able to gain economically from their natural resources.  
In summary, it can be said that the structural change of output, saving and 
capital have two significant policy implications in Iran. It was found that high 
domestic saving is an important determinant of economic growth in both short 
and long term. In addition, saving should be used in order to improve the 
efficiency of capital accumulation which is an important factor in promoting 
economic growth in the short term.  The use of saving in both provision of 
capital and infrastructure is necessary in order to promote economic growth in 
Iran.  
Of course resource rich countries are significantly different and what is suitable 
for a high income and capital abundant country like Kuwait is doubtful to be 
suitable for low income, scare capital country like Uganda. However, policy 
issues for other oil based economies can be saving of resource income, high 
quality institutions, early versus late industrialization and also improving 
human capital in the country. It is also important to consider how geo-political 
and geo economic conditions would work together with domestic social and 
political features to form development results in countries with natural 
resources endowments.  
7.4 Problems and Limitations of the Study 
The main difficulty this thesis faced was the reliability and availability of data. 
The study has used annual instead of seasonal data due to the lack of 
availability of reliable data. Iran, like most developing countries, is poor at 
producing reliable data. In addition, due to political issues in 2000, the 
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president announced that data on the main economic indicators were 
confidential, therefore the researcher had difficulty in collecting data for some 
years of the study. Moreover, the quality of data is not ideal for most developing 
countries, which might generate unreliable results from quantitative analysis. 
However, we hope the above-mentioned problems are not severe enough to 
invalidate the outcome of this thesis.  
7.5 Contribution to Knowledge  
The contribution of this research lies in the fact that it supports the evidence in 
the ongoing debate of the positive impact of oil revenue on the economic 
growth process, specifically in contrast to the so-called “resource curse”. While 
previous studies contributed significantly to knowledge in the area of natural 
resource abundance and economic growth, there is limited coverage of the 
literature on case studies. When the role of natural resources in an economy 
is considered studies with the focus on the short-term impact would either look 
at Norway as a success or Nigeria as a failure. This research; however, looks 
at Iran as the oldest oil exporting country in the Middle East and tests the 
hypothesis of a positive impact of oil on the Iranian economy both historically 
and empirically.     
This research has made some contributions to the literature on the relationship 
between natural resources, particularly oil, and economic growth in Iran over 
the period 1955-2014. The contributions are summarized as follows:  
Firstly, most of the empirical studies on the resource curse have focused on 
the short-term impact of natural resources on economic growth. Therefore, 
there is a scarcity of literature analysing the long-term impact. The study 
applies a new data set over the period 1955-2014 demonstrating that there is 
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a positive long-term impact from oil income on the Iranian economy. Therefore, 
the findings can be seen as a long-term analysis. Thus, these findings can help 
to enable a better understanding of the role oil revenue has played in the long 
term in Iran, specifically in terms of development. 
Secondly, the study introduced a theoretical framework in order to test the data 
empirically. In the developed framework, income from oil enters the saving 
function of the country. In addition, when the country’s savings turn into 
investment the oil revenue is invested as well. Therefore petrodollars enter the 
long-term output of the country.     
Thirdly, two different co-integrating methods were applied and both came to 
the same conclusion that there is a long-term positive impact from oil revenue 
on output per capita. Furthermore, literature on natural resources and 
economic growth that uses time series usually applies only the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (AFD) or at best the AFD and Phillip -Perron (PP) tests. Several 
studies, such as Perron (1989) Zivot and Andrews (2002) and Vogelsang and 
Perron (1998), have indicated that both ADF and PP have high size distortion, 
which is a chance of rejecting a true null hypothesis or accepting a false null 
hypothesis. To prevent this issue, this research applies another unit root test: 
KPSS. Therefore, this research has used the data that have been analysed 
more carefully than previous researches.    
Fourthly, the study analyses the role of oil income in Iran both historically and 
economically. One chapter is allocated to scrutinizing oil in the economic 
history of Iran and one chapter looks at it economically, applying two different 
approaches. Interestingly, the historical results are confirmed by econometric 
approaches.    
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7.6 Areas for Further Research  
Based on the conclusions and findings of the thesis, it can be suggested that 
the following are possible areas for further research: 
It would be interesting to estimate a model taking into account the important 
factors of a global economy. 
Another important field for further research is developing a more sophisticated 
model for all the OPEC members, probably including some other important 
variables, such as interest rate, institutional quality and foreign variables.  
In light of the finding that oil was not a curse for the Iranian economy, contrary 
to the resource curse hypothesis, it would be interesting to employ other 
econometric methods to investigate the relationship between oil and output per 
capita.  
Although the context of the analysis carried out in this thesis concerns the 
Iranian economy, the time series data can be readily extended based on 
country and regions to formulate specific policies for each originating country.  
There is also a need for research on the effects of the interactions between 
different sectors of the economy and the effects of government policies in 
terms of dealing with volatilities.  
The present research focuses on financial development as endogenous and 
volatility as weakly exogenous factors that impact on the economy. However, 
there are some other important factors as well that can be included in the 
model. Furthermore, the study assumes that political economy factors impact 
on the equilibrium and takes into account their impact indirectly. Further study 
can include political factors in a model to see if the results change.  
In addition, research on natural resources and growth can be grouped 
according to the frequency of data, and model specification.   
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Finally, with regard to the general results of the study on the role of oil income 
in the Iranian economic growth, it would be interesting to develop a comparison 
study. 
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